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PART XIII.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF THIBET.

1910.

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112	Sir A. Nicolson ..	215 Tel.	Aug. 1,	Troubles in Thibet. Reports a conversation with M. Isvolsky concerning the newspaper reports of the contemplated dispatch of British troops across the Thibetan frontier	103

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114	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	411 Tel.	Aug. 2,	Situation in Thibet. Refers to No. 112. Reports proposed communication of a memorandum concerning the dispatch of troops to Gnatong and return of Dalai Lama to Russian and Japanese Ambassadors and further confidential information concerning them which should not be communicated..	104
115	India Office ..	..	2,	Situation in Thibet. Transmits telegram from Government of India of 28th July. Discusses the action of the Amban in forbidding communication with foreigners and the unfriendly attitude of Chinese officials in Thibet in general	104
116	Sir A. Nicolson .	216 Tel.	3,	Troubles in Thibet. Refers to No. 114. Reports communication made to M. Isvolsky in terms of No 114	105
117	Memorandum communicated to Count Benckendorff and Mr. Kato	..	3,	Protection of trade posts. Informs the Russian and Japanese Ambassadors of the arrangements made for this (see No. 162)	105
118	India Office ..	..	3,	Site of Gyantse trade agency. Transmits telegram to India of 28th July. Captain Weir should be prepared to accept a reasonable compromise	106
119	,, ,, ..	..	3,	Dalai Lama. Transmits telegram of 30th July from Government of India. Dalai Lama should not be detained against his will	106
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123	Mr. Max Müller ..	238	July 29,	Situation in Thibet. Refers to Nos. 95 and 98. Reports an interview with Wai-wu Pu, at which their attention was called to the interference with the Dalai Lama's supplies and to the stationing of a force at Gnatong and the addressing of a note to Prince Ch'ing, pointing out the inadvisability of stationing Chinese troops near Bhutan, Nepal, or Sikkim (see No. 142)	110
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127	India Office ..	..	9,	Dalai Lama. Transmits telegram from Government of India of 8th August. Mr. Bell reports call from three delegates of Thibetan National Assembly and others. Messages from Amban to endeavour to induce Dalai Lama to return	112
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128	„ „ ..	141 Tel.	12,	Dalai Lama. Refers to No. 127*. Chinese Government communicate a telegram from resident in Thibet concerning mission of taotai to Dalai Lama (see Nos. 136 and 140)	112
129	To Consul - General Wilkinson	Telegraphic	12,	Chinese operations in Thibet. Dalai Lama's Ministers state that 7,000 troops have been ordered to leave Szechuan for Lhassa. Have you any information?	113
130	India Office ..	..	12,	Dalai Lama. Transmits telegram from Government of India of 11th August Government of India reports that Dalai Lama has sent an answer refusing to return unless Chinese evacuate Thibet, and that he has received a more friendly letter from the Maharajah of Nepal	113
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134	Mr. Max Müller ..	144 Tel.	18,	Dalai Lama's supplies. Refers to No. 100. Chinese resident in Thibet reports that clothing, &c., has invariably been released and that only treasure has been stopped..	114
135	„ „ ..	146 Tel.	18,	Situation in Thibet. Refers to No. 124. Reports a discussion with Wai-wu Pu, in which they gave the impression that they wished our reinforcements to be withdrawn. This idea was discouraged (see No. 145)	114

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137	India Office ..	..	19,	Chinese operations in Thibet. Mr. Bell reports movement of Chinese troops to Chumbi, Phari, and Gyantse	115
138	Mr. Max Müller ..	263	3,	Leasing of land for trade agency at Gyantse. Refers to No. 105. Transmits note addressed to Wai-wu Pu on the subject of	115
139	India Office ..	..	22,	Dalai Lama. Transmits telegrams from Government of India concerning proposed visit of taotai to Dalai Lama	116
140	To Mr. Max Müller ..	118 Tel.	23,	Visit of taotai to Dalai Lama. Refers to No. 128. Necessary facilities will be given for. Chinese Government should be informed that His Majesty's Government regard Dalai Lama's movements with indifference (see No. 161)	117
141	India Office ..	..	27,	Protection of trade agencies. Transmits telegram from India of 26th August. Suggesting cancellation of military preparations for (see No. 146)	118
142	Mr. Max Müller ..	274	11,	Situation in Thibet. Refers to Nos. 123 and 124. Transmits reply of Chinese Government concerning safety of escorts and return of Dalai Lama. Reports also a conversation with Mr. Chou Tzu Chi upon these subjects	119
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144	India Office ..	..	26,	Scientific expeditions to Thibet. Transmits telegram of 9th August from Government of India. Discusses future attitude of His Majesty's Government and question as to whether some informal arrangement with Russia could not be arrived at	121
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146	To India Office ..	..	30,	Reinforcements for trade posts. Refers to No. 141. Sir E. Grey concurs in the discontinuance of military preparations ..	122
147	India Office ..	..	30,	Situation in Thibet. Transmits telegram of 30th August from Government of India. Mr. Bell reports an interview between trade agent at Gyantse and Lo Chang Chi, the Amban's secretary, concerning safety, site, and rent of trade agency, and return of Dalai Lama	122
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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Thibet.

Part XIII.

[761] No. 1.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 8, 1910.)

(No. 413.)

Sir, *Peking, November* 12, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 313 of the 2nd September last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from the acting consul-general at Chengtu, enclosing a letter received from the Rev. J. R. Muir, of the China Inland Mission at Batang, respecting the condition of affairs in the Thibetan Marches.

According to Mr. Muir, the position is far from satisfactory.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Acting Consul-General Smith to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 32.)

Sir, *Chengtu, October* 19, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter received from the Rev. J. R. Muir, of Batang, dated the 14th September last regarding affairs in the Thibetan Marches.

With regard to the proposed purchase of land by the China Inland Mission at Batang, I enquired yesterday, in the course of an interview with the Viceroy, whether he had received any reply from Chao Erh Feng on the subject. As will be remembered, his Excellency stated on a previous occasion (reported in my despatch No. 17 of the 9th July last) when I mentioned the matter to him, that he could not give me an answer before consulting the Warden of the Marches. The Viceroy said he had not yet received a reply, and as the matter is not pressing, I did not pursue the subject.

I have, &c.

J. L. SMITH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Rev. J. R. Muir to Acting Consul-General Smith.

(Extract.) *Batang, September* 14, 1909.

REGARDING the purchase of land in Batang and other frontier places, I ought to have mentioned the fact that the French Mission have property here when I wrote before. I had it in mind, but I was not sure of the facts. To-day I was talking with the priest, and he says that they have bought land in former years. They also own property at Yen Ching (Yakalo) and at Litang. To our knowledge they did not

have property in Litang two years ago, but they have since bought a small house on the Chinese street in that place. Here in Batang they have three fields adjoining, to my knowledge, and a small walled garden. Then they have the premises formerly occupied by the Associate Prince of Batang. This is a very large property, and we understand that it was given to the Mission as a part of the indemnity at the time the priests were killed here in 1905. There is some question as to whether they hold this latter for a season only, or whether it has been made over to them without incumbrance. The latter is probably the case, and so we can say that the French do own considerable property in Batang. As to Yen Ching, I do not know how much they own except that the priest says they have property there.

There has been a complete change here since 1906. What was possible formerly is not possible now. Still we seem to be waiting for his Excellency Chao. First, let me remind you that he has never been near to Batang since he gave over the seals to his brother in Cheng-tu. Many people suppose that he has been here. Nothing will be settled till he does come, and we will not be able to buy property, nor to get many other things settled till he arrives. The people on the street are feeling it very much indeed. The period "between hay and grass" has been too prolonged; the story that Chao Erh Feng is coming has long ago passed the stage of the famous "wolf fable." No one would run to-day if we heard he was coming. All this is demoralsing. Everybody is told the same tale, and there will never be anything settled till something else happens. They all harp back to the old days before 1906 (even the Catholic priest does so) when there was some system. Now the Chinese soldiers are packed into every available hole, while one large building is held for Chao Erh Feng. The French Mission has another, so the Thibetans bear all the burden. The Chinese soldiers and students are overbearing and exacting, and they themselves have many grievances. The answer to all is: "Wait till the Big Man comes."

We have greater doubts than ever about the possibility of his coming. Recently a part of his own contingent that has been waiting here for him for about a year has been moved to Derge. The rest of that contingent are Manchus, and we understand that the present Tartar general is not pleased with the arrangement made by Choh-ha Pu, by which Chao Erh Feng was to have a number of bannermen for his Thibetan campaign. Now it seems that these bannermen are to return from here, at least to Litang, and the rest have gone to join Chao. Chao's original intention undoubtedly was to come through here from Chengtu and push his campaign along the main road to Lhassa. Now he has been diverted toward the north and has been so long in the region of Derge that we begin to believe he will take the road from Derge to Chiamdo and from thence proceed to Lhassa. That will mean that he will not come to Batang. Another event points in the same direction. I have frequently reported Thibetan soldiers in the neighbourhood of Kiangka (Garthok) in the Lhassa territory. These soldiers have recently been withdrawn in the direction of Chiamdo. They were at Kiangka for the purpose of hindering the advance of Chao Erh Feng along the main road if he had intentions to force a way into Thibet with his soldiers. When Chao meets these men it will be the first contact with the soldiery from Lhassa. Up to this point he has been dealing with tribes that have been nominally under direct Chinese control or those that have been independent of either China or Lhassa.

Supplies are being sent from here daily that are evidently intended for Derge. We have met several caravans that were leaving at dusk. When asked where they were going they only replied "ula." We could get nothing further from the men, but one man shook his head in the affirmative when I called to him and asked if he was bound for a point on the Derge road. This all points to an imminent campaign in that direction, and we can think of nothing else but that the objective is Chiamdo. The carrying of so many supplies from here is likely to run us short in Batang. I have been unable to buy a bushel of this year's harvest of wheat. The official claims about one-half and the citizens are afraid to sell what they have left for fear of famine during the year. The official has been willing to sell to us ever since we have been here, but the other day he said that there were to be so many soldiers here this winter that they would have to retain all the supplies they have. He offered to sell me grain if we could not buy on the street, but I do not think they are pleased to let us have much. All other supplies are about as bad. We have our own garden, or I am sure we should find it hard to get sufficient to eat.

I do not know that I have referred to the tannery here. A lot of buildings are under construction, and some work had been done by the artisans that have come from Chengtu. They have forbidden the sale of leather of any kind, and when we

want shoes made or repaired, or wish a piece of leather for other purposes, they charge outlandish prices. These are the things that make the Thibetans here wish that something would happen. It will not surprise us if that something turns out to be rebellion and more bloodshed.

[1364] No. 2.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received January* 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th January, relative to the reported arrival of the Dalai Lama at Lhassa.

India Office, January 12, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 12, 1910.

TELEGRAM from British trade agent, Yatung, states that Dalai Lama is reported to have arrived on the 25th ultimo at Lhassa.

[2409] No. 3.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 22, 1910.)

(No. 439.)

Sir, *Peking, November* 29, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from the acting consul-general at Ch'eng-tu, which contains some interesting particulars regarding the state of affairs in the Thibetan Marches.

The Chinese Government continue to be uneasy about Chao Erh-feng's operations and the effect they are producing upon the mind of the Thibetans.

The Dalai Lama, they state, remains a day's march from Lhassa, and his refusal to return there is apparently attributed to anti-Chinese tendencies.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Acting Consul-General Toller to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 35. Confidential.)

Sir, *Ch'eng-tu, November* 8, 1909.

UNDER instructions from Mr. Smith, I have the honour to enclose herewith a series of extracts, relating to the political affairs of the Marches, taken from an account of a journey to Chamdo, in Thibet proper, made by Mr. T. Sorensen, of the China Inland Mission, Ta Chien-lu. I regret that it is not possible to transmit his account in full. It is intended for publication in another form, and was handed to me privately by Mr. W. N. Fergusson, of the British and Foreign Bible Society, who did not feel at liberty to agree to more than my making extracts.

Mr. Sorensen, who is a Swede, and has spent some thirteen years in Szuchuen, made his journey in company with a German traveller, Dr. Lauffer. His original intention was to travel from Derge to Chamdo, and thence viâ Draya and Kiangka (Garthok) to Batang. Trouble at Kiangka rendering this inadvisable, he returned to Derge, proceeding thence to Batang by the new road made by Chao Erh-feng. The journey occupied altogether over eighty days.

It will be noticed that Mr. Sorensen confirms Mr. Muir's opinion, stated in the enclosure in Mr. Smith's despatch No. 32 of the 19th October last, that Chao Erh-feng is making his headquarters at Derge, and has no present intention of proceeding to Batang, but will make his next advance in the direction of Chamdo.

I have, &c.

W. STARK TOLLER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Extracts from Mr. Sorensen's account of Journey to Chamdo and Batang.

DERGE is the largest State in eastern Thibet, and has been, up to the present, an independent little kingdom, though rather inclined to favour the Chinese than the central Thibetan authorities. The whole population of Derge is said to be 40,000 families ; the greater parts are nomads, and scattered over such a large area of country that one may travel for days without seeing any sign of human life. The boundaries of Derge are—on the north, Tsa-Chu-Ka, or the Ngo-Log country ; on the south, Batang ; on the east, the Horba States ; and on the west, Chamdo. The people of Derge are not fighters, like the Horba people—they make poor soldiers, and the nomads are deceitful, untrustworthy, and very mean. The villagers are much superior in character, and are the most industrious people in eastern Thibet.

Derge has suffered from internal strife for more than four years. A conflict has arisen between the King and his younger brother, with the natural result that the people are also divided into two parties, one supporting the King and the other his younger brother. The real difficulty is, that while they have one and the same mother, it is said and believed that the younger brother is not the son of the former King. The younger brother succeeded in expelling the elder from the country and took the control of the State for four years. Meanwhile, the elder brother appealed to the Chinese authorities, and it is with the help of his Excellency Chao Erh-feng that he is now reinstated as King or chief of Derge. We did not meet the King, as he had gone with Chao Erh-feng to the north of Derge in search of the younger brother, whom they are determined to capture. It is rumoured that he has gone to Tsa-Chu-Ka, and taken refuge in a monastery. Chao Erh-feng, with 500 Chinese and 500 Thibetan soldiers, and in company with the King, succeeded in capturing the place, but the younger brother is still at large.

One cannot but admire the ability of Chao Erh-feng in settling the complicated and difficult affairs of these people. As an example, I might mention the plan on which he seems to be working in order to subdue the whole of eastern Thibet. While Chan Tui, Draya, and Gan Tse are his greatest enemies and cause him most trouble, he is simply leaving them alone, while he is establishing the Chinese authority in the State of Derge, which is the most favourable to the Chinese. At the same time he is building a road from Derge to Batang, thus connecting the State with China, without having to depend on the main road from Ta Chien-lu, which passes through Gan Tse and part of Chan Tui. His next move, I am told by an authority, will be to send his army of 2,000 soldiers to Chamdo, and then he has practically the whole of eastern Thibet under his control, as his greatest enemies, Chan Tui, Draya, and Gan Tse, are being surrounded by his army. If the Chinese Government do not change their plan, there is no doubt that in the near future the whole of eastern Thibet will be entirely subdued and controlled by China.

It was raining when we entered Chamdo, but as soon as we were in sight the whole village—men, women, and children—were in great excitement, wanting to get a look at the first foreigner ever seen in Chamdo. The officials were friendly and obliging, but made us understand that it was their duty to send us back to China, as they had received instructions from the Foreign Office to that effect. We were told, however, that if we insisted on going forward an escort would be provided, but we should go entirely on our own responsibility. It may be as surprising to others as it was to us to learn that Chamdo is not a part of Lhassa territory, and is in no way under the Lhassa Government, but is an independent State with a Government on the Lhassa principle—one incarnated Lama as ruler of State and Church, with three chief Lamas as his Ministers, residing within the enormous lamasery of Chamdo. In connection with this ministry there are in all twenty-four lay magistrates throughout the whole State of Chamdo, governing a population said to amount to 80,000 families. The Chamdo Government sends a mission with tribute every six years to the Emperor

of China. If the advantage were not on the Chamdo side there would certainly be no tribute sent to Peking, but we are told that the presents they receive in return from the Emperor are much more valuable than the tribute they bring, in addition to which there are the great facilities for trade afforded by such a mission.

Chamdo is the largest and most important place between Ta Chien-lu and Lhassa. It is situated on a large plain, between the Rivers Tsa Chu and Ngon Chu, at an elevation of 11,472 feet above sea level. The village, which is at the foot of the monastery, has a population of 400 Thibetans and 300 Chinese or half-castes, besides 130 Chinese soldiers, under the command of a military t'ung ling. The Chinese are absolutely powerless in Chamdo ; they have to serve the lamasery, and even the Chinese soldiers are not exempted from these taxes. In case of trouble between Chinese and Thibetans the latter decide the cases, and any appeal to the Chinese mandarin is of no avail. The Chinese soldiers told us that up to quite recently it was quite common to see Chinese soldiers beaten by Thibetans in the village, and the mandarin confirmed this statement by saying that they (the Chinese) had not been able to lift up their heads. However, they all agreed that their standing had been much improved since his Excellency Chao had been appointed High Commissioner of the Thibetan Border, and they were hoping that the time would soon come when they would not be obliged to serve the lamasery. This, they added, is the only place in the whole of Thibet where such compulsory service is demanded from the Chinese. There is also a great deal of unrest among the Thibetans in these and other parts of Thibet owing to the appointment of his Excellency Chao, whom they fear and hate, and everywhere they are preparing and drilling soldiers, and in some places they have already declared their independence, and are refusing to give ula or cattle and horses for the convenience of Chinese travelling in Thibet.

Merchandise from Peking and Calcutta, Lhassa, and Ta Chien-lu were all for sale in Chamdo, the heart and centre of Thibet. Food is also plentiful and easily obtained.

As we were leaving on the morning of the 17th July (for Draya and Batang) the mandarin overtook us at the bridge and told us that he had just received word from the official in Kiangka that there was trouble, and it would not be safe for us to travel that way. There was nothing else for us to do but to return by Derge. We decided on returning from Derge to Ta Chien-lu viâ Batang. The new road made by order of his Excellency Chao makes travelling very comfortable between the capital of Derge and Batang, and with the exception of Lha-kia La (16,150) there are no passes worth mentioning. The Derge territory extends up to the Da-shi boundary, within three days' journey of Batang.

On our way from Derge to Chamdo we made our first stage towards the Dre Chu, and rested at a place called Chong Ra, where there are a few houses in the village, and some farming. His Excellency Chao has appointed a few soldiers to cultivate vegetables. They had succeeded very well, and their garden produced all kinds of Chinese vegetables, including tobacco.

[4722] No. 4.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received February* 9.)

Sir, *India Office, February* 9, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India regarding the situation created by the advance in Thibet of the Chinese troops under Chao-Erh-Feng.

I am also to enclose copies of papers* received by this mail from India on the subject, from which it will be seen that the Dalai Lama and Council of Thibet have sent an appeal to the British Government, through the trade agent at Gyantse.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is aware of the general position of affairs as concerns Nepal. From that country the Government of India draw their main supply of Gurkha recruits, whose quality as soldiers is not more essential to the native army than their detachment from Indian politics and religious disputes, and their loyalty. They supply not only military but also police forces upon whom the greatest reliance is placed. At the same time Nepal stands apart from the Indian

* Not printed.

protectorate, and is very jealous of any interference. It has in times past settled its own quarrels with Thibet, and is entitled to have its own Resident at Lhassa. Its army is efficient, and would probably give effect to any policy in Thibet which the Prime Minister might decide upon.

In view of these considerations it is of the utmost importance to avoid a collision between Nepal and its neighbour. Although Nepal has admitted in its treaty with Thibet, dated the 24th March, 1856, its traditional allegiance to China, yet its treaties with the British Government require each party to consider the enemies of one as the enemies of the other. Viscount Morley would therefore be glad if Sir Edward Grey should see fit to address the Chinese Government in the sense suggested by the Government of India. Whether at this stage a communication should be made to the Russian Government is a matter for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But as regards the question raised by the Prime Minister of Nepal concerning the revision of the Anglo-Russian Convention relating to Thibet, the reply proposed by the Government of India appears to Lord Morley to be suitable.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 31, 1910.

BRITISH trade agent, Gyantse, telegraphs as follows :—

"I received a call to-day from an official sent specially by the Dalai Lama and Council. Chinese troops are still at Chiemdo, according to his statement. As Thibetan troops are massed at a distance of only half day's march from Chiemdo there is not the least doubt that there will be bloodshed if Chinese persist in coming to Lhassa. Dalai Lama and Council wish the Wai-wu Pu to be informed urgently, as they believe that actions of Chinese troops in East Thibet are not known to the authorities at Peking. In reply, I said that the Government of India could not interfere actively in the affairs of China and Thibet, though they are friendly to the latter. I promised to telegraph on the subject to the officer immediately superior to me."

It is added by political agent, Sikkim, that the above news and probability of bloodshed are confirmed by a telegram received by him from Maharaj Kumar, of Sikkim.

Confidential communication to following effect, dated 29th December last, received by resident from Prime Minister, Nepal:—

"Enclosed herewith is a translation of a Thibetan letter which the kazis of the Kasyai, Lhassa, have addressed to me. The Chinese, as is shown by a perusal of the letter, seem to have begun in right earnest the reduction of Thibet in their own old orthodox fashion; and the Potala Lama and the kazis appear to be filled with alarm at the prospect of the extension to the whole of Thibet of the operations now started on the Kham side. I am afraid that a latent desire to prepare for extremities, should such occur, by offering armed resistance with men trained on modern methods, has been produced in the minds of the Thibetan authorities by the failure of repeated requests to the Lhassa Amban to bring about a cessation of oppressive depredations and sacrileges committed by the Chinese troops on the said frontier territory of Thibet by prompt and proper representations to the authorities at Peking. The counsel seems to be that of desperation. This Government's responsibilities will be aggravated, and its anxiety for [? watchfulness] in that quarter emphasized by an angry, turbulent, and distracted Thibet, and a coterminous Chinese frontier. The apprehension or suspicion of the Thibetans is evidently that movement is being made by Chinese authorities towards taking from them the power and authority in the government of their own country, which they have hitherto exercised unquestioned, a step which is deeply resented by them, and from which serious conflict, collision, and disturbance may arise, or even as the Potala Lama himself fears according to the kazis, a general rising.

"The present anxiety for state of things in Thibet is undesirable in any circumstances, as it is of vital importance to this country, which has such heavy stake in

Thibet, as also, I suppose, to Government of India, that peaceful and orderly government should be continued there. There appears to be justification in a way for the demand of the Thibetans that the Chinese troops now entering Thibet should be withdrawn, that the outrages they are alleged to have committed on the Kham side should be discontinued, and that, without any prejudice to China's pre-existing suzerain rights, the *status quo* should be maintained. In these circumstances the Thibetans, in their struggle for the preservation of their legitimate rights, are deserving of moral support from us, but I regard as quixotic their proposal that assistance in the shape of arms and men should be given them."

"Whether action should be taken at this juncture by the British Foreign Office, in view of probable complications which might arise in the immediate future from the novel policy initiated by China in Thibet, and deeply resented by the people, it is not for me to say. It will be esteemed a favour if your views and those of the Government of India are communicated to me at an early date, so that in replying to the kazis' letter I may have the advantage of them.

Apprehensions of Nepal are, in our opinion, reasonable, and we consider situation serious. Chinese are in a difficult position, though apparently Thibetan troops, who are commanded by a brother of Maharani of Sikkim, will not be able to stand up against the Chao Erh Feng. Attempt has been made by Amban at Lhassa to get Gurkhas to enlist and to buy rifles and ammunition from Nepal. On the ground, apparently, of conspiracy with Thibetans, a Chinese official has recently been decapitated by him. There is a hostile country behind Choa, who has apparently worked down on Chiemdo from Derge. Atrocities which will shock the civilised world will no doubt accompany the subjugation of Thibet.

Representation should, we venture to suggest, be made at Peking. We might point out to China that Nepal could not easily be prevented from taking steps for the protection of her interests, and that disorder on our frontier could not be viewed by us with indifference, resulting as it possibly might in *status quo* being entirely changed, and in conditions being set up wholly inconsistent with the spirit of our agreements with Thibet and China, agreements by which the continuance of a Thibetan Government is recognised. We might tell Chinese Government that we should be compelled in self-defence to strengthen our escorts at Yatung and Gyantse if unsettlement of the country continues. Assurance could be given at the same time both to China and to Russia that maintenance of *status quo* under the treaties and trade regulations is all that we desire: and, for the promotion of better understanding between Thibetans and Chinese, we might offer our good offices with the Nepalese Government, to whom overtures have been made by both sides.

Prime Minister mentions in another communication rumour that at end of three years there will be revision of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. It is proposed to explain that only the dispatch of scientific expeditions to Thibet is referred to in the subsidiary agreement; that this will not necessarily be revised, although it may be; and that main agreement between Great Britain and Russia would not be affected by its revision.

Maintenance of friendly relations with Dalai Lama is important, as, in his absence, a monopoly of wool, hides, and yak's tails, against which strong remonstrances have been addressed to us by Cawnpore woollen mills and Kalimpong merchants, were given by Thibetans to certain Thibetan traders. Our political officer has also received an appeal in regard to this from Bhutan Durbar. A separate communication on this subject will be addressed to you.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[4722] No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Müller.

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February* 11, 1910.

SITUATION in Thibet.

Viceroy of India's telegram of the 31st January.

I shall be glad of your views on Vicercy's proposals with regard to representations to Chinese Government.

The India Office support his recommendations and draw attention to great importance of preventing any pretext for armed intervention being given to the Government of Nepal.

[4722] No. 6.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Government of India dealing with the situation in Thibet.

Sir E. Grey fully appreciates the serious complications which might arise upon the Indian frontier as a result of an attempt on the part of the Chinese to deprive the Thibetans of their local autonomy, and he is disposed to share the view that His Majesty's Minister at Peking should be instructed to make representations on the subject to the Chinese Government before definitely deciding on the course to be adopted. Sir E. Grey has, however, thought it desirable to address the enclosed telegram to Sir J. Jordan,* requesting his observations upon the suggestions made by the Government of India.

If, upon the receipt of Sir J. Jordan's reply, it be definitely decided to make representations, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that a notification should be made to the Russian Government.

With reference to the last sentence of your letter, I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey concurs in Viscount Morley's view as regards the suitability of the reply which the Government of India propose to return to the point raised by the Prime Minister of Nepal with respect to the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[5292] No. 7.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, February* 15, 1910.

THIBET. In reply to your telegram No. 26 of the 11th instant, I would propose that our friendly representations with regard to the situation in Thibet should be confined to the following points :—

We might tell the Chinese Government that any further advance of the Chinese forces into the interior of Thibet is regarded with apprehension by the Government of India in view of the possible frontier troubles that might arise therefrom, particularly in the case of Nepal, as it would be difficult for us to prevent that country from taking measures to protect its interests. In these circumstances we would express the hope that China would do nothing calculated to create complications in Thibet likely to react on the neighbouring countries, not excepting China herself.

I venture to submit that neither the facts as at present known to us, nor the terms of the convention of 1906 would warrant our making any protest against a possible change of the *status quo*, or infringements of the spirit of our agreements with China and Thibet. We have long been aware of the objects of the Chinese expedition, and I would therefore deprecate those arguments as being somewhat belated.

A report from the military attaché, inclosed in my despatch No. 476 of the 18th December, stated that no outrages had been committed by Chao Erh Feng's troops, and that strict discipline was maintained among them.

[5558] No. 8.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 16.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 15th February, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, February 16, 1910.

* No. 5.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

February 15, 1910.

(Telegraphic.) P.

THIBET. See my telegram dated the 30th ultimo.

Report from Nepalese representative at Lhassa states that he has heard that there has been received recently at Lhassa authentic news of the arrival of Chao Erh Feng with 2,000 Chinese soldiers at Chiamdo, and of his having informed Thibetan officials in writing that he intends to send half this force into Thibet, adding a threat that if Thibetans offer resistance they will be annihilated. Existence of considerable tension at Lhassa between Thibetan and Chinese officials is also indicated in representative's letter; 1,000 Thibetan troops have left for Lhassa from Shigatse and 700 from Gyantse, according to Thibetan trade agent at Yatung. It is estimated by the latter that 10,000 troops, who are stationed at different strategic points in order to stop Chinese troops' advance, have been mobilised by the Lhassa Government. In the meanwhile there have arrived in Calcutta four Thibetan officials, of whom the senior has brought me an oral message from the Dalai Lama, to whom he is junior secretary, announcing Lama's return to Thibet, together with a scarf. In addition, he has a paper in Thibetan, with a seal said to be the Lama's, which authorises him to represent case of Thibetans in present trouble to Viceroy, political officer at Sikkim, and British trade agent at Gyantse. Similar paper bearing three or four seals of monasteries is brought by the other Thibetan officials. They spoke freely at an interview with Secretary, Foreign Department, of apprehension of Chinese, and said that they looked for assistance to us. It would probably have a bad effect and injure our interests if deputation were turned away, having regard to reception accorded to Dorjieff's party in Russia. In these circumstances, I propose to receive the deputation, and by it to send the Lama an oral message, saying I am glad to learn of his return to Thibet, and thanking him for the scarf. I would add an expression of my hope that His Holiness and Thibet may enjoy well-being and prosperity, and that friendly relations between Thibet and this country may continue. I propose to say, as regards differences between Thibetans and Chinese, that I hope these may be settled amicably before long, and that treaty obligations with China and Russia preclude British Government from interference in Thibet's internal administration.

It is possible that Chinese officials at Gyantse might seek refuge in British post at that place in the event of fighting between Thibetans and Chinese. Political officer, Sikkim, enquires whether refuge should, in such circumstances, be given them by British trade agent. In reply, I propose to say that attitude of strict neutrality should be maintained by British trade agent, in event of such a situation arising, and that unless he is satisfied that Chinese officials are in imminent danger of losing their lives, asylum should not be granted to them.

I would suggest in conclusion that instructions may be sent to consul-general, Chengtu, that all important information that may reach him regarding affairs on the China-Thibet frontier should for the present be telegraphed to us. Rumours of a disaster to Chinese arms at Chiamdo, in which consul-general was inclined to believe that there was some truth, are mentioned in a letter recently received from him under date the 18th December, 1909.

[5292]

No. 9.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, February 16, 1910.

Sir,

WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 12th instant on the subject of the telegram of the 31st January, 1910, from the Government of India in regard to Thibet, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram which has been received from Mr. Max Müller,* who, during the illness of His Majesty's Minister, is in charge of His Majesty's legation at Peking.

Lord Morley will observe that Mr. Müller sees no objection to friendly representations being made to the Chinese Government to the effect that His Majesty's Government hope the Chinese Government will avoid any action likely to complicate

* No. 7.

the situation in Thibet and create difficulties for neighbouring States, but that he deprecates any reference to a change of the *status quo* and to the establishment of conditions inconsistent with the spirit of our agreements as hardly warranted by the convention of 1906 or by facts as at present known to us.

Subject to Lord Morley's concurrence, Sir E. Grey proposes to concur in the view taken by Mr. Müller, and to authorise him to make representations to the Chinese Government in the sense he suggests.

The Russian Government would be informed accordingly.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[6101] No. 10.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 38.)

Sir,

Peking, January 31, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 23 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to state that, according to a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Ch'eng-tu, who has himself received the information from Mr. Muir at Batang, the Chinese forces operating upon the Thibetan frontier have been entirely successful, and have occupied Chiamdo, Draya, and Kiangka without suffering any casualties.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

[6104] No. 11.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 21.)

(No. 44.)

Sir,

Peking, February 4, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 38 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorial to the Throne advocating the incorporation of Derge into the Chinese Empire.

In my despatch No. 439 of the 29th November last, I forwarded an account of Derge by Mr. Sorensen of the China Inland Mission. He says that Derge is the largest State in Eastern Thibet, and has been an independent kingdom, although inclined to favour the Chinese rather than the Thibetan authorities. Mr. Sorensen also gave an interesting account of the internal strife in Derge, which has evidently been of great use to Chao Erh Feng in his policy of assimilation to China.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Memorial by the Reform Council in reply to a Memorial from Chao Erh Feng, Warden of the Thibetan Marches, proposing that the Native State of Derge should be brought under direct Chinese rule.

EXTRACT FROM "GAZETTE" OF THE 27TH JANUARY, 1910.

(Translation.)

IN obedience to the Imperial edict, we now present our report on the memorial sent in by Chao Erh Feng, in which he proposed that the native State of Derge should be allowed to adopt our civilisation and come under our direct rule.

The frontier commissioner states as follows:—

"The chief of the State of Derge, Toko Sheng Chi, is a man of no ability, and he has made repeated requests to me to be allowed to hand over the whole of his territory to China. He has also handed over to me his seal of office, and begs that I will memorialise on his behalf. He adds that the feud which has been raging for ten years

[5953] No. 9*.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 20.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, February* 20, 1910.

THE Chinese operations in Thibet are encountering no opposition, according to information received by His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu from a well-informed correspondent at Batang. The latter wrote on the 26th January that Chinese domination was being accepted by the Thibetans, and that no resistance was being offered to the march on Lhassa.

Purpose of Chinese troops was said to be to police Thibet, and Chao's head-quarters were at Chiamdo.

His Majesty's consul-general telegraphs that Governor-General will give him no information about the operations now in progress.

or more between him and Ang Ni over the question of chieftainship has caused indescribable sufferings to the people of the State. This territory borders on Ch'a T'ai, and is strategically important while the country is fertile. With this territory under proper control we shall be able to strengthen Central Thibet and at the same time screen the frontiers of Szechuan. But if we insist on the chief carrying on the succession, there will be no end to the sufferings of the inhabitants, and other States will get drawn into the disturbances. China ought to take measures to guard against the above."

When the wild tribes submitted to China, native States were created in various provinces, and on account of the customs of these tribes differing from China official rank and authority were given to the chiefs in the hope of keeping the districts quiet. As regards the administration of these States, the viceroys and governors were to investigate, and degrade or promote when necessary. Moreover it is laid down in the imperial institutes of the reigning dynasty that native chiefs who do not govern properly must be denounced and punished, either by the substitution of other chiefs or by their territory reverting to China. Accordingly, whenever a case occurred of disturbance in a native State, we have, after careful consideration, established a prefecture or a magistracy in its place. Examination will show that recently there have been changes on the frontiers of Yünnan Kueichow and Szechuan—as, for instance, the establishment of the department of Chen Kan and Pei Sheng in Yünnan, &c. The above changes have all been officially approved, but present conditions on the frontier are not the same as those of old, and we must therefore take proper measures to keep our boundaries secure and to put an end to tribal feuds. Now the State of Derge has been the scene of a war of succession for ten years or more, and we have had to send many troops to pacify this country, which is of great strategical importance to Szechuan and Thibet. The Derge chieftain is actuated merely by fear for his life in making his request, while the headmen and people in general are extremely anxious to come under Chinese jurisdiction, and extricate themselves from their present sufferings. We have the honour to request that the frontier commissioner's proposal be acceded to—namely, that the entire State of Derge be brought under Chinese rule. As regards the Derge chief To Ko Sheng Chi, since he is willing to hand over his territory, we beg that he may be granted a special mark of the imperial favour by the bestowal on him of the hereditary title of captain; further, that a sum of 2,000 taels or 3,000 taels annually may be appropriated to his needs out of the Derge land tax quota. The said chief moreover states that it has been the custom that, when proceeding to Peking with tribute, the chiefs of his State have worn the button of the second class and the peacock feather, so we suggest that he be allowed to continue to wear them.

We furthermore request that instructions may be sent to the Viceroy of Szechuan to concert with the frontier commissioner Chao Erh Feng, and take satisfactory measures with regard to the proper allowance to be made to the chief, and also respecting the future administration of Derge. Moreover, the seal handed over by the chief should be given up to the board for cancellation. Again, the chief's name, To Chi Tseng Ko, has been wrongly called To Ko Sheng Chi, and he is therefore permitted to correct the mistake.

The question, then, whether or not the State of Derge ought to come under direct rule is therefore humbly submitted for the Imperial decision. The delay in presenting this memorial is due to the numerous telegrams which had to be exchanged when examining into the question.

On the 25th January, 1910, the Imperial decree was received as follows :—

"The matter has been noted."

[6192] No. 12.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams relative to the relations between China and Thibet and the movements of the Dalai Lama.

India Office, February 21, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 19, 1910.

MY telegram of the 18th instant.

We are informed by trade agent, Yatung, that the Dalai Lama, accompanied by two high officials of Thibet, is expected to reach Phari to-night. Thibetans ask for use of dak bungalow and an escort of mounted infantry. We have issued instructions to following effect:—

"Mounted infantry should not leave Yatung, nor should Macdonald go out to escort the Dalai Lama. While the Lama may be permitted to occupy the dak bungalow temporarily, it must not be treated by him as a sanctuary. It is not clear what Chinese troops are proceeding from what direction. Full information should be telegraphed. Has fighting been reported, and what attitude is being adopted by the local Chinese officials? Trade agents at Yatung and Gyangtse should observe strict neutrality, and remember that the object of the escorts is the protection of agencies only."

Do you consider that there is any danger to British subjects or trade agency?

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 19, 1910.

THIBET. According to reports now received the Dalai Lama intends coming to Calcutta to throw himself on our protection. It is stated that a force of thirty Chinese troops in Chumbi Valley has left Phari, and that trouble is expected at that place. Dalai Lama, however, proposes to force his way through. We have told trade agent, Yatung, that if the life of the Lama is in danger and he claims protection at the agency he should be afforded such protection, and that a report should be made in the case for our orders.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 19, 1910.

THIBET. My telegram of the 18th instant.

Telegraphing from Kangma, trade agent, Gyangtse, reports that the Dalai Lama, accompanied by three Ministers and three shapes and a party of about 100 Thibetans are travelling by night and day. Chinese troops are out to intercept him, and Chinese officials left Kangma in pursuit. It is possible route of Dalai Lama might be diverted into Bhutan territory.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 4 in No. 12.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 20, 1910.

IT is expected that Dalai Lama will reach Yatung to-day. Ten Chinese were killed during fighting which took place at Kangma on the 18th instant. Position at Phari was as follows:—

140 Chinese troops had gathered together from all sides against a force of 400 Thibetans, including party with the Dalai Lama. Letters dispatched from Phari addressed to Thibetan trade agent at Yatung have been intercepted by the Chinese. Local position is not yet known. We have called for full particulars.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[6370] No. 13*.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 22.)

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, February* 22, 1910.

AFFAIRS of Thibet.

A Thibetan messenger has arrived in Peking, sent by the Dalai Lama on the 13th November from the Tacheng temple, three days' march from Lhassa. He left Lhassa on the 30th November, Calcutta on the 7th January, and arrived here on the 7th February, bearing a letter from the Dalai Lama to the Minister, as also other letters, none of which, he says, are addressed to other legations.

He called here yesterday, accompanied by a lama from the temple in Peking, and presented the letter, together with the usual "hata" or scarf and a small packet said to contain gold dust. After the usual complimentary phrases, the letter, which is dated the 12th November, announces the arrival of the Dalai Lama in Thibet, contains an assurance of the Dalai Lama's desire to remain on friendly terms with England, and ends by begging the Minister to listen to the message which will be delivered by the bearer.

The gist of this verbal message was that the Dalai Lama had found with concern, on arriving in Lhassa territory, that Chinese troops were taking active measures in the country, and he hoped that the Minister would do what he could in the matter.

Am I authorised to return a verbal reply in the terms proposed by Viceroy of India in his telegram of the 15th February?

Messenger will call for an answer on the 23rd February.

[6337] No. 13.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received February* 22.)

Sir, *India Office, February* 22, 1910.

WITH reference to your letter of the 15th instant on the subject of the relations between China and Thibet, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of further telegrams which have been received from the Viceroy,* showing that the situation has developed with great rapidity, and that the Dalai Lama is fleeing in the direction of India.

It is therefore clear that the terms in which Mr. Max Müller proposed to address the Chinese Government are no longer suitable in the altered circumstances. It is true that, in view both of our treaty relations with China and Russia and of the history of our past policy in regard to Thibet, the position of Great Britain is somewhat delicate, and that it is difficult for us to make an effective protest. But Viscount Morley is strongly of opinion that it should be pointed out emphatically to the Chinese Government (1) that Great Britain, while disclaiming any desire to interfere in the internal administration of Thibet, cannot be indifferent to disturbances of the peace in a country which is both our neighbour and is on intimate terms with other neighbouring States upon our frontier, and especially with Nepal, whom we could not prevent from taking such steps to protect her interests as she may think necessary in the circumstances; (2) that, in view of our treaty relations with both Thibet and China, His Majesty's Government had the right to expect that the Chinese Government would at least have tendered friendly explanations before embarking on a policy which, in the absence of such explanations, cannot but appear intended to subvert the political conditions set up by the Anglo-Thibetan Convention and confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese Convention; and (3) that His Majesty's Government must claim that, whatever the intentions of the Chinese Government may be as regards the future of Thibet, an effective Thibetan Government shall be maintained with whom we can when necessary treat in the manner provided by those two conventions.

As regards this claim, I am to invite reference to Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 20, dated the 9th February, 1907, to Sir John Jordan, in which the latter was instructed to represent to the Chinese Government that Chinese officials could not be regarded by His Majesty's Government as taking the place at trade marts of the Thibetan agents to be appointed there. It seems to Lord Morley that *à fortiori* the substitution of a Chinese for a Thibetan Government at Lhassa could not be accepted by His Majesty's Government as giving effect to the Anglo-Thibetan convention.

I am to enclose copy of a telegram which, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, Lord Morley proposes to send approving the instructions which have been given by the Viceroy.†

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 18, 1910.

PLEASE see my telegram dated the 15th instant. Trade agent, Gyantse, telegraphs 17th instant, as follows:—

"I was visited to-day by Thibetan trade agents, who tell me that a letter sent by Lhassa Shao Shapes has been received from Nagartze Jong, in which forty Chinese mounted infantry are stated to have arrived on the 12th instant at Lhassa. The rest of the Chinese army from Chiamdo are in near neighbourhood of the city.

"No fighting has been reported. On the night of the 12th instant, Dalai Lama and party left Lhassa and are flying viâ Kalung, Nyeru, Kangma, Kala, and Gangtok to India. They wish supplies to be arranged at Gangtok by Maharaj Kumar.

"Permission to use dak bungalow is desired by Dalai Lama. In order to verify I reach Kangma to-morrow; full particulars will be telegraphed."

I will telegraph again on receipt of further information.
(Repeated to Peking.)

* See No. 12. † See No. 18

[6370] No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 22, 1910.

YOUR telegram No. 31 [of 22nd February: Message from Dalai Lama].
Proposed verbal reply to Thibetan messenger approved.

[6373] No. 15.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 22nd February, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, February 23, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 15.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Calcutta, February* 22, 1910.

THIBET. In a telegram received last night, the trade agent, Yatung, reports to following effect:—

"The Dalai Lama arrived last evening. While he was here an agent was sent by Chinese with a request for permission to occupy the dak bungalow; their request was readily granted. Three Chinese officials of Chumbi interviewed me shortly afterwards. They wished me to entice the Dalai Lama to remain here; but, as I was aware that Chinese troops were coming from Phari, I would not listen, and told the Dalai Lama to leave as speedily as possible. At an audience which the Chinese had with the lama he acknowledged their salutations, but no conversation was held. The lama left for Ghatong this morning. Everything passed off quietly. He left with me a report, of which the following is the purport:—

"'The Chinese have been greatly oppressing the Thibetan people at Lhassa. Mounted infantry arrived there. They fired on inhabitants, killing and wounding them. I was obliged, together with my six Ministers, to make good my escape. My intention now is to go to India for the purpose of consulting the British Government. Since my departure from Lhassa I have been greatly harassed on the road by Chinese troops. A force of 200 Chinese Mongol infantry were behind me at Chaksam, and I left a party of my soldiers to hold them back. A small fight took place there, in the course of which two Thibetans and seventy Chinese were killed. I have left Regent and acting Ministers at Lhassa, but I and the Ministers who accompany me have brought our seals with us. I have been receiving every courtesy from the British Government, for which I am grateful. I now look to you for protection, and I trust that the relations between the British Government and Thibet will be that of a father to his children. Wishing to be guided by you, I hope to give full information on my arrival in India.'"

The lama telegraphed previously from Phari, sending most friendly greetings to the Government of India, and thanking us for the use of the dak bungalow. The trade agent's attitude has been scrupulously correct. The lama is expected to reach Darjeeling on the 27th instant. I have sent instructions to the authorities there to show him every courtesy, but to treat his visit as private. Until other arrangements can be made, I propose to invite lama to occupy Hastings House, as the Tashi Lama did. I do not think any reply to his messages is necessary, beyond showing him ordinary civilities. Effect of flight of Dalai Lama and Ministers, not only in Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, but also on Indian opinion, will be profound. In India he is regarded with veneration and awe. It is of first importance to show him high consideration. It is also necessary to let our border States see that we are not afraid of

China. It is, I think, necessary to take the Prime Minister of Nepal into our confidence. I have ordered Colonel Manners-Smith back to Katmandu, and have summoned Mr. Bell to Calcutta. I hope in a short time to submit to you our views on the situation. Meanwhile, although the position is, without doubt, serious, a powerful lever wherewith to secure a satisfactory settlement may be found in the presence in India of the Dalai Lama and his Ministers. It seems possible that the fact that their position would be rendered difficult if the Dalai Lama escaped was realised by the Chinese, and that their request for permission to send troops through India was prompted by desire to close the means of escape.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[6337] No. 16.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1910.

YOUR telegram No. 27 [of 15th February : Thibet].

Events reported in recent telegrams repeated to you from India make the previously-proposed representations to the Chinese Government no longer suitable. We do not, of course, know how far the proceedings of Chao-erh-feng are countenanced by them. Our position is somewhat delicate, and it is difficult for us to make an effective protest, but we feel constrained to point out to the Chinese Government (1) that Great Britain, while disclaiming any desire to interfere in the internal administration of Thibet, cannot be indifferent to disturbances of the peace in a country which is both our neighbour and is on intimate terms with other neighbouring States upon our frontier, and especially with Nepal, whom we could not prevent from taking such steps to protect her interests as she may think necessary in the circumstances; (2) that, in view of our treaty relations with both Thibet and China, His Majesty's Government had the right to expect that the Chinese Government would at least have tendered friendly explanations before embarking on a policy which, in the absence of such explanations, cannot but appear intended to subvert the political conditions set up by Anglo-Thibetan Convention, 1904, and confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese Convention, 1906.

You should lose no time in addressing the Wai-wu Pu in the above sense, and enquire what the intentions of the Chinese Government are as regards the future of Thibet. You might remind them, if necessary, that treaty of 1904 was negotiated with the Thibetan Government and was confirmed by themselves, and that consequently His Majesty's Government feel they have a right to expect that an effective Thibetan Government shall be maintained, with whom they can, when necessary, treat in the manner provided by those two conventions.

[6866] No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. MacDonald.

(No. 44.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1910.

IN view of the alliance with Japan, I took an opportunity of telling the Japanese Ambassador to-day that we heard the Dalai Lama was taking refuge in India.

From what we heard, it seemed that the Chinese were assuming a very aggressive attitude in Thibet, and we had received messages from the Dalai Lama, apparently sent in the hope that we might intervene at Peking.

We could not, however, embroil ourselves in a dispute between China and Thibet, nor interfere in the internal affairs of Thibet.

Subsequently, on the receipt of further disturbing news from India, I sent his Excellency a memorandum, of which a copy is enclosed.*

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

* No. 19.

[6556] No. 18.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to India Office letter of the 22nd February, 1910, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 23rd February, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, February 23, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, February* 23, 1910.

AFFAIRS in Thibet.

Your telegram of the 31st January last.

The reply which you propose to send to the Prime Minister of Nepal is approved. As regards representations to China, His Majesty's Minister at Peking is being consulted.

Your telegrams of the 15th, 19th, and 20th instant.

The instructions which you have given to Bell and the agents at Gyantse and Yatung are approved. Any Chinese who, in order to save their lives, take refuge with British officials, should accept the condition that they must leave the country if the Thibetans demand it. This should be clearly understood.

The Dalai Lama should if possible be diverted from Bhutan, as his presence there might provoke invasion by Chinese. Lines on which you propose to frame your reply to deputation are approved. It is essential that a strictly non-committal attitude on all points at issue between China and Thibet should be observed.

Please repeat to Jordan.

[6337] No. 19.

Memorandum communicated to the Russian and Japanese Ambassadors, February 24, 1910.

THE operations in which the Chinese forces under Chao-erh-feng have been engaged for some months past on the eastern frontier of Thibet have now culminated in the invasion of the territory of the Lhassa Government itself. Lhassa is reported to have been entered by the Chinese forces, and the Dalai Lama and his Ministers have fled in the direction of India, with the intention, it is understood, of proceeding to Calcutta. Should His Holiness carry out this intention it is proposed that he shall be received at Calcutta with all the respect due to him on account of his high rank and the veneration in which he is held by large numbers of His Majesty's Asiatic subjects, but at the same time his visit will be regarded as strictly unofficial by the Government of India.

The turn which events have taken is a cause of serious anxiety to His Majesty's Government, who cannot but apprehend that grave trouble may arise upon their Indian frontier. In particular they are concerned as to the attitude which will be taken up by the Government of Nepal, who have intimate treaty relations with the Thibetan Government, and to whom an appeal for assistance has been made by the authorities of Lhassa. His Majesty's Government recognise the dangerous situation which would arise if the Government of Nepal yielded to such an appeal, and, whilst reluctant to let it appear that they have any wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the Chinese Empire, they nevertheless consider themselves compelled to use their influence with the Chinese Government in order to avert so serious a contingency.

His Majesty's Minister at Peking has accordingly been instructed to make representations to the Chinese Government pointing out that Great Britain, whilst disclaiming any desire to interfere in the internal administration of Thibet, cannot be indifferent to disturbances of the peace in a country contiguous to His Majesty's

possessions in India and on intimate terms with other States upon the Indian frontier, and especially with Nepal, whom His Majesty's Government could not prevent from taking such steps to protect her interests as she might think necessary in the circumstances ; that, in view of their treaty relations with both Thibet and China, His Majesty's Government had the right to expect that the Chinese Government would at least have tendered friendly explanations before embarking on a policy which, in the absence of such explanations, cannot but appear intended to subvert the political conditions set up by the Anglo-Thibetan Convention of 1904 and confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.

Sir J. Jordan has been instructed at the same time to enquire what the intentions of the Chinese Government are as regards the future of Thibet. He has been authorised to remind the Wai-wu Pu, if required, that the treaty of 1904 was negotiated by the Thibetan Government and was confirmed by themselves, and that, consequently, His Majesty's Government feel that they have a right to expect that an effective Thibetan Government shall be maintained with whom they can, when necessary, treat in the manner provided by that instrument.

(Ending for Russian Ambassador only) :—

In view of the cordial relations existing between the British and Russian Governments, and of their common interest in the affairs of Thibet, which led them to conclude the agreement of 1907, His Majesty's Government desire, as a matter of courtesy, to acquaint the Russian Government with the steps they are taking.

(Ending for Japanese Ambassador only) :—

In view of the alliance and friendship so happily existing between the British and Japanese Governments His Majesty's Government desire to inform the Japanese Government of the steps which they are taking at Peking in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and security on the frontier of British India.

Foreign Office, February 24, 1910.

[6633] No. 20.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the observations of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy of the 24th instant relative to a reported advance of Chinese troops into Thibet.

India Office, February 24, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 20.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 24, 1910.

THIBET.

Reuter's agency telegraphs from London to following effect :—

"A force of 25,000 Chinese troops, who have been trained on Japanese system, are being pushed into Thibet. Eight thousand men under German supervision are at work in the arsenals at Changtu day and night."

I shall be glad to be informed as to the authenticity of this news.
(Repeated to Peking.)

[7249] No. 21.

Translation of Telegram from Wai-wu Pu, dated the 25th instant, received in London on the evening of the same day.—(*Communicated by Chinese Minister, February* 26, 1910.)

IN 1904 the Dalai Lama fled from Lhassa at a critical moment, which was brought about by his own misconduct, and, as a punishment for his action, he was temporarily deprived of the title of "Dalai."

On his coming to Peking to pray for an audience with the Emperor, the Imperial Government was disposed to forgive what he had done, and showed him many favours, and ordered him to return to Thibet to resume his duties. All this was done in the hope that he might repent and reform himself accordingly.

Since the conclusion of the new Thibet Convention, all matters in connection with the opening of new trade marts and the maintenance of peace in that country are of such great importance that it has been found necessary to dispatch 2,000 soldiers from Szechuan to Thibet for the purpose of preserving order.

Unexpectedly, however, on the arrival of the soldiers in Lhassa, the Dalai Lama, ignorant of the actual situation, secretly ran away in the night of the 12th February, and no one knew where he had gone to.

As he is so independent in his action as regards remaining at or leaving his post, it is greatly to be feared that he may create difficulties by giving rise to rumours which will instigate people to have sympathy with him.

An Imperial edict has this day been issued depriving the Lama of the title "Dalai" on the ground that he, being charged with the supervisory control of the Yellow religion, and having acted so independently in leaving his post, is not considered a competent head for all the Hutuktu (chief abbots of the Lhassa monasteries), and, at the same time, ordering the selection of a successor.

This department has already communicated the Imperial edict to the British Minister in Peking, clearly stating that the affairs of Thibet will continue to be dealt with in accordance with the Thibet Convention concluded between England and China.

Furthermore, this department has also telegraphed in the same sense to our representatives abroad.

You are now requested to call at the Foreign Office and inform the Foreign Secretary of the following points :—

1. That the Dalai Lama has violated the rules of his religion by his arbitrary behaviour and other acts of misconduct.

2. That His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China has deposed the Dalai Lama, and ordered the selection of a successor in order to uphold the principles of the Yellow religion.

3. That China will observe the treaty provisions, maintain local peace, and make no changes in the *status quo* of Thibet.

[6889] No. 22.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 27.)

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February* 27, 1910.

DALAI LAMA.

I was asked to-day by M. Isvolsky whether I could explain in any way the events which had been occurring recently in Thibet, and whether I had any information with regard to the situation there. I said that the only information which had reached me was what had appeared in the press. M. Isvolsky then read to me a telegram which he had received from the Russian Minister at Peking, in which M. Korostovetz reported the steps which Sir J. Jordan had taken and the vague nature of the Chinese reply.

Is there any further information available which I might communicate to M. Isvolsky beyond what has already been made public?

[6721] No. 21 A.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, February 26, 1910.*

THE Dalai Lama has been deposed by Imperial decree. A copy of this document has been sent to me by the Chinese Government. Details will follow.

[6860] No. 21 B.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, February 26, 1910.*

SITUATION in Thibet.

I made formal representations yesterday to the Wai-wu Pu according to the terms of your telegram No. 32, which only reached me yesterday, although it is dated 23rd February. Sentences marked 1 and 2 were embodied in a memorandum which I handed in. I made at the same time a verbal statement in the sense of the last sentence of your telegram, laying stress upon the fact that the Chinese Government had committed a mistake in concealing their plans from His Majesty's Government and not having been more open with regard to their Thibetan policy.

His Excellency Liang Tun-yen begged me to assure you that the Chinese Government had no desire to alter the internal administration of Thibet or modify the *status quo* in that country. In adopting the measures under discussion they only intended to put themselves in the position of being able to police the country and to exercise a more effective control than in the past, more especially in connection with Thibet's obligations towards neighbouring States. The total strength of the expeditionary force did not exceed 2,000 men, who were commanded by a brigadier-general. Chao was not with them; he is presumably still at Chiamdo. His Excellency said that the Wai-wu Pu had just communicated to me a decree deposing the Dalai Lama, and he had therefore meant to speak to me about Thibet. The Dalai Lama had already been deprived in 1904 of his title, which was subsequently restored to him. There had been no intention to strip the Dalai Lama of his power, and repeated messages to that effect had been sent to him. The Chinese Government would now punish him personally by deposing him and electing a new Dalai Lama, but, unless unforeseen circumstances obliged them to alter their plans, they contemplated no further aggressive action. His Excellency added that he had already explained to Sir John Jordan that the intentions of the Chinese Government were purely pacific when making the suggestion that the Indian Government should grant permission for Chinese troops to pass through Indian territory. He begged His Majesty's Government not to believe the false reports spread by Lamaists that outrages had been committed and monasteries burnt.

I will send a note to the Wai-wu Pu confirming my verbal representation. At my suggestion that it would be to China's interest to do so, Liang also promised to publish through the press a contradiction of the exaggerated report issued by Reuter.

[6886] No. 21 C.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, February 26, 1910.*

THIBET. In continuation of my telegram No. 34 of yesterday's date, the Wai-wu Pu's note covering the decree concerning the Dalai Lama states that the Chinese Government will continue to deal with all Thibetan matters in accordance with Anglo-Chinese treaties. After enumerating the Dalai Lama's misdeeds up to and including his flight from Lhassa on the 12th instant, the decree orders that he is to be treated as an ordinary person, declares that the expedition into Thibet was undertaken with the real object of protecting the trade marts and preserving peace, and instructs that a new Dalai Lama be discovered and confirmed as the true incarnation of the previous generation of Dalai Lamas in the manner prescribed by precedent.

[7151] No. 23*.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 28.)

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, February* 28, 1910.

THIBET.

Prince Ch'ing, in a written reply dated the 27th instant to my note, acknowledged His Majesty's Government's friendly and fair attitude, and renewed the verbal assurances of his Excellency Liang Tun-yen. He assures me that under no circumstances will the retention or dismissal of a Dalai Lama be made the occasion for effecting any change in the political situation, and there need be no apprehension of the Anglo-Chinese treaty relating to Thibet being broken by the Chinese Government, who attach great importance to its observance. The note further explains the reasons why the expedition was decided on, and described it as merely a force of 2,000 police to protect the trade marts, oblige the Thibetans to keep their treaty engagements, and generally to pacify the country. The Amban has had repeated instructions to maintain friendly relations to neighbouring States, and act in accordance with treaties, to afford protection to laity and clergy, and to prevent disturbances. It must be considered that by this second flight the Dalai Lama has renounced his position of his own free will.

[7140] No. 23.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 27th February, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, February 28, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) *February 27, 1910.*

THIBET. The Dalai Lama's position as spiritual leader is not affected by the Chinese edict deposing him. Mr. Bell will leave for Darjeeling to-night, bearing our compliments to Dalai Lama, with enquiries after his health. Thence he will report fully to us. In the meantime, I have requested the resident in Nepal to ascertain the Prime Mtnister's views on the situation. In Bhutan watch is being kept on possible Chinese intrigue. Our matured views will be communicated to you later by telegraph.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[6889] No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 104.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, February 28, 1910.*

THIBET. Please refer to your telegram No. 72 of yesterday's date.

On the 25th February I communicated to Count Benckendorff a copy of a memorandum in which we explained the state of affairs in Thibet, and the representations that had been made at Peking by His Majesty's Minister. A copy of this memorandum was sent to you on the 26th instant by post. We are sending you a telegram from Mr. Max Müller (No. 35 of the 26th instant) containing the Wai-wu Pu's reply. The Chinese Minister in London has made us a communication in the same sense. As soon as you receive these communications you should inform M. Isvolsky of their contents.

[7249] No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic. P. *Foreign Office, March 1, 1910.*

THE Chinese Minister on Saturday showed me a telegram he had received from the Wai-wu Pu, which is practically the same as your telegram No. 37 of that day.

[7280] No. 26.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 112.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 26, 1910.*

THE "Novoe Vremya" published a short article to-day on the recent events in Thibet. It states that the news which has been received from English sources is scanty and vague, and the true significance of what is taking place in those regions will only be made clear later on. Chinese-Thibetan relations are matters pertaining to the internal policy of China, and therefore Russia has no pretext for taking an active part in the question. Had the Dalai Lama taken refuge in Russian territory, Russia would have been bound, by the laws of hospitality, to make representations at Peking in defence of his rights. But as he has chosen to place himself under the

protection of the Indian Government, Russia must, in these circumstances, abstain from independent action, and limit herself to loyally supporting such representations as the Anglo-Indian Government may make at Peking.

Misunderstandings have arisen between Russia and China on questions more directly affecting Russian interests, and Russian diplomacy must devote more attention to these questions than to the Chinese-Thibetan quarrel. Of late the Chinese Government have manifested hostility towards Russia, and have adopted measures such as levying illegal dues on Russian imports into Manchuria and on Russian vessels on the Sungari, as well as prohibiting the export of wheat from Northern Manchuria, which call for the action of Russian diplomacy.

I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON.

[7327] No. 27.

Mr. Kato to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

Japanese Embassy, London,
March 1, 1910.

Dear Sir Edward Grey,

HAVING transmitted to my Government the substance of the memorandum which you were good enough to send me with regard to the situation in Thibet, and the instruction given to Sir John Jordan in connection therewith, I am now desired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tender to His Majesty's Government the thanks of the Imperial Government for the information so kindly given.

I beg to remain,
Yours sincerely,
TAKAAKI KATO.

[7304] No. 28.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 10th February, relative to Chinese spies in Bhutan.

India Office, March 1, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

Mr. Bell to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Gangtok, January 22, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of letter, dated the 6th January, 1910, from the British trade agent at Yatung to my address, regarding Chinese spies who have recently arrived in Bhutan.

2. There is a Chinaman from the Chumbi Valley now in Punaka, and he also appears to be a spy. He arrived in Punaka a few days before me.

I have, &c.
C. A. BELL,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

Mr. Macdonald to Mr. Bell.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Yatung, January* 6, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received information to-day that the Chinese frontier officer has sent a Chinese spy to Tongsa in Bhutan. It appears that he first sent two Thibetans to Bhutan, who went as far as Paro disguised as beggars, but the Bhutanese prevented them from going further.

I have, &c.

D. MACDONALD,

British Trade Agent at Yatung.

[7345] No. 29.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy,* dated the 2nd March, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, March 2, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 29.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 2, 1910.

THIBET.

We have received to-day the following telegram from Bell, in reply to our telegram of yesterday, calling for a report on the situation :—

"It appears that Thibetans sent considerable force to face Chinese troops Chiamdo in order to intimidate them, but with orders not to fight. They accordingly retreated as Chinese troops advanced, and meanwhile Amban at Lhassa promised Dalai Lama that only 1,000 Chinese troops would be brought to Lhassa. Forty Chinese mounted infantry arrived suddenly in Lhassa and fired on several Thibetans, including two high officials, as these latter were leaving Potala peaceably, wounding one in leg and hitting pony of other. Dalai Lama also ascertained that Chinese had broken their promise to bring only 1,000 soldiers to Lhassa. He accordingly decided to fly to India, though against the advice of Council and National Assembly. There appears to have been no fighting except at Chaksam, where several Chinese were killed, the number of killed being variously estimated at from forty to eighty-two. Dalai Lama's clothes, presents for Viceroy, &c., are believed to have been captured by Chinese. At Phari lots were cast as to whether Dalai Lama should proceed viâ Bhutan or Khambajong or Gnatong, and lot fell on last route. Dalai Lama complained that Emperor of China promised him in Peking that he, Dalai Lama, would have the same power as before in governing Thibet, but that Chinese in Thibet have broken this promise. Above information is from reliable Thibetan source. Dalai Lama arrives at Darjeeling to-day. At my suggestion the deputy commissioner is sending twenty-two native police under European inspector to conduct Lama on the last six miles into Darjeeling, so that he may not be mobbed by sightseers and worshippers. One mile out of Darjeeling Lama will be met by the deputy commissioner, who will conduct him to the quarters which have been prepared for him and his followers."

Chinese are buying rice for their troops at Kalimpong. The Bhutanese agent has informed Foreign Secretary that Thibetans have undoubtedly been ill-treated by the Chinese.

(Repeated to Peking.)

* See 7334.

[7737] No 30.

Question asked in the House of Commons, March 2, 1910.

Sir Gilbert Parker,—To ask the Secretary of State for India whether he can make a statement concerning the flight of the Dalai Lama from Thibet; whether this Government has made enquiries of the Chinese Government as to the invasion of Lhassa; and what is the result of its enquiries.

Answer by the Under-Secretary of State for India (Mr. Montagu).

Honourable members have been able to follow the course of events in the daily newspapers, and it is unnecessary for me to recapitulate the main facts. I will, however, read from a telegram which was received from the Viceroy last night:—

"It appears that Thibetans sent considerable force to face Chinese troops near Chiamdo in order to intimidate them, but with orders not to fight. They accordingly retreated as Chinese troops advanced, and meanwhile Amban at Lhassa promised Dalai Lama that only 1,000 Chinese troops would be brought to Lhassa. Forty Chinese mounted infantry arrived suddenly in Lhassa and fired on several Thibetans, including two high officials, as these latter were leaving Potala peaceably, wounding one in leg and hitting pony of other. Dalai Lama also ascertained that Chinese had broken their promise to bring only 1,000 soldiers to Lhassa. He accordingly decided to fly to India, though against advice of Council and National Assembly. There appears to have been no fighting, except at Chaksam, where several Chinese were killed, the number of killed being variously estimated at from forty to eighty. Dalai Lama complained that Emperor of China promised him in Peking that he, Dalai Lama, would have the same power as before in governing Thibet, but that Chinese in Thibet have broken this promise. Above information is from reliable Thibetan source. Dalai Lama arrives at Darjeeling to-day."

His Majesty's Government have communicated with the Chinese Government with regard to the unexpected situation thus created, and in reply have received assurances upon the details of which it would be premature to make a statement.

[7368] No. 31.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 114.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 28, 1910.

M. DORJÉEW, the well-known Russian Buriat, has been interviewed by the "Novoe Vremya" in connection with recent events in Thibet. M. Dorjéew says that he is impatiently expecting a letter which he hears is on its way to him by special messenger from the Dalai Lama and which will no doubt clear up many points. M. Dorjéew said that he was well acquainted with the Dalai Lama, having been educated with him, and that when at Peking the Dalai Lama frequently stated that he anticipated that lamentable events would occur in the near future, as he was sure that China wished to seize Thibet and transform it into a Chinese province.

I have, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

[7472] No. 32.

Verbal Communication made by Count Benckendorff, March 3, 1910.

(1.)

Télégramme de M. Isvolsky au Comte Benckendorff.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 17 *février* (2 *mars*), 1910.

VEUILLEZ exprimer à Sir Edward Grey nos plus sincères remerciements pour sa communication concernant les affaires du Thibet. Le télégramme suivant con-

[7334] No. 30*.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.—(Communicated by India Office, March 2, 1910.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *March 2, 1910.*

THIBETAN affairs. The three chief Ministers with the Dalai Lama were interviewed on the 25th February by a native official at Kalimpong, who gives the following account:—

At the request of the Nepal resident and leading traders at Lhassa, the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Amban agreed to stop fighting and to allow 1,000 Chinese troops only to come to Lhassa for purpose of guarding frontiers. In view of this agreement, the Lhassa Government ordered the withdrawal of the Thibetan troops from Chiamdo and cessation of hostile opposition. While the Chinese force of 1,000 troops were marching from Chiamdo to Lhassa, 200 Chinese infantry and 50 cavalry arrived unexpectedly from the north at a place within two marches of Lhassa. The Chinese troops at Lhassa, numbering 200, went out to join them, and on their return to Lhassa, in the neighbourhood of Kading, they killed or captured seventeen Thibetan soldiers, who were, by chance, marching in that quarter. On arrival at Lhassa the Chinese troops shot two of the Thibetan guards and wounded two persons of position.

The Dalai Lama summoned a meeting of Ministers at his Palace; while this meeting was being held the Chinese dispatched ten soldiers to the house of each Minister with orders to arrest him. Upon hearing this the Dalai Lama and his Ministers decided to fly to India. They left Lhassa on the 13th February and arrived in Indian territory on the 24th idem.

The foregoing story needs confirmation. We have been unable to ascertain what happened at Lhassa after lama and his party fled.

We have instructed Bell, who has reached Darjeeling, to let us have as soon as possible a full report by telegraph. At present news is somewhat conflicting, but there seems no doubt that the Chinese have been active.

News has just reached us, but it requires verification, which is [? compatible with] suggestion that wool monopolies, &c. (see our despatch of the 10th February last), were given at instance of China.

Recent reports received from British postal officials contain indications of an attitude of opposition on the part of the Chinese. Further instances of a forward policy on their part are to be found in their request for a consul at Calcutta, and a recent suggestion that a Chinese educational official should be deputed to inspect schools for Chinese in Burmah.

(Repeated to Peking, and Political Officer, Sikkim.)

tiendra nos instructions à M. Korostovetz au sujet de ces affaires. Nous reconnaissons comme lui que la convention fournit des intérêts communs au Thibet, et nous sommes prêts à appuyer les démarches que l'Angleterre croirait utile de faire auprès du Gouvernement chinois pour sauvegarder ces intérêts. Nous échangerions volontiers avec le Gouvernement britannique des idées en ce but, pour préciser l'attitude à prendre.

(2.)

Télégramme de M. Isvolsky à M. Korostovetz.

Sans dessein de nous mêler en aucune façon des affaires intérieures de la Chine nous ne sommes pourtant pas désintéressés du sort du Dalaï-Lama, chef spirituel d'un nombre considérable de sujets russes bouddhistes.

Veuillez attirer sur ce fait l'attention du Gouvernement chinois, et vous informer auprès de lui des circonstances qui ont amené la fuite du Thibet du pontife, et des raisons qui ont induit le Gouvernement à prendre une mesure aussi extrême que la promulgation d'un décret promulguant son détrônement et prescrivant l'élection d'un successeur.

Ces mesures sont de nature à pouvoir provoquer de l'effervescence parmi les bouddhistes russes, et le Gouvernement Impérial croit devoir prémunir le Gouvernement chinois des conséquences fâcheuses que des mesures trop hâtives pourraient amener.

[7454] No. 33.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Vicerey, dated the 2nd March, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, March 3, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 33.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 2, 1910.

THIBETAN affairs.

We have just received an account of the situation, dated Lhassa, 18th January, in form of a report to his Government by the Nepalese representative at that place. The report was enclosed in a letter from the Prime Minister of Nepal, dated the 24th February.

The Nepalese representative in his earnest effort to prevent a rupture between the Thibetans and Chinese called on the Kasyal Kazis on the 7th January, urging that a conference should be held with the view to an amicable settlement being arrived at with the Chinese Amban at Lhassa. The Kasyal, in the course of conversation, said that they were forbidden by their religion to allow British to enter their country. This brought on a conflict, but British troops left Lhassa without damaging religion. At that time they received no help from China. On the withdrawal of the British force the Amban established nine new offices and made fresh regulations, which were accepted by them. Subsequently Chao-erh-Feng made his appearance with Chinese troops in Eastern Thibet, innocent monks were killed, monasteries burnt, and various acts of sacrilege committed; collection of revenue by Thibetan authorities was stopped and communication with them cut off. At Lhassa the Amban set up a plea of police work, and he secured the dispatch of 1,000 Chinese troops and claimed provision of transport. To this arrangement Thibetans objected, and urged that their grievances should be submitted to the Emperor of China, pointing out that Thibet was a poor country, Chinese troops would intensify trouble, would excite British suspicions, and bring about convulsion. They also urged that Thibetans were capable of guarding their own country. The Kasyal Kazis waited on Chinese Amban, but he refused to give

them a hearing. Further, he thwarted the Thibetans in making arrangement which Tarag Tarin Amba had directed about urging salt duty and the monopoly of certain articles. Eventually their relations with the Amban having become impossible, they addressed the Assistant Amban. They agreed to refer to the Chongdui Council and the Bada Kazis.

On the 10th January the Kasyal Kazis summoned the Nepalese representative and handed to him copies of three representations which they had addressed to the Amban and Assistant Amban. These documents had not yet been translated.

On the following day Nepalese representative received a visit from an officer of Chinese troops at Dhapchi, who asked him to recruit 100 or 150 Gorkhali subjects, explaining that the highest ranks in the Chinese army would be open to them. In reply, the Nepalese representative explained to him that Thibet, being a cold country, living was dear there and food difficult to obtain ; he pointed out China's difficulties and urged moderation, but said that he would communicate with the Prime Minister of Nepal on the subject. In his letter to the Prime Minister he pointed out that the proposed arrangement might be advantageous, as it might bring about the return of Chinese troops to China. He added that the Thibetans are ignorant and the Chinese extremely cruel, that there are many Nepalese people in Thibet, with which country Nepal had carried on trade for centuries, and much money was sunk in it. Commenting on this proposal, the Prime Minister says in his covering letter that it does not at all commend itself to him. On the same day, the 11th January, the Nepalese representative was asked by Gal Kazis to come again, when they made the following statement :—

"In the course of our conversation a few days ago we discussed the arrival at Chiamdo of Dhan Tarin Amba (*i.e.*, Chao-erh-Feng). The day following a letter from the Thibetan officers on the Chiamdo side was received by urgent post, in which they stated that all their efforts to persuade Dhan Tarin to go back had been in vain, that he had fixed a certain date for the advance of his troops, demanded free passage for them, and threatened the annihilation of any who dared to offer opposition. The tale of police duty was but a ruse on the part of the Chinese. This could be gathered from the fact that they had brought 2,000 men to Chiamdo in addition to the 1,000 mentioned, making a total force of 3,000. Thibetan officers, despairing of any success of their pleadings with Dhan Tarin, had withdrawn to a place called Ninda, two marches on the Lhassa side of Chiamdo, the men being quartered in small batches at places convenient for obtaining water and fuel. A detachment of Chinese soldiers numbering about 300, under one named Tuthunlin, came to Ninda. They attacked a small party of Thibetan soldiers, plundered all their effects, capturing one, whom they sent to Dhan Tarin. Up till now the Thibetan soldiers had been under orders to refrain from laying insolent hands on the Chinese.

"Since the Chinese have now acted in the manner described, the Changdai Council, having deliberated over the question, decided to issue orders to the Thibetan troops to oppose the Chinese should they attempt to advance beyond Ninda. The order has now gone forth with a firm resolve on the part of all of us to die rather than permit Dhan Tarin and his force to enter Lhassa."

Nepalese representative was asked by Gal Kazis to see the Chinese Amban, and, without letting him know that he was acting on their request, to endeavour to stop the advance of the Chinese troops pending some amicable settlement. They offered Nepalese representative their assurances that they would continue to show to China the same regard as heretofore, and asserted that Chao-erh-Feng was the cause of all the trouble. It was, they said, on account of Chao-erh-Feng's oppressive and tyrannical acts of sacrilege and sin, his over-bearing policy, diverting all power into his own hands, that a resolution had been passed by the monks and laymen of the whole country, severing all connection with the Lhassa Amban, with a full determination to take all responsibility, whatever it might be, for their action. Being now completely at variance with the Amban, no Thibetan will like or venture to approach him. Upon the Nepalese representative urging that they should confer with the Amban, they pleaded that he should in the first instance go to him. He accordingly called on the Amban, and pointed out to him the danger of driving the Thibetans to despair. He represented to him that there were a large number of monks with no family ties, the rugged nature of the country and the [? justness] of foreign lands. The Amban replied that the more he argued with the Thibetans the more captious they became. He could do nothing with them. The 1,000 Chinese troops for police work would, he contended, benefit the country, and look after the interests of the merchants, both Thibetan and

Nepalese. The [? Chinese] had been fired on at Ninda. So far as Chao-erh-Feng was concerned, he had nothing to do with him; he, Chao-erh-Feng, had only defended his countrymen and punished Thibetans for their crimes. They, the Thibetans, had murdered a Chinese Amban at Ba, and at another place an innocent Chinese officer had been murdered and flayed by them; his corpse had been preserved by them, and was taken out every year in the performance of certain ceremonies. The protection of Chinese had been sought by the people on the way to Chiamdo, and they were happy and contented. The troops having been sent by Imperial order, the matter was no longer in his hands. A similar reply was given by the Assistant Amban, to whom the Nepalese representative paid a visit subsequently.

The above is the circumstantial account of an independent eye-witness who is anxious to see an amicable settlement arrived at. Until I am in possession of further information I reserve an expression of opinion, but I would invite attention to an extract from the "North China Herald" of the 14th January last, purport of which is as follows:—

"Government have been asked in a telegram sent jointly by Chao-erh-Hsun of Szechuen and Commissioner Chao-erh-Feng to convert Thibet, with as little delay as possible, into a Chinese province, with official administration, and also to secure the subjugation of lamas and Thibetans, so that aggression on the part of foreigners may be prevented."

The Prime Minister asks for a reply to his letter of the 29th December last (see my telegram of the 30th January).

I am sending to the Resident, Nepal, substance of telegrams from Max Müller of the 26th and 28th ultimo.

I am awaiting news from the Prime Minister as to recent developments of the situation. Bell will interview the Dalai Lama at Darjiling to-day, and I hope shortly to make definite proposals.

It would be of much assistance to me to see Foreign Office [? instructions] to Peking, and also the full text of written communications by the Chinese Government, summarised in the legation's telegram of the 28th February.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[8276] No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Macdonald.

(No. 48.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 3, 1910.

THE Japanese Ambassador asked me to-day whether we had received any answer from the Chinese Government to our representations about Thibet.

I told him that we had received a reply to the effect that the Chinese Government did not intend to alter the *status* of Thibet, but that their object was to secure order in the administration of the country, and to ensure that the situation was such that the treaty obligations of Thibet would be observed. They had also expressed their own intention of observing all the provisions of treaties. This answer was much what we had expected: it was unexceptionable in form, but I had no doubt that the Chinese Government intended to increase their hold upon Thibet.

The Ambassador asked what our attitude towards the Dalai Lama would be, and whether we knew his intentions.

I replied that I understood the Government of India would place a house in Calcutta at the disposal of the Dalai Lama, and I supposed that they would treat him as a guest. As to the intentions of the Lama, I thought that we should probably hear soon from the British official who had met him at Darjeeling. I promised to keep the Japanese Ambassador informed of the progress of events in connection with Thibet.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[7502] No. 35.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 1st March, relative to the treaty with Bhutan.

India Office, March 3, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 35.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March* 1, 1910.

BHUTAN. Your telegram of the 22nd February. So soon as you have ratified treaty it may be published.

[7506] No. 36.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 1st March, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, March 3, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 36

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March* 1, 1910.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 24th February.

Information was given to Reuter's by Fergusson (see enclosure to your secretary's letter of the 28th January, 1909). Reuter's statement as to the strength and organisation of the Chinese force in Eastern Thibet was corroborated by him generally at an interview here. The objective is not the occupation of Lhassa, but the reduction of frontier tribes. His account appeared to be entirely credible. Papers were sent by mail of the 25th February to Secretary, Foreign Department.

[7557] No. 37.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of three telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd March, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, March 4, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No 37.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 3, 1910.

THIBETAN affairs.

Following message from Bell is communicated in continuation of my telegram of the 1st instant :—

"The Thibetans were alarmed and enraged by the excesses which have been committed by Chinese troops, who destroyed, some two months ago, a large monastery near Litang as reprisal for the murder, by 100 monks belonging to the monastery, of a Chinese amban. The Chinese soldiers took sacred Buddhist books and used them for making soles of boots, when they destroyed the monastery. Thibetans have continually requested the Chinese amban to arrange that those troops should not be brought to Lhassa, but he refused.

"After the return of the Dalai Lama to Lhassa, which was about the 25th December, the representatives of Nepal and Bhutan, in Lhassa, together with some of the leading merchants and Mahommedan headmen in Lhassa, again approached the amban as well as the Dalai Lama with a request that they would settle the dispute as to whether or not these troops should be allowed in Lhassa. The Dalai Lama and the amban were together on the 9th February in one of the former's rooms in Potala, and Nepalese representatives and some Thibetan traders were present. A promise was then and there given by the Amban Wen not to bring more than 1,000 Chinese troops. These were to be stationed at following posts : Gyangtse, Phari, Chumbi Valley, and Khambajong. The amban promised further that there should be no bringing to Lhassa of fresh Chinese troops. He also undertook to give them a promise to same effect on the 12th February in writing. On that day three chief Ministers ("lonchens") and three shapes were with the Dalai Lama in Potala. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon Lhassa was entered by forty Chinese mounted infantry and 200 Chinese infantry. A crowd of Thibetans, unarmed, went to look at these new arrivals. The Chinese troops fired upon the crowd, with the result that two Thibetan policemen were killed, a Thibetan high official named Tsetrung Jamyang and an old Thibetan woman were wounded. A pony was also wounded belonging to a high Thibetan official named Punkang. This high official was arrested, and was taken to the residence of the amban.

"The above occurrence becoming known to the chief Ministers and shapes, they were afraid to return to their houses. At midnight the Dalai Lama fled. He was accompanied by the aforesaid chief Ministers and shapes, together with other officials and attendants, and some 200 soldiers. After travelling for twelve or fourteen hours the Dalai Lama reached the ferry over the Brahmaputra river at Chaksam. There he left his soldiers to check Chinese who might be in pursuit. He crossed the river himself, and on the 15th reached Nagartse, on the 16th Ralung, and on the 17th he arrived at Nor. Here the Jongpen of Nagartse sent them a letter, from which they learnt that about sixty Chinese soldiers and three Thibetan soldiers had been killed at Chaksam, and that eventually the Thibetan soldiers had separated and dispersed in different directions.

"The Dalai Lama arrived at Dochen on the 18th February, and on the following day he reached Phari. The Chinese official at that place endeavoured to obtain an interview with the Dalai Lama and the Ministers, but he only succeeded in having an interview with the shape named Samtrup Potrang. On the 12th (*sic* ? 20th), while the Dalai Lama and his party were on the march to Yatung from Phari, they were joined by about 100 men of the Chumbi valley, who came to reinforce them. These men were armed with rifles, revolvers, and swords, and escorted them as far as Yatung that day. The day following this reinforcement, joined by many other men of the Chumbi valley, and bringing fresh supplies of mules, escorted the Dalai Lama with his party to the gate of a Chinese village some way on beyond Yatung, whence he was conducted by twenty-five mounted men of the Chumbi valley to the proximity of the Sikkim frontier. Subsequently, on the same day, Gnatong, which lies 8 miles within the border of Sikkim, was reached by the Dalai Lama.

"This afternoon a meeting of Darjeeling Buddhists took place, and a resolution expressing indignation at the treatment accorded by the Chinese to the Dalai Lama was adopted. It was further resolved to communicate the resolution to the Emperor of China by telegraph."

As the Chinese abstain from discussing matters with our trade agents at Yatung and Gyangtse, it is difficult to test information. Certain stories which have appeared in the press are disbelieved by Bell, viz., that Drepung (which has been wrongly called "Lebong") monastery opposed the entrance of the Dalai into Lhassa; that the right to appoint the Abbot of Sera was the subject of dispute between the amban and the Lama; that more than 1,200 soldiers were in Lhassa or its neighbourhood; that fighting took place in Lhassa between the Chinese troops and the golden soldiers; that soldiers were sent by the Chinese to arrest Ministers before the Dalai Lama fled. Bell has been assured by high Thibetan authorities that the amban has not reappointed Ti-Rimpoche to be regent, but that the Dalai Lama has appointed incarnation lama of the Tsomoling monastery in Lhassa to be regent, and has appointed others to be officiating chief Ministers and officiating shapes. I have not yet received any news from Nepal, nor has Bell's account of his interview with the Dalai Lama reached me. I will send letter when received.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 3, 1910.

THIBET. General officer commanding, North China command, has sent a telegram to Intelligence Branch. Following is purport:—

"Chinese troops in Thibetan territory number 4,900. The Chinese authorities give the number as 2,000. Regular troops in Szechuan number 2,000; local troops, 12,000. In Yünnan regular troops number 10,000; number of local troops uncertain. Orders have been issued to regular troops Nanking-Kinkiang to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce."

"North China Herald" of the 4th February contains announcement to following effect:—

"Request has been made by telegraph by Resident in Lhassa for the dispatch to Thibet of a number of officials to assist in educational and foreign affairs. His request will be granted."

(Repeated to Peking and Resident, Nepal.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 37.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 3, 1910.

THIBET. Following is substance of a report from Bell:—

"At noon to-day I called on the Dalai Lama. The Lama rose from his seat to receive me, and shook hands with me, after which we exchanged ceremonial scarves. I conveyed the Viceroy's message, omitting the invitation to Calcutta, since there seems to be some doubt whether the Lama will desire to visit Calcutta unless he feels assured that he will receive what he would consider a favourable reply from the Viceroy. The Lama asked me to convey his thanks to the Viceroy by telegraph for the arrangements made for the comfort of his party and himself. Upon the Lama commencing to discuss his reason for coming to India all those present, including the Maharajah of Sikkim, left the room, leaving me alone with the Lama. The Lama proceeded to tell me that when Ugyen Kazi presented the letter before the Thibet mission was dispatched, he, the Lama, would not receive it, since he had agreed with the Chinese to conduct his foreign affairs through Chinese intermediaries only. In like manner, when Younghusband wrote to him in the course of the Thibet mission, the Chinese refused to allow him to send a reply.

"When in Peking he received an assurance from the Emperor of China that he, the Lama, would retain his former power and position in Thibet, and that no harm would be done to the Thibetan people. This promise had been broken since he came to Lhassa. The Chinese police already in Lhassa and the forty Chinese mounted infantry who arrived there fired upon inoffensive Thibetans in Lhassa, with the result that three were killed, one high official was wounded in the leg, and the pony of another

[7546] No. 37*.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 4.)

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, March* 4, 1910.

THIBET.

The Wai-wu Pu are not disposed to be very communicative, though I have represented to them the advantages of being open with us with regard to the future developments in Thibet, especially as to the dispatch of any reinforcements.

Last night my Russian colleague informed me that the flight and deposition of the Dalai Lama had formed the subject of representations addressed by him to the Chinese Government, in which he expressed the hope that the creation of unnecessary disturbances in Thibet would be avoided by the Chinese Government, and pointed out that the fact that Russia had millions of Lamist subjects of her own made it impossible for her to ignore developments in Thibet.

high official was wounded. The Lama then fled, as he feared that he would be made prisoner in the Potala (1,000 Chinese troops were at the time within only two days' march of Lhassa, though this was not referred to by the Lama), and that he would be deprived of all temporal power. He said that the Chinese authorities sent 400 soldiers by the direct route to Phari from Lhassa, and another party of 300 along the road to Gyangtse, offering a reward to anyone who might effect his capture, or might capture or kill his Ministers.

"Some of the Chinese letters containing offers of those rewards fell into his hands. The Lama then informed me that he had come to India for the purpose of asking the help of the British Government against the Chinese. He stated that unless the British Government intervened China would occupy Thibet and oppress it; they would destroy the Buddhist religion there and the Thibetan Government, and would govern the country by Chinese officials. China, he said, will extend her power into Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal, for it is claimed by China that these are States (? which were) under China. Eventually her power will be extended into India. He added that there are already 2,000 Chinese troops in Lhassa and its neighbourhood, that others are following, and that it is not for Thibet alone that so large a number of troops are required.

"I promised the Lama that I would communicate what he had told me to the Government of India. To-morrow morning I expect to see the Lama's Ministers. I will telegraph without delay a report of my interview with them."

With reference to assurances of Chinese a telegram is in course of preparation. We are awaiting the result of Bell's interview with Ministers.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[7695] No. 38.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd March, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, March 4, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March* 3, 1910.

THIBET: Your telegram dated the 2nd March.

His Majesty's Minister was addressed by telegraph on the 23rd ultimo to the following effect:—

"Representations to Chinese Government previously proposed are no longer suitable in view of events reported in recent telegrams repeated to you from India. How far Chinese Government countenance Chao-erh-Feng's proceedings is, of course, not known to us. We are in somewhat delicate position, and an effective protest on our part is difficult. We feel constrained, however, to point out to the Chinese Government, firstly, that while we disclaim any desire to interfere in Thibet's internal administration, disturbances of the peace cannot be viewed with indifference by us in a country which, besides being our neighbour, has intimate relations with other States on our frontier that are our neighbours, and with Nepal in particular, who could not be prevented by us from taking such steps as in the circumstances may appear to her necessary to protect her interests; secondly, that His Majesty's Government had the right to expect, in view of our treaty relations with both China and Thibet, that friendly explanations would at least have been tendered to us by the Chinese Government before the latter embarked upon a policy which cannot but appear, in the absence of such explanations, to have for its object the subversion of the political conditions which the Lhassa convention set up, and which the Anglo-Chinese agreement of 1906 confirmed.

"Wai-wu Pu should be addressed in the above sense without loss of time, and should be asked what are Chinese Government's intentions as regards Thibet's future. If necessary they might be reminded that they themselves confirmed the treaty of 1904, which was negotiated with the Thibetan Government, and that His Majesty's Government consequently feel entitled to expect the maintenance of an effective Thibetan Government with whom it is possible for them to treat, when necessary, in the manner in which those two conventions provide."

His Majesty's Minister at Peking will be requested to send a copy of Prince Ch'ing's note to you. Copy of a telegram from Wai-wu Pu to the same effect as Ch'ing's note has been given to the Foreign Office by the Chinese Minister, in which it is said that "it has been found necessary to dispatch 2,000 troops to Thibet from Szechuan for purpose of preserving order, owing to the great importance attaching, since conclusion of new Thibet convention, to all matters connected with opening of new trade marts and maintenance of peace in that country." Telegram concludes by stating that "provisions of treaty will be observed by China, local peace will be maintained, and *status quo* of Thibet will not be changed in any respect."

Your views are awaited, but I request that last sentence of my telegram of the 28th ultimo may be borne in mind.

[7733] No. 39.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 5th March, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, March 5, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 39.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 5, 1910.

IT seems desirable, in view of general assurances given at Peking, to send a connected telegram reviewing whole situation. Attention was drawn in our despatch of the 1st October, 1908, to the clear signs that China was adopting a forward policy on the north-east frontier of India, to the attempt to establish influence in Bhutan which she made openly in April 1908, and to her designs on Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, and we recommended the conclusion with Bhutan of a treaty, which, while securing Bhutanese independence in internal affairs, would give us control of their external relations. Signature of that treaty took place on the 8th January at the capital of Bhutan, and within a fortnight its ratification will probably be effected. It is proved beyond doubt by the accounts that have reached us from different sources, and especially from the Prime Minister of Nepal, for many months past, that our fears have been realised, and that a deliberate policy of subjugating Thibet, and of excluding the Thibetan authorities at Lhassa from any real share in the government of their own country, had been entered upon by the Chinese.

Our attention was drawn by the Prime Minister of Nepal, in a letter dated the 29th December last, to China's reduction of Thibet in her "own orthodox fashion," to the requests repeatedly made to the ambans at Lhassa that the "oppression, sacrileges, and depredations committed by Chinese troops on the frontier territory of Thibet" should be terminated, and to the likelihood that, as an act of desperation, armed resistance would be offered by the Thibetan authorities. It was pointed out by him that the responsibilities of his Government would be aggravated, and their anxious watchfulness emphasised in that quarter by an angry, turbulent, and distressed Thibet, and a coterminous Chinese frontier; that it was vitally important that peaceful and orderly government in Thibet should be continued; and that moral support was due to the Thibetans. And he suggested that representations should be addressed to the Chinese Government demanding that the Chinese troops now entering Thibet should be withdrawn, that the outrages alleged to have been committed in East Thibet should

be terminated, and that the *status quo* should be continued, without any prejudice to principle of China's existing suzerain rights.

Prime Minister's views were telegraphed on the 30th January last to your Lordship, and it was suggested that an intimation should be made to China that Nepal could not easily be prevented from taking measures for protection of its interests, and that disorder on our frontier could not be regarded with indifference by us, resulting as it possibly might in *status quo* being completely changed and in creation of conditions wholly inconsistent with our agreements with China and Thibet, by which continuance in Thibet of a Thibetan Government was recognised. It was further suggested that it should be intimated to Chinese Government that we should be compelled, in self-defence, if unsettlement of country continued, to strengthen our Yatung and Gyangtse escorts, but that we should inform Russia and China that maintenance of *status quo* under the treaties and trade regulations was all that we desired, and that, with a view to the promotion of a better understanding between Chinese and Thibetans, we should offer our good offices with the Nepalese Government.

We telegraphed again on the 15th ultimo, reporting receipt at Lhassa of authentic news of the arrival at Chiamdo of Chao-erh-Feng with a force of 2,000 Chinese troops, and of the existence of great tension; and stating my intention of receiving a deputation which had come from Thibet to Calcutta, and of sending the Dalai Lama an oral message expressing my hope that His Holiness and Thibet might enjoy well-being and prosperity, that the friendly relations between this country and Thibet might continue, and that the differences between the Chinese and Thibetans might be settled amicably, reminding him at the same time that treaty obligations with Russia and China preclude the British Government from interfering in the internal administration of Thibet.

A telegram reached us from Gyangtse on the 17th ultimo, stating that Lhassa had been entered by an advance guard of Chinese troops, and that Dalai Lama had taken flight for India, together with his Ministers with their seals of office. Since then they have arrived in India, and on the 2nd instant the Dalai Lama, in an interview at Darjeeling with Mr. Bell, asked for help against the Chinese from the British Government. He stated that, failing the intervention of the British Government, Thibet would be occupied and oppressed by China, the Buddhist religion there under the Thibetan Government would be disturbed, and Chinese officials would govern the country; that the power of China would be extended into Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal, and eventually into India; that in and around Lhassa there were already 2,000 troops, and that for Thibet alone such large numbers of troops were not required. He said that he had been assured by the Emperor, when in Peking, that his former position and power in Thibet would be preserved and that the people of Thibet would suffer no harm. Both oral and written assurances had been given by the Chinese at Peking.

Effect of oral assurances appear to have been that Chinese Government had purely pacific intentions, their object being the policing of the country and the exercise, particularly in regard to the obligation of Thibet towards neighbouring States, of a more effective control than in the past; that there was no desire on the part of Chinese Government for the modification of the *status quo* in Thibet, or for the alteration in any way of the internal administration. The Dalai Lama had been deposed and a new one appointed by them, but they contemplated no further aggressive action in Thibet unless compelled to such a course by unforeseen circumstances. Oral assurances were repeated by assurances in writing, which described the expedition as merely a police force of 2,000 men, object of which was protection of trade-marts, tranquillisation of country and enforcement of conformity to treaty on part of Thibetans. It was added that Dalai Lama, by taking to flight, must be regarded as having renounced his position voluntarily, and that in no circumstances would Dalai Lama's dismissal or retention be used to alter in any way the political situation. Ch'ing stated that there would be no breach of Anglo-Chinese treaty, but no mention was made of trade regulations if summary telegraphed to us is complete. There can be no doubt whatever that Chinese amban's action in Lhassa and movement of Chinese troops in Eastern Thibet are quite irreconcilable with Chinese Government's assurances.

Information received from other sources as to China's aggressive intentions is confirmed independently by Nepalese and Tibetan versions. Before commencement of aggressive movement, Thibetan and Chinese authorities were working together, and the country was tranquil. Beyond China's own intrigue in our dependencies, to which we have referred, there were no disturbances on the borders, and neither Chinese nor Thibetan authorities at Lhassa had received any representation that

manner of carrying out treaty obligations was causing any dissatisfaction. A report from Yatung has reached us that in the Kharput province Thibetans are being driven out of their land to make room for large numbers of Chinese who are being settled there. An attitude of aloofness from our officers, amounting at times to obstruction, has been adopted by the local Chinese officers in Chumbi valley for some time past. The Thibetans, we are credibly informed, were instigated by them to grant monopolies, the result of which has been to divert the trade from India of wool, yaks' tails, &c. An attitude of stiff neutrality was preserved by our agents at Yatung and Gyangtse during Dalai Lama's flight. Nevertheless local Chinese officials abstained persistently from communicating with them in any way. No information has been furnished to us from a Chinese source of any of China's movements. No secret appears to have been made of their designs or their attitude by the local Chinese authorities. Under the heading of "Chinese news translated from Chinese press," the "North China Herald" of the 14th January contained a statement that Government had received a joint telegram from Commissioner Chao-erh-Feng and the Viceroy of Szechuan, requesting that Thibet should be converted into a Chinese province with an official provincial administration as soon as possible, and also that subjugation of Thibetans and lamas should be secured, with a view to the prevention of foreign aggression; the same journal stated on the 4th ultimo that a telegraphic request had been made by the resident at Lhassa, and would be granted, for the deputation to Thibet of a number of officials to assist in educational and foreign affairs.

Information has reached us from reliable source that there are 4,900 Chinese troops, as against 2,000 stated by Chinese authorities, in Thibetan territory, that there are 2,000 regular troops and 12,000 local troops in Szechuan, and in Yunnan there are 10,000 regular and an uncertain number of local troops, and that orders to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce others have been issued to the regular troops from Nangking and Kinkiang.

It was stated in the "China Herald" of the 27th November, 1909, that China had received an offer from a foreign Power, which the Government was inclined to accept, of a loan for the construction of the Szechuan-Thibet and Kalgan-Woiga railways. This evidence coming from so many different sources is, in my opinion, absolutely irresistible in its cumulative effect, and proves beyond a doubt the determination of China to create in Thibet a violent change of the *status quo*, which will obliterate the Thibetan Government and seriously affect our own position on the north-eastern frontier. As this movement has the effect of driving the Thibetan Government out of the country, it is idle to talk of it as one to police Thibet.

The only advice I can give His Majesty's Government at the present stage is, that we require from China something more tangible than general assurances. Our recommendations on the whole subject will, I hope, be shortly submitted.

Enclosure 2 in No. 39.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 5, 1910.

REPORT from trade agent, Gyangtse, states that according to Chinese, fear of Chinese troops caused Dalai Lama's flight. It was stated by Chinese officer that Chinese captured many British rifles; agent, however, was able to demonstrate that our rifles would not take the cartridges captured which Chinese officer showed him. Chinese captured a Russian revolver.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[7996] No. 40.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, March* 6, 1910.

THIBET.

Nat'ung, President of the Wai-wu Pu, who is also a Grand Councillor, granted me a special interview last evening.

On my observing that, as detailed information of the course of events in Thibet was reaching His Majesty's Government from Thibetan sources, it was desirable to furnish them with the official information in possession of the Chinese Government,

[7750]

No. 39*.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 6.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Peking, March 6, 1910.

THIBET.

With reference to the telegrams of the 3rd and 5th instant from the Indian Government, owing to its condensed form the Intelligence Branch information supplied originally by the military attaché here is misleading. He estimated the Lhassa expeditionary force to be 1,700, and reported that the forces under the orders of Chao Erh Feng in the Thibetan marches, which does not necessarily mean in Thibet proper, numbered about 3,200 last year. Under normal conditions Resident's escort and post-station guards in Thibet number about 1,500, and are furnished by Szechuan. The warning sent to Hukuang (not Kiukiang) and Nanking authorities is considered by military attaché as merely a military precaution of an obvious nature.

Nat'ung made ready response, and said he was most anxious that His Majesty's Government should learn the facts of the case. The Viceroy of India's telegram of the 5th March only reached me after my interview, but in view of its terms it would seem expedient to furnish you with a full telegraphic report of the Chinese version of the case. In a sketch of the Dalai Lama's career since he assumed office in 1895, Nat'ung endeavoured to show how he had been the cause of endless trouble to China, and how unworthy of confidence he was. The British expedition of 1904 was necessitated by his intrigues and intentional disregard of treaty obligations. On his flight from Lhassa at that time without their authorisation, the Chinese Government had overlooked his insubordination and treated him with consideration, but they had now been obliged to depose him and set up another in his place on account of his conduct since he returned to Lhassa, and his renewed absence without any proper reasons.

In reply to my request for definite instances of disobedience, the President of the Wai-wu Pu said that the Dalai Lama, during the fifty days of his sojourn in Lhassa, had refused to see the amban for the friendly transaction of business, in spite of the fact that the latter had gone out to meet him when he arrived. By refusing to supply the regular transport he had tried to cut off communication with China, and the supplies usually found for the amban and his escort had been withheld. Bodies of Thibetans had from the outset hindered the Chinese troops on their march, and had ultimately set fire to the stores which had been collected for them, although every care had been taken to warn the Dalai Lama that the church need fear no interference and that it was not proposed to effect any internal change in the administration of the country, but that the troops were merely being sent to serve as police, and for the protection of trade marts. Nat'ung denied that any reduction had been made in the position or power of the Dalai Lama, nor could he believe that any promise limiting to 1,000 the number of troops to come to Lhassa could ever have been made by the amban, who could not give any such assurance in the absence of authorisation from his Government. On my mentioning the events reported to have occurred at the time of the Dalai Lama's flight, Nat'ung said that the information of the Chinese Government did not correspond with mine. The troops had the strictest orders to abstain from attacking Thibetans without provocation, and he could not, therefore, accept the reported charges of their misconduct, though he would not go so far as to assert that they had made their entry absolutely without incident. He emphatically denied that the report which had appeared in the press as to the Viceroy and Chao Erh Feng having proposed the conversion of Thibet into a Chinese province, rested on the slightest foundation. The Chinese Government never for a moment entertained such a thought, as the step would constitute a violation of the stipulations of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty. His Excellency reminded me that His Majesty's Government had thought it necessary to insist on the trade regulations of 1908 bearing the signature of a Thibetan delegate in order to secure their observance by the Thibetans, and that the Chinese Government had been reproached in the past with failing to keep the Thibetans up to their treaty obligations. With regard to the troops in Thibet, the only force besides the post station guards and the normal escort of the Amban was a special body of Szechuan troops, 2,000 strong, which did not form part of Chao Erh Feng's force still stationed at Chiamdo and Derge. None of the latter had entered Lhassa. Nat'ung reiterated his assurances that the Chinese Government's action was solely directed against the person of the Dalai Lama. In 1710 the sixth Dalai Lama had been deposed for misconduct, and precedents for the removal of Lamas were numerous. There were Lamist dignitaries at the Peking Court, and among her Mongolian subjects China counted millions of Lamists. It was, therefore, absurd to suppose that the Chinese Government intended to interfere with the Lama Church or to disturb the system of administration obtaining in Thibet. The right of stationing troops in Thibet had always belonged to China, and reinforcements had recently been despatched solely to preserve order, to secure the observance of treaty engagements, and to protect the trade marts.

With regard to the charges of burning monasteries, it was necessary to go back for over a year to find an instance, and then only one monastery had been destroyed by Chao to avenge the slaughter of a Chinese Amban, and thirty of his escort, in an ambush set by the Lamas. The Grand Council had received a telegram from Lhassa, dated the 26th February, on the 4th March, reporting the good behaviour of the Szechuan troops and the tranquility of the country, and stating that the administration was being carried on by the Council as usual, and that the people and lamas were unmolested in the pursuit of their ordinary vocations. Nat'ung assured me that

telegrams had repeatedly been sent to the Amban by the Prince Regent himself instructing him to observe treaty engagements and maintain order, and that this question was engaging the Prince's greatest attention.

After giving me a private hint that the Dalai Lama had only been prevented by the distance from seeking refuge in Russia, where, his Excellency suggested, his cause was a matter of interest, Nat'ung promised to give me a detailed statement of the Chinese Government's indictment against the Dalai Lama, and to keep me informed of the course of events in Thibet.

Nat'ung thoroughly recognised the correct and fair attitude of His Majesty's Government, on whose support he trusted the Chinese Government might rely in the pursuit of the objects he had set forth. Finally his Excellency expressed his thanks to me for affording him an opportunity of explaining the Chinese view of the question for the appreciation of His Majesty's Government.

[8496] No. 41.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. MacDonald.**

(No. 53.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 7, 1910.

I INFORMED the Japanese Ambassador to-day that the Dalai Lama had given to the British official at Darjeeling a lamentable account of Chinese aggression in Thibet. The Dalai Lama had expressed the opinion that this action on the part of the Chinese was only preliminary to further aggressive movements, which would involve the Indian frontier. I thought, however, that he was probably making the most of what had happened, or was likely to happen, in order to influence us on his behalf. He would be received with hospitality as a guest at Calcutta, if he wished to go there; but we should not commit ourselves to him in any way.

As long as the trouble was confined to Thibet, I did not think we should go beyond diplomatic representations at Peking of the kind which we had already made there. But if the Chinese interfered in Sikkim or Bhutan, or if Nepal, which was a strong State, became involved, then there would be serious trouble. It did not seem that this contingency was likely to occur; but even if it did, we should probably not take any action in Thibet itself, but bring pressure to bear upon China direct.

The Ambassador said that China would have to go a long way before reaching the Indian frontier, and he concurred in the sketch I had given him of our views and probable proceedings, which he said seemed to him to be quite the right line for us to take.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8204] No. 42.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 7th March, relative to the relations between China and Thibet.

India Office, March 8, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 42.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 7, 1910.

AGENT, Gyantse, telegraphs as follows:—

"A Thibetan arrived here from Lhassa to-day. He reached Lhassa the day after the flight of the Dalai Lama, and left on the day following. According to his report, it was two or three days before it was generally known that Dalai Lama had fled.

* Also to Viscount Morley.

Chinese troops to the number of about 2,000 arrived from Chiamdo, where on the 20th January a small fight took place between Chinese and Thibetans. Eight Chinese were killed, fifteen Thibetans were killed and eighteen captured. Captured Thibetans were beheaded at once. Except for small quarrel on their entry, Lhassa was quiet both before and after Chinese entered. There was a rumour that fresh Lonchen (*i.e.*, Ministers) were going to be appointed by the Chinese, but it is not known what their names are. Tsarchong Shape is the only high Thibetan official left in Lhassa, and he has to obtain Amban's permission for all his acts. Chief opponent of the Thibetans is Len, the chief Amban. It is common talk in Lhassa that Len desires to take entire administration into his own hands, and is very suspicious of British influence in Thibet. The first thing he would do would be to decapitate Thibetan Ministers and force Dalai Lama to give him the power. Chinese have posted twenty-five soldiers on each side of River Chaksam, and a pass signed by the Amban is required before any Thibetan is permitted to cross. This Thibetan had to pass round the Yamdok Tso on the east and south side. Except Chinese soldiers, there is no traffic between Gyantse and Lhassa. [End of Thibetan's report.]

"Chinese here, who are still very reticent, are of opinion that the Dalai Lama will be deposed, and that his Ministers, on their return to Thibet, will be beheaded."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[8256] No. 43.

Reply to Russian Representations at Peking about Thibet.—(*Communicated by Count Benckendorff, March* 8, 1910.)

(Confidentiel.)

EN l'absence du Ministre Ljan, Fan a répondu au Ministre de Russie que la déposition du Dalaï-Lama a été provoquée par ses intrigues et sa constante opposition aux réformes stipulées par traité. La Chine n'aurait fait qu'user de son droit en punissant un sujet coupable d'infraction à ses devoirs de vassalité, qui, ne reconnaissant plus le pouvoir de la Chine, s'immisçait dans l'administration intérieure du pays, au lieu de vaquer à ses devoirs spirituels.

Par sa fuite secrète du Thibet le Dalaï-Lama aurait manqué de considération pour la Chine, qui déjà une fois lui avait démontré de la condescendance, lors de son premier départ, et par là il aurait provoqué la mesure décisive prise aujourd'hui à son égard.

[7506] No. 44.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 84.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1910.

WITH reference to recent telegraphic correspondence between this Office and His Majesty's Legation, I have to state that Reuter's informant as to the strength of the Chinese force now in Thibet is a certain Mr. Fergusson, whom you will no doubt recollect as the author of a map of Independent Lololand forwarded in your despatch No. 381 of the 16th October last, and a member of the British and Foreign Bible Society. Mr. Fergusson has called at this Office and at the India Office, and at the latter department corroborated generally Reuter's statement respecting the strength and organisation of the Chinese troops in Eastern Thibet, and asserted that the objective of the Chinese Government is the reduction of the frontier tribes and not the occupation of Lhassa. At the India Office his story was considered entirely credible.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[8843] No. 45.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 14.)

(No. 58.)

Sir, *Peking, February* 26, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 38 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at

Chengtu, enclosing copy of a further letter from Mr. Muir at Batang respecting the operations of Chao Erh-feng on the Thibetan borders.

In view of the recent developments in Thibet, which are at present the subject of telegraphic correspondence, the information conveyed by Mr. Muir is somewhat out of date.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
W. G. MAX MÜLLER

Enclosure 1 in No. 45.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 8. Confidential.)

Sir, *Chengtu, January* 28, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 39 of the 18th December last, I have the honour to enclose copy of a further letter from Mr. Muir, of Batang, on the movements of Chao Erh-feng, warden of the marches, and the opposition displayed by the Thibetans.

I cannot learn here that Chiamdo and Draya "have been reckoned a part of Szechuan." Probably what Mr. Muir's informant meant was that they are considered as falling within the sphere of the warden's action, and not within that of the Amban at Lhassa.

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 45.

Mr. Muir to Consul-General Wilkinson.

Dear Mr. Wilkinson, *Batang, December* 20, 1909.

ON the evening of the 18th December I sent a telegram to you as follows, using the C.I.M. code, and sending it through Mr. Franck:—

"(Confidential and strictly private.)

"Please notify consul—exciting rumours prevalent. There has been no news from Thibet during the last few days. Chinese anxious about the safety of the Minister."

To-day I sent a man down the river to go as far as he could and see what he could find. He returned about 3 P.M., and reports as follows: When he had gone only 40 *li* he met the local official (Chun-liang Fu), from whom we had not heard for some days. It was lack of word from him, as well as from his Excellency Chao, that caused me to send the telegram. The official turned my man back, and said it was useless for him to go any further. The situation is as follows: (I am at a loss to know how familiar you are with the border, so I will have to locate points for you. I will use the C.I.M. atlas of China.) His Excellency Chao has been operating all this year in the region of Darge Gonchen (32° north, 99° east, map 15). Recently he moved some of his troops from here, and they were sent to Chiamdo (31° north, 97° east, map 21), to prepare the way for him. The small force met with some inconvenience, but with no real opposition. On the 4th December Chao himself, with a large part of the troops that were with him at Darge, started for Chiamdo, and that is the last authentic news that has reached us from him. The Batang official was ordered to Chiamdo, and left here accordingly in proper time to meet Chao at Chiamdo. The official reached Draya (30° 30′ north, 98° 20′ east, Chamdum Draya) on the 6th December, but he was unable to proceed further. Please follow the road that he had to take. The Thibetans have placed a force, numbered as 500, on the border at Bamutang (29° 20′ north, 98° 50′ east). From Draya to Bamutang the official passed as an ordinary soldier, with an escort of two, one of them an interpreter. He says only thus would he have escaped. He does not know what has occurred at Chiamdo—at least, I do not know that he knows.

That is the story told to my man, and he was ordered back to Batang as I have

said. They say that the force at Bamutang will let no one through. I wish that our man had at least got to Bamutang, but he had to obey the official. I will try to send him again in a day or two, but he may be stopped. This much is certain, the Thibetans are not going to take Chao's military programme lying down. I have pointed out again and again to your consulate that the move I have just explained was the only one of importance since he took Batang three years ago. He only crossed the recognised border this month. Up to this time he has operated in territory that Lhassa has recognised as belonging to China. What has happened or is going to happen I do not know. If Chao is strong enough and succeeds, history will be made. If he is too weak and fails more important history will be made. We wait with excitement in the air.

Before this reaches you, you may know the truth by wire, but the letters will bear fuller explanation.

One more report may be of interest. Since the present Amban arrived in Lhassa, it has been the custom to send most of the Lhassa correspondence to Peking viâ Darjeeling and Calcutta. On Saturday night just after I sent the wire to you, a great batch of official matter to go forward by wire and courier arrived from Lhassa. That points to possible trouble there, and we have heard for some time that the Chinese in Lhassa were getting afraid of complications. If there is any truth in this report about the change in the method of sending information to Peking, it can be found out from India.

December 21.—This morning I saw the local official. He himself says that all I have written is substantially correct. He is not quite as fearful as the reports have made out, but he says that there have been rumours that the Thibetans had planned to attack Batang. That, however is doubtful. He says that the Thibetans are prepared to resist the advance of Chao. That the Dalai Lama had no knowledge that China was to send in the new militia to police Thibet. That the old order of things will be maintained. They will permit the Chinese couriers, &c., as formerly, but nothing new. That Chao is now at Chiamdo, but that he does not know what he will be able to do. He says that there is no trouble in either Draya or Chiamdo, and that Chao is safe in Chiamdo, but he did not explain why he himself only went to Draya and then returned, when he was supposed to be going to Chiamdo He explained what was news to me, namely, that Chiamdo and Draya have been reckoned a part of Szechuan. I knew that they were independent of any direct control from Lhassa, but I understood that they were looked upon as rather independent. Now it seems that the Dalai Lama takes the same view, and has resented Chao's move on Chiamdo, though at the same time he has not technically encroached on the Dalai territory. The district near to Batang called Gartok by the Thibetans, and Kiangka by the Chinese, is the Dalai's territory. The official says that is where the agitation is. (For Gartok, see Map 15, 29° 30′ north, 98° 30′ east.) He says that the Thibetans are camped on the mountain between there and Ranteng, the next place to the south.

Batang rations are getting scarce. The soldiers cannot get any wheat now, and the supply of rice is poor.

December 31.—I am sorry that this has not gone off. I was busy for a few days before Christmas while I waited for more news, and then I took influenza and have been laid up. There is little now to be told. The rumours have subsided since the return of our official in safety. Recently more provisions were sent to Derge, presumably for Chiamdo. Chao will not have enough to last him there for a long siege. It is said that all is quiet there, but an order was sent here for a squad of carpenters to build boats at Chiamdo. If you will consult the map again, you will find that Chiamdo lies in the fork of the Dza and Om Rivers. There are bridges over both rivers ordinarily, but the Thibetans have destroyed the bridge over the Dza, keeping Chao out of Chiamdo itself, and he has sent for men to build boats so that he can cross. The river at this point is very swift, but not heavy in the winter time. During the next few months it will be possible to cross on the ice, so it is difficult to see why he wants boats.

The local official is about to be changed, though he only took office in July. Such changes are not good for the place, but no one wants the job.

It is time for me to stop. Hoping that these notes will be of some use, very sincerely yours,

JOHN R. MUIR.

[8938] No. 46.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th March, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, March 14, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 12, 1910.

IT appears from latest information that all power at Lhassa has been taken by Chinese into their own hands, that soldiers have been posted by them at Chaksam Ferry, and that a pass by the amban is required before any Thibetans are allowed to cross. The only high Thibetan official left at Lhassa, the Tsarong Shape, can take no action without consulting the amban. Reports from trade agents state that Chinese do not allow Thibetans to deal with them direct. We are in receipt of various reports as to Chinese aggressive and oppressive action, but their authentication is difficult. There is at present no confirmation of persistent rumours that have been current in last few days that Tashi Lama was fleeing to India in disguise. It appears to be the case, however, that there is no longer any Thibetan authority in existence. Reference is invited to telegram dated the 6th instant from His Majesty's Minister at Peking. It is impossible to reconcile with established facts the statements that power and position of Dalai Lama have not diminished, and that no alterations in internal administration were contemplated. Copies of correspondence that passed between the Dalai Lama and the Assistant Minister at Lhassa have been given to Mr. Bell by Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim. Following is translation of letter dated the 10th February from the Assistant Minister:—

"I, Great Minister at the time, had a personal interview on the 1st of this Thibetan month (9th February, 1910) at the Potala with his Holiness the Dalai Lama, in regard to the orders sent from Szechuan about sending 1,000 Chinese troops to Lhassa. The kindness and favour shown to Lama by Great Emperor have been minutely explained to him. The following three conditions have, moreover, been agreed to by me:—

"1. The distribution of Chinese troops to guard different frontiers will be considered on their arrival at Lhassa.

"2. The lamas will not be harmed or monasteries destroyed by Chinese troops.

"3. There will never be any diminution, in any degree, of his Holiness the Dalai Lama's spiritual power.

"At the same time the Dalai Lama agreed to the following three similar conditions:—

"1. Chinese troops entering Thibet will, in obedience to command, have no resistance offered them. The Thibetan troops that have assembled will all be dismissed to their various homes.

"2. The excellent and precious Dalai Lama returned to Thibet after meeting the Emperor at Peking, and being the recipient of high titles with countless presents. Thanks for the great kindness shown to him should, therefore, be given by him through us, the Great Minister, to the Heavenly God (Emperor).

"3. Great respect should, as usual, be paid to Mo Len, the Chinese Emperor's Great Minister, and all things should be as formerly. In future all business should be transacted with honesty and justice.

"The above conditions have been explained by me, the Assistant Minister, to the Great Minister Len, who has agreed to them, as stated to his Holiness the Dalai Lama at our personal interview. It will not be necessary for me, the Great Minister, to carry out my promises in the event of his Holiness the Dalai Lama not acting

according to the three conditions agreed to by him. An early reply to this is important."

The above letter was in reply to a request on the part of the Thibetan authorities that there might be no interference with their power. The following, also dated the 10th February, was the reply of the Dalai Lama :—

"In accordance with the statement in the representation received on the 10th February, 1910 ('the third day of the first month'): (1) Orders for the withdrawal of the troops have been issued; (2) I send herewith the report of my return from Peking of the (? magnificent) Empire to Lhassa. Orders for carrying out Len Amban's (? great powers) as before have been issued. It was mentioned in clause 1 of Len Amban's promise that on the arrival of Chinese troops in Lhassa no disturbance will take place; orders were issued to the public accordingly. But many people have been killed to-day. It is stated in the 3rd clause only that there will never be a diminution, in any degree, of the Dalai Lama's spiritual power, but the temporal power over Thibet is not mentioned. There is no statement, either, that the Thibetans will be given no trouble. Clause 2 makes it clear that the lamas will not be harmed nor the monasteries destroyed. We ask you to abide by your three conditions, as we have observed our three conditions."

This correspondence, in the genuineness of which there is every reason to believe, shows (1) that the intention was that the Dalai Lama's temporal power should be taken from him; and (2) that the dispatch of only 1,000 troops was contemplated. Nepal representative's letters show clearly that 1,000 was number of troops fixed by the amban. It was evasive and misleading to state that the signature of the Trade Regulations of 1908 by a Thibetan delegate had been insisted on by His Majesty's Government, because they considered that, otherwise, Thibetans would not conform. Reference to my telegram of the 22nd October, 1907, to that of the 12th November, 1907, from His Majesty's Minister at Peking, and to subsequent correspondence will show that question was keenly contested. Any misapprehension on this point, which is significant as to Chinese Government's attitude, may, we trust, be removed.

A letter has been addressed by the Maharaja of Bhutan, through the political officer, Sikkim, to the Chinese Emperor, in which attention is drawn to the Thibetans' troubles and to the inconsiderate way in which the amban has treated them, no allowance being made by him for their ignorance; adding that there was no need in a religious country for so many troops; that the sufferings of the Dalai Lama, who is the king of lamas, aroused sympathy in all Buddhists; and that there will be trouble with traders and raiyets, and enmity with other rajahs, if the Chinese troops remain. It is not proposed that this letter should be forwarded.

Prime Minister of Nepal is maintaining a correct and friendly attitude. He says that he will undertake no enterprise that may be disapproved by the British Government, but that he can at short notice dispatch 8,000 men to the frontier. Increased vigilance of Chinese in Thibetan affairs, and more especially the guarantees of territorial integrity given by Russia and Great Britain to Thibet, are, in his opinion, bound to affect adversely the interests of Nepal in Thibet. Assurances regarding protection of Nepalese interests have been given by amban to Nepalese representative at Lhassa. A memorandum is being drawn up by the Prime Minister, in which he will enquire how far Nepal is, in our opinion, free to act, in defence of Nepalese rights in Thibet, against China or Thibet. He gave a hint that, if we will guarantee him support for the continuance of existing relations for Nepal *vis-à-vis* China and Thibet, he would not be indisposed to consider question of an agreement between British and Nepalese Governments, giving us control of Nepalese foreign relations with China. We await a communication. In reply to appeal of Kasyal Kazis, Prime Minister has advised them that their differences with the amban should be settled amicably by their acceptance of assurances regarding intentions of Chinese in dispatching 1,000 troops to discharge duties of police; he justifies himself in refusing to send Thibet armed assistance, and makes an offer of his representative's services to carry on negotiations between China, amban, and Thibetan Government. Prime Minister has also sent through his representative at Lhassa a letter to the amban, which is to be delivered if there is no change in the situation, otherwise so much of the letter as may be appropriate is to be communicated. In this letter, regret at misunderstanding is expressed, reply sent to Kasyal Kazis is explained, amban is thanked for assurances which Nepalese representative has received, and earnest hope is expressed for recall to Lhassa, and reinstatement in his former power and position, of Dalai Lama.

Pressure at Peking by British Government for re-establishment of former Thibetan Government under Dalai Lama would be welcomed by Nepalese Government. If Chinese would accept this, which would probably be best solution, our friendly offices could be offered. Lama Buddhists and Thibetans will not recognise that Dalai Lama has been deposed spiritually, and latter will therefore be a source of trouble to the Chinese. There is no reason why Dalai Lama should have our support, but confidence would be restored on the frontier by his restoration, and it would be proof of a desire to maintain *status quo*. Suzerainty of China was desired by Thibetan Ministers in conversation with Mr. Bell, but if China wishes to be friendly it might still be possible to bring about a *modus vivendi*. I suggest that in any case our own interests must be protected. There is unsettlement in our frontier States. Rumour of location of a garrison at Yatung and the number of troops in Thibet constitute, in the opinion of the military authorities, a menace to the peace of our border. The reform, not the abolition, of the Thibetan Government was contemplated in the edict forwarded with the despatch of the 9th April, 1908, from His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

Trade Regulations of 1908 have been violated in the following respects:— Administration and policing of trade marts have, inconsistently with article 3, been taken over by Chinese and direct dealings between our agents and Thibetans have been prevented. Thibetan Government was recognised by convention of 1904, which was recognised by article 1 of convention of 1906. A large slice of Thibetan territory has been lopped off by Chinese, who have forcibly occupied and dispossessed Thibetans of Chiamdo, of Draya, and of Tsa Kalho—provinces of Eastern Thibet. It seems necessary in any case, therefore, that Chinese Government should be required to give definite assurances on the following points:—

1. The limitation of the Chinese garrison in Thibet to a number adequate for maintenance of order internally.
2. The maintenance of a real Thibetan Government.
3. The policing of the trade marts by Thibetans under Chinese officers, if necessary.
4. The appointment at Lhassa of an amban less hostile to British interests.
5. The issue of instructions to Chinese local officers to co-operate with British trade agents, and not to hinder our officers and Thibetans from dealing direct with one another.

It might be advisable that, at this stage, Chinese Government should be informed that the British Government must reserve the right to retain and increase escorts at Yatung and Gyantse, if necessary, in view of change in *status quo*, unfriendliness of local Chinese officers, and disturbed state of Thibet. Individual Chinese might get out of hand, though we consider it improbable that our agencies will be attacked by Chinese.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[9582] No. 47.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 103.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, March* 20, 1910.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs received yesterday an emissary of the Dalai Lama, who appealed on behalf of his Holiness for protection, &c. The emissary in question was the bearer of a letter from the Dalai Lama to Dorjieff, sent before his Holiness fled from Lhassa.

M. Isvolsky replied that the Imperial Government sympathised with the Dalai Lama in his misfortunes, but that they had received no definite information respecting recent events in Thibet, and that they would not, in any case, do anything without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government and in agreement with them.

[9093] No. 46 A.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 15.)

(No. 51.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, March* 15, 1910.

I HAVE received a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Shanghai, reporting that he has been asked for a letter of introduction to the Government of India by Chien Hsi Pao, who was proceeding direct from Shanghai to Thibet, viâ Calcutta, to take up his new post as councillor on the Amban's staff.

Having ascertained from the Wai-wu Pu that as soon as Chien's movements were fixed they proposed to inform me, and that the facts as above stated were correct, and as I thought that the Foreign Secretary might like to have an opportunity of talking over matters with Chien, I have authorised His Majesty's consul-general at Shanghai to give the desired introduction.

[9589] No. 46 B.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 20.)

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, March* 20, 1910.

THIBET. In reply to an enquiry at the Wai-wu Pu, I was informed that some time would be required for the proceedings in connection with the selection of a new Dalai Lama. Everything was reported to be quiet in Lhassa, in a telegram dispatched from there on the 7th March. I was further informed that the Chinese Government had appointed as regent in charge of the civil administration, or "shang shang," one of the abbots, or "kanpus," whose name was given as Gulatan Sepa Lobatsang Tanpa.

[9417] No. 46*.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.—(Communicated by India Office, March 18, 1910.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 17, 1910.

I HAD a private interview with Dalai Lama on afternoon of Monday, the 14th March, after exchange of formal visits in morning of same day. Lama expressed reliance on British Government and gratitude for hospitality. The difficulties between Thibet and Britain in 1888 and 1903 had been caused by China. As he told our Minister when at Peking, China's interference had always been harmful. Promises of Emperor and Dowager-Empress had been disregarded by Amban, who had clearly shown that he would leave the Thibetans no power. He appealed to us to secure the observance of the right which the Thibetans had of dealing direct with the British. But he also desired the withdrawal of Chinese influence, so that his position might be that of the fifth Dalai Lama who had conducted negotiations, as the ruler of a friendly State, with the Emperor. There should also be withdrawal of Chinese troops. Treaties of 1890 and 1906, to which they were not parties, could not be recognised by the Thibetans. He was cut off from communication with the Regent whom he had left at Lhassa, although he and his Ministers were the Government of Thibet and had the seal of office. All travellers were stopped and searched by the Chinese, and, unless sent secretly, no official letters got through. He had received some private letters. He would not return to Lhassa unless his matter was settled satisfactorily. What his eventual destination would be he could not say; he wished to return to Darjeeling for the present. After violation of the promises which the Dowager-Empress gave him, he would not trust Peking Government's written assurance. Intrigue on his part against the Chinese he denied. The Amban was altogether hostile, and a hostile policy had been adopted by the Chinese. The Chinese had designs on Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal. So far as Thibet was concerned there was no need for the large force of 2,700 troops, which, according to his information, the Chinese had in and round Lhassa. The lama gave his account of his relations with Dorjieff, who, he said, was a purely spiritual adviser, and of the treatment of the letter from Lord Curzon. He inquired at the conclusion of the interview how his appeal was answered. In reply, I said that at present I could give no reply at all, but that I was very glad to make his acquaintance, to extend hospitality, and to hear his views, which would be placed by me before His Majesty's Government. He again thanked me warmly for hospitality and took his leave. He will probably leave for Darjeeling on Friday. We are sending fuller report by mail.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[9742] No. 48.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 65.)

Sir, *Peking, March* 4, 1910.

AS I have already had the honour to inform you by my telegram No. 36 of the 26th ultimo, I lost no time in acting on the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 32 of the 23rd ultimo, which for some reason, which I have not been able to ascertain from the telegraph officer here, took nearly thirty-six hours in reaching me.

My above-mentioned telegram so fully explains the nature of the communication which I made to his Excellency Liang-tun-yen, president of the Wai-wu Pu, and of the assurances which I received from him in reply that there is no need for me to recapitulate them here, though I would add that his Excellency laid special emphasis on his statement that the Chinese Government had no intention of in any way altering the internal administration or interfering with the religion of Thibet, but merely wished to be in a position to police the country and exercise their recognised authority so as to be able to compel the Thibetan Government to observe their treaty obligations.

On returning home from my interview I found a note from the Chinese Government communicating the terms of the Imperial Edict issued that morning deposing the Dalai Lama, and giving instructions for the election of a successor as the "true embodiment of previous generations of Dalai Lama." I had the honour to telegraph the gist of this edict and of the covering despatch in my telegram No. 37 of the 26th ultimo, and I will now confine myself to transmitting to you a translation of the documents without any further comment.

As I was anxious to receive in writing the assurances already verbally made by his Excellency Liang-tun-yen I addressed to Prince Ch'ing, on the 26th ultimo, the note, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, and on the following day I received the accompanying reply, the gist of which I communicated to you in my telegram No. 39 of the 28th February.

In the interview which I had with his Excellency Liang-tun-yen on the 25th ultimo I laid stress on the advantage to the Chinese Government of being open with us in regard to their future action in Thibet, and also of taking the press into their confidence so as to counteract the effect of such telegrams as that published by Reuter's Agency in London as to the strength of the force that China was sending to Lhassa. His Excellency promised to act on this advice, but in spite of a further message from me in the same sense, I have received no communication, verbal or written, from the Wai-wu Pu as to what is at present going on in Lhassa, what forces they have there, what their intentions are in regard to the so-called policing of Thibet, and whether they propose to despatch further troops into Thibet. The native papers, Chinese and English, have contained long articles justifying China's action in Thibet, but I cannot ascertain that any definite communiqué such as I suggested in regard to the number of Chinese troops in Thibet, the objects of Chinese policy in that country, &c., has been made to the foreign correspondents here.

I have already informed you, on the authority of Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby, military attaché, and of His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu, of the inaccuracy of the Reuter telegram as to the numbers of the Chinese expeditionary force, and the warlike preparations at the Chengtu arsenal, and I now beg to transmit a copy of a memorandum on the subject by Colonel Willoughby.

I would mention that the messenger from the Dalai Lama, referred to in my telegram No. 31 of the 22nd February, called again on the 23rd, when Mr. Campbell communicated to him verbally the reply authorised in your telegram No. 30 of the 22nd February.

I have since learnt that his statement that he was not the bearer of letters addressed to other legations was false, as he delivered similar letters to the Japanese, French, and Russian Ministers, and probably to others also, and M. Korostovetz informed me that the letter to him was couched in more definite terms than that addressed to Sir John Jordan, and asked directly for Russian help against the aggression of the Chinese.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

[Enclosure 1 in No. 48.

Prince Ch'ing to Sir J. Jordan.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *February* 25, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 20th February a telegram was received from the Imperial resident in Thibet, stating that the Dalai Lama had flown from Thibetan territory in the night of the 12th February, he knew not whither, but that officers had been sent in all directions to follow him up, attend upon him, and protect him. At the moment, although the Dalai Lama was gone, the clergy and laity of Thibet were as peaceful as usual.

A report was forthwith presented to the throne by this Board, and on the 25th February the following decree was received:—

The Dalai Lama of Thibet, A-wong-lo-pu-tsang-t'u-pu-tan-chia-t'so-chi-chai-wang-ch'ü-ch-'üeh-lê-lang-chieh, has long been the recipient of the favour and abounding kindness of my Imperial predecessors, and, if he put forth the good that was in him, he would devoutly cultivate the precepts of his religion and scrupulously observe the established rules, in order to spread the doctrines of the Yellow Church. But, since he assumed control of the administration, he has been proud, extravagant, lewd and slothful beyond parallel, and vice and perversity such as his has never before been witnessed. Moreover, he has been violent and disorderly, has dared to disobey the Imperial commands, has oppressed the Thibetans, and precipitated hostilities.

In July 1904 he fled during the disorders, and was denounced by the Imperial resident in Thibet as of uncertain reputation, and a decree was issued depriving him temporarily of his title. He went to Urga, and on his retracing his steps to Hsi-ning, the court, mindful of his distant flight, and hoping that he would reform and repent, ordered the local authorities to pay him due courtesy and attention, and, when he came to Peking in the year before last, he was received in audience, given an addition to his title, and presented with numerous gifts. Further on his way back to Thibet, officers were sent to escort him, but though the aforesaid Dalai loitered and caused disturbance by his exertions, every indulgence was shown to him in order to manifest our compassion. The past was forgiven in the hope of a better future, and our intention was generous in the extreme. The present entry of Szechuan troops into Thibet is specially for the preservation of order and the protection of the trade marts, and the Thibetans should not have been suspicious because of it, but the aforesaid Dalai, after his return to Thibet, spread reports and became rebellious, defamed the resident, and stopped supplies to our officers. Numerous efforts were made to bring him to reason, but he would not listen, and when Lien-yü telegraphed that, on the arrival of the Szechuan troops in Lhassa, the Dalai, without reporting his intention, had flown during the night of the 12th February, and that his whereabouts were unknown, we commanded the resident to take steps to bring him back and make satisfactory arrangements for him. Up to the present his whereabouts are unknown. How can he be allowed to absent himself repeatedly from the control of the administration? The aforesaid Dalai has been guilty of treachery over and over again, and has placed himself outside the pale of the Imperial bounty. To his superiors he has shown ingratitude, and he has failed to respond to the expectations of the people below him. He is not a fit head of the saints (Hu-t'u-k'o-t'u).

"Let Awang, &c., be deprived of the title of Dalai Lama as a punishment. Henceforth, no matter whether he has flown, or whether he returns to Thibet or not, he is to be treated as an ordinary person, and the resident in Thibet shall at once institute a search for a number of male children bearing miraculous signs, inscribe their names on tablets, and according to precedent, place them in the golden urn, from which one shall be drawn as the true re-embodiment of the previous generations of Dalai Lamas. A report shall be made to the Throne, and the Imperial favour will be bestowed on the child selected, who will thus be enabled to continue the propagation of the doctrine and glorify the Church. The court rewards virtue that vice may suffer, and holds perfect justice. You, clergy and laity of Thibet, are our children, and from the issue of this decree let all of you obey the laws and preserve the peace, and let none disregard our extreme desire for the tranquillity of a border dominion, and for the support of the yellow church."

I have the honour to observe that an Imperial decree has been issued depriving the Dalai Lama, Awang, &c., of his title and ordering the selection of a person in

accordance with precedent, upon whom the title of Dalai Lama will be bestowed by His Majesty the Emperor, to keep order in the Yellow Church ; and that all matters affecting the relations of Thibet will continue to be dealt with according to the treaty concluded between China and Great Britain. Instructions in this sense have been sent by telegraph to the Imperial resident in Thibet.

In communicating the above to your Excellency, I have the honour to request that the British Government may be informed.

I avail, &c.
Prince CH'ING.

Enclosure 2 in No. 48.

Sir J. Jordan to Prince Ch'ing.

Your Highness, *Peking, February* 26, 1910.

AS I stated yesterday verbally at the Wai-wu Pu, my Government feel some anxiety as to the effect that may be produced by the events at present taking place in Thibet on the neighbouring States which border on our Indian Empire.

Great Britain, while disclaiming any desire to interfere in the internal administration of Thibet, cannot be indifferent to disturbances of the peace in a country which is both our neighbour and on intimate terms with neighbouring States on our frontier, and especially with Nepal, whom His Majesty's Government could not prevent from taking such steps to protect her interests as she may think necessary in the circumstances. In view of our treaty relations with both Thibet and China, His Majesty's Government had the right to expect that the Chinese Government would at least have tendered friendly explanations before embarking on a policy which, in the absence of such explanations, cannot but appear intended to subvert political conditions set up by the Anglo-Thibetan Convention of 1904 and confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.

I venture to remind your Highness that the treaty of 1904 was negotiated with the Thibetan Government and confirmed by the Chinese Government, and His Majesty's Government consequently feel that they have a right to expect that an effective Thibetan Government shall be maintained with whom they can, when necessary, treat in the manner provided by the two above-mentioned conventions.

I hope that your Highness will, in replying to this note, furnish me with information which will enable me to send a reassuring message to my Government as to the intentions of the Chinese Government in regard to their future action in Thibet.

I avail, &c.
(For His Majesty's Minister),
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure 3 in No. 48.

Prince Ch'ing to Sir J. Jordan.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *February* 27, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note, from which I learn that His Majesty's Government disclaim any desire to interfere in the internal administration of Thibet, and to express my appreciation of this fair and friendly attitude.

A treaty having been concluded between China and Great Britain relating to Thibet, its provisions must be scrupulously carried out. However, in consequence of the repeated disobedience and obstinacy of the Thibetan people, the Chinese Government has been compelled to dispatch troops to preserve order. The Chinese Government fully believed that His Majesty's Government must share their views with regard to China sending troops to tranquillise the country and protect the trade marts. This intention was mentioned to your Excellency verbally, and a proposal was suggested to His Majesty's Government by telegraph for sending 2,000 troops by the short route into India. On this occasion only 2,000 troops have entered Thibet by the land route, merely with the hope of protecting the trade marts and seeing that the Thibetans conform to the treaties, and they are in no way different from a police force. But the

Dalai Lama does nothing but run away on one pretext or another, and must really be considered to have renounced his position voluntarily. The object of the Imperial Court in issuing the decree depriving him of his title and ordering the appointment of another is to support the Yellow Church and to tranquillise the country. Telegraphic instructions have repeatedly been sent to the Imperial resident to observe the treaties, and to pay special attention to putting affairs in order, protecting clergy and laity, and maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring States, so that there may be no disorder and that Thibet may remain peaceful as usual.

The Chinese Government attaches importance to the Anglo-Chinese treaty relating to Thibet, and there need be no apprehension whatever of its being broken. Under no circumstances will the dismissal or retention of a Dalai Lama be used to alter the political situation in any way. The relations between our two countries being those of firm friendship, Great Britain will, I am sure, understand the intentions of the Chinese Government and, as occasion arises, give support to them.

I shall be obliged if your Excellency will be so good as to communicate the above to His Majesty's Government.

I avail, &c.

Prince CH'ING.

Enclosure 4 in No. 48.

Note on the Chinese Troops in Thibet.

REUTER'S telegram this morning, to the effect that 25,000 Japanese-trained Chinese troops, with wireless telegraphy and ample machine-guns and artillery, have advanced into Thibet, &c., must be an exaggeration, as there is nothing approaching that number of modern regular troops in Szechuan, the province that naturally finds the Thibet garrisons and escorts, &c. Moreover, we are fairly well informed from various sources of the progress of Chinese operations in the Thibetan marches and of the troops employed. Other contingents from other provinces—*e.g.*, Yünnan and Hupei, &c.—could hardly have been dispatched therefrom to reinforce Chao Erh Fêng without our consular authorities becoming aware of the fact and reporting it.

The "regulars" in Szechuan consist of the 33rd Brigade of Luchün only, under Brigadier-General Chang Ying. Viceroy Chao Erh Hsün's brother, Chao Erh Fêng, was appointed titular resident in Thibet in March 1908, but in the meantime has been occupied in the pacification of the marches, where the lamas have steadily resisted Chinese domination. The Derge territory (north of Batang) has now been formally incorporated in Chinese-administered territory, and at the end of January our consul-general at Chengtu reported that Chao's troops had occupied Chiamdo, Draya, and Garthok without casualties. Last year's reports gave the numbers of Chinese troops operating in the marches as three battalions of "new" troops (said to number 1,200), five battalions of provincial troops, and a bodyguard (200)—in all, about 3,200 men.

In August 1909 a column started from Chengtu far Lhassa, under General Chang Ying, numbering 1,700, with some mountain artillery. (Of these, some 800 only were "regulars," of the 33rd Mixed Brigade.) Yünnan has practically a complete division of "regulars" (19th Division), and could furnish a contingent of some 10,000 "regulars"; but in view of possible trouble at any time on the Tonking border I imagine that the authorities would be hardly likely to deplete the province of "regular" troops. Moreover, His Majesty's consul-general would assuredly have reported their dispatch, whether to Chengtu or viâ Talifu and Weihsi towards Garthok or Batang, the journey in either case being one of many weeks.

Kueichou, Kansuh, and Shensi have practically no contingents of "regulars" worth considering for dispatch (a brigade only at each capital), and we should probably have heard if they had been sent. Hupei has a division and a-half, but certainly our consul-general would have heard if any large contingent had been sent up-river from Wuchang. Szechuan has over 12,000 provincial troops, in addition to the "regulars."

M. E. W.

February 25, 1910.

[9853] No. 48 A.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.—(*Communicated by India Office, March* 21.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 19, 1910.

A PROCLAMATION forbidding Thibetans to call the Dalai Lama by that title, as the Emperor of China, who conferred the title on him, has now taken it away, has been posted by the Chinese in Gyantse bazaar.

Wen, the junior amban at Lhassa, has been dismissed for showing Thibetans favour. Confirmation has been received of statement of Dalai Lama that he is now prevented by Chinese from holding any communication with Thibet. Report from political officer, Sikkim, states that there is no doubt Chang yin Tang, alias Tang Darim Amban, suggested monopolies in wool, &c.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[9864] No. 48 B.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.—(*Communicated by India Office, March* 21.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 21, 1910.

ARRIVAL at Lhassa, about middle of February, of 800 or 900 Chinese troops is reported by Nepalese representative at Lhassa. There was no disturbance.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[10041] No. 48 C.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.—(*Communicated by India Office, March* 22.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 22, 1910.

FOLLOWING telegram, dated the 22nd instant, received from resident in Nepal :—

" All reported quiet in Lhassa in letters from Nepalese representative at Lhassa, dated the 23rd ultimo and 6th instant, received here together on the 19th instant. Recall of Amban Wen confirmed; arrival of 1,000 troops only, and publication of notices, by which monopolies on yak tails and wool trade is revoked, reported."

[10609] No. 49.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 74.)

Sir, *Peking, March* 12, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a report by Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby, military attaché at this legation, upon the recent Chinese advance into Thibet.

The following points in this report appear to me to merit special attention :—

1. That two independent foreign observers of English and French nationality respectively have each commented favourably upon the appearance, discipline, and behaviour of the troops of the column of occupation.

2. That the invading column probably did not exceed 1,700 men all told.

3. That the gradual reorganisation of the old-fashioned Chinese army on modern lines is not confined to the few centres, where reform in military matters is universally known to be in progress, but is being carried out all over the Empire.

With reference to the statement on p. 3 in Colonel Willoughby's report that the Amban at Lhassa had agreed with the Dalai Lama that the expeditionary force should not exceed 1,000 men, I have already reported in my telegram No. 45 of the 6th March that the Wai-wu Pu deny that any such promise could ever have been given.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure in No. 49.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby respecting the Chinese Advance into Thibet.

IN view of the recent events in Thibet, a brief review of the progress of the operations that have led up to the occupation of Lhassa by a force additional to the normal Chinese garrison of Thibet, and a statement of the Chinese forces in, near, or available for dispatch to the dependency (should circumstances demand it) may be of interest.

As a result of the British expedition to Lhassa in 1904 and the flight of the Dalai Lama, and the subsequent Anglo-Chinese convention regarding Thibet, it has since been the object of China to make more effective her control over Thibet, with a view (among other things) to the proper observance of her obligations, and those of her vassal, towards Great Britain. As the suzerain Power, it is only natural that China should most strictly insist on the foreign relations of Thibet being under her own control. The Thibetan authorities at Lhassa, however, and the Thibetan States actually within the borders of China proper have continually shown a disposition to disregard Chinese domination.

His position, however, was made clear to the Dalai Lama when he was here in Peking in the winter of 1908.

He returned to Lhassa in December 1909, and friction appears to have at once arisen.

Meanwhile, in March 1908, Chao Erh Fêng (brother of Chao Erh Hsün, Viceroy of Szechuan) was appointed resident in Thibet, but from that time on he has, in pursuance of the Chinese policy above mentioned, been occupied in the subjugation of the unruly Thibetan States within and on the western confines of Szechuan, with the title of "Warden of the Thibetan Marches," and with his head-quarters at Batang. His corps of occupation actively employed in these operations was said to number some 3,200 men, viz. :—

Three battalions of the new troops (presumably "Lu-Chün," *i.e.*, regulars), said to be 1,200 ; four battalions of "Hsün-fang-tui" (provincial troops) ; one battalion of other provincial troops, and body-guard ("wei-tui"), 200.

During the operations the Chinese troops have at times met with stout resistance, and have suffered considerable hardships and losses. Darge was subjugated last year, and by Imperial edict brought under direct Chinese rule.

His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu, writing on the 18th January, says

"three battalions of militia* ('Hsün-fang-chün') are proceeding to Batang from Tachienlu. These troops belong to the middle division ('chung lu')." He adds: "Mr. Edgar, of Batang, who visited Chengtu recently, says that the majority of troops in his district belong to the modern army; they do not seem to have undergone a long period of training, but are now being carefully drilled every day. The officers do their best to keep order among them, and discipline is very strict, almost cruel, consequently the Thibetans have very little ground for complaint in their treatment by the soldiers. Artillery drill is given at Batang, and the chief of Chala (Tachienlu) has sent 100 of his men there for instruction. Opium smoking is effectively prohibited among the troops."

In August–September of last year a force under the command of Brigadier Chang Ying (general officer commanding 33rd mixed brigade of "Lu-Chün") started from Chengtu for Lhassa to be placed at the disposal of the Assistant Resident Lien Yü. The strength of the column was about 1,700 all ranks, and included 800 regulars from the 33rd brigade and one battery of mountain artillery. The balance of the force was to consist of provincial troops picked up at Yachou and Tien-chüan-chou. They were to be provided with winter clothing on arrival at Tachienlu. (They left Chengtu in khaki.) A foreign (French) observer who met them on the march stated the troops are well armed (new magazine rifles), and their equipment leaves nothing to be desired; the bearing of the men is excellent, as is also their order and discipline on the march. At halts the officers attend to the comfort of the men, and take care that all supplies, &c., are paid for. The points to be criticised adversely were the youth of the men, the short time they had been under training at Chengtu, and that many were already suffering from malaria and dysentery.

On the 29th January His Majesty's consul-general, Chengtu, telegraphed that Garthok, Draya, and Chiam-do had been occupied by Chao's troops without casualties.

On the 26th February he telegraphed: "I do not think that the Chinese troops in and near Thibet exceed 8,000. They have some mountain guns and a searchlight, but no wireless telegraphy."

On the 25th February an Imperial edict issued deposing the Dalai Lama, who had again fled from Lhassa (on the arrival of a detachment of Chinese troops, said to number 200 infantry and 40 mounted infantry), and directing the choice of a new Dalai Lama in accordance with the regular procedure ordained.

According to the formal statement of the Wai-wu Pu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) the column that entered Lhassa territory did not exceed 2,000 men, and Chao Erh Fêng's frontier corps of occupation in the Thibetan Marches formed no part of this expeditionary column. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that this latter column is the same as that mentioned above as having left Chengtu under Brigadier Chang Ying last autumn.

An interesting point in connection with the statement of the Wai-wu Pu is the question of the exact position of the Szechuan–Thibet border. On our maps it is shown as running roughly along the Yang-tsze–Mekong watershed, one projecting tongue of territory between Yakalo and Dayul only extending west of the latter river as far as the Mekong–Salween watershed, Batang and Darge being within the limits of Szechuan, and Garthok, Draya, and Chiam-do in Thibet. Ethnologically, however, almost one-third of Szechuan may be said to be Thibetan, and Chinese officialdom in much of that region appears to exist, so to speak, merely on sufferance, lama authority being paramount. The Wai-wu Pu officials, at any rate, while admitting the presence of Chao at Chiam-do and the occupation by his "frontier corps" of that place, Draya and Garthok do not reckon that Lhassa territory had been entered till the troops passed west of Chiam-do.

It is as yet uncertain exactly what proportion of the expeditionary force actually pushed on to Lhassa; possibly not more than the 1,000 as agreed upon with the Dalai Lama by the assistant Amban, Wên Tsung Yao. The distance from Chiam-do to Lhassa viâ Lhari and Giamda is some 470 to 480 miles, which would take, for a small force even, some five weeks to cover, without allowing for checks or opposition. It must be remembered, however, that the marching power of Chinese troops is remarkable. Accounts received up to date lead to the supposition that the Thibetan authorities had decided not to offer resistance to the Chinese advance from Chiam-do. The Thibetan troops guarding the Dalai Lama in his flight, however, in a rear-guard action at

* Militia is hardly a suitable translation, as the "Hsün-fang-tui" are permanent forces. "Man-lien" is the correct word for militia.—M. E. W.

Chaksam Ferry, are said to have inflicted a loss of sixty on the pursuing Chinese; this, however, may prove to be an exaggeration. Reuter's sensational telegram of the 25th February gave the strength of the Chinese force that had entered Thibet as some 25,000 modern troops, which was obviously a very great exaggeration.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to point out that the existence of Chinese troops in Thibet is not an abnormal state of things. Mayers' "Chinese Government" gives the following interesting particulars:—

"The Chinese armies that entered Thibetat the end of the seventeenth century to support the authority of the Diba, invested by the Emperor K'ang Hi in 1694 with the title of 'King of Thibet,' and to repel the Sungar invasion, remained as conquerors in the land. In 1725 a revolt against the ruler set up by the Chinese Sovereign afforded the pretext for appointing two high commissioners to control the affairs of Thibet on behalf of the Chinese Government. In 1750 the temporal sovereignty was suppressed, and the existing form of government by the Dalai and Panshen Lamas, assisted by a Council of State under the direction of the two Chinese residents, was introduced.

"The residents correspond on a footing of equality with the Viceroy of Szechuan, whence the troops constituting the Chinese garrison and the officers of the Chinese civil administration in Thibet are detailed. The provincial exchequer of Szechuan is charged also with the expenses of the Chinese occupation and government of Thibet. Appointments to the principal civil and military offices of the Thibet Government and hierarchy are made on nominations submitted to the throne by the Imperial residents, who are also invested with the supreme command of both the Chinese garrison troops and the Thibetan soldiery. The Imperial institutes provide for a corps of about 1,500 officers and men detached from the provincial forces of Szechuan, who are distributed at various points in the Thibetan territory. The Thibetan soldiery, consisting principally of village militia, undrilled, and armed only with the most antiquated description of weapons, is officially reckoned as a force of 64,000 men, of whom 14,000 are described as cavalry."

I am not in a position to say how far this description, published in 1897, still applies as regards the Thibetan soldiery, but an official of the Chinese War Office informed me a few days ago that the Chinese troops in Thibet have hitherto belonged to the "Lu Ying" (old provincial troops), and I understand that one of the objects of the present Chinese move, that has caused so great a stir, is to replace these out-of-date troops by soldiers organised, drilled, and armed on more modern lines. It is a perfectly natural result of the establishment of a regular force and reorganised "provincial troops" in the province of Szechuan, whose duty it is to furnish the Thibet garrisons. The informant above mentioned added that there should be some 4,000 troops in Thibet, including the residents' escort ("wei-tui") and the posts along the Batang-Lhassa post road, but that there are probably, normally, not more than about 1,500.

It is now of interest to consider the forces at the disposal of the Chinese Government for operations in Thibet, should such, on a large scale, become necessary.

Taking Szechuan first:—

The only regulars ("Lu-Chün") are the 33rd brigade, with head-quarters at Chêng-tu, where, at the end of 1909, there were only some 2,000 men, the brigade having been largely drawn on for Chao Erh Fêng's "frontier force," and latterly, in August–September 1909, for a portion (800 men) of Chang Ying's Lhassa column. It is probable that steps have since been taken to enlist recruits to replace the men so withdrawn. Though there were, last year, some modern guns at Chêng-tu, I had, up to the autumn, no information of any organised body of artillery in the Lu-Chün there; but as some mountain artillery was stated to have accompanied Chang Ying's column, some had evidently been organised, or possibly assistance may have been obtained from Hu-pei.

The provincial troops in Szechuan were in process of reorganisation, according to the new "Hsün-fang-tui" regulations, last year. On completion of the process they should number about 14,300, but as, in the summer, they were stated to number between 12,000 and 13,000, it perhaps is wiser to estimate them at the lower figure.

The next provinces, in ordinary sequence, to be drawn on would be the Hu-Kuang provinces, viz.:—

Hu-pei has, at Wu-ch'ang, the 8th division and 21st "mixed brigade" of regulars, numbering together about 18,000 all ranks, with seventy-two guns. The 8th division is commanded by one of the most zealous and energetic commanders in the Chinese army, Major-General Ch'ang Piao.

The provincial troops in Hu-pei number some 6,500.

The Hunan troops (in the same Viceroyalty) consist of the 25th "mixed brigade" of regulars, about 5,200 all arms, with eighteen mountain guns, and some 13,000 provincial troops. Ch'ang-sha, within easy water communication of the Yang-tsze, is rather nearer to I-ch'ang than is Wu-Ch'ang. The 400 miles river journey up-river from the latter to I-ch'ang takes, by steamer, four or five days. Thence to Chung King, by junk, takes from three weeks to a month, and from Chung King to Chêng-tu, by road, about a fortnight.

Continuing on below Hankow, the Lower Yang-tsze troops in the Liang-Kiang Viceroyalty come next in order, viz. :—

The Kiang-si (27th) "mixed brigade" of regulars at Nan-Ch'ang and Kiukiang, about 5,300 all arms, and eighteen mountain guns, and provincial troops about 10,500.

The 31st (Anhui) "mixed brigade" of regulars at An-ching, same strength as the 27th brigade ; provincial troops about 5,500.

The 9th division at Nanking and Chinkiang, about 12,700 all arms, and fifty-four guns.

Nanking extra brigade, about 1,000.

The 23rd "mixed brigade" at Soochow, about 5,300 all arms, and eighteen mountain guns.

The 13th "mixed brigade" at Ching-ch'iang-pu (under the Kiang-pei lieutenant-general) is three days up the Grand Canal from Kua-chou, opposite Chinkiang; about 7,000 all arms, and thirty-six mountain guns.

The provincial troops in Kiang-su number some 11,600.

The Shanghae–Hangchow Railway brings the new Che-kiang "mixed brigade" (about 4,500 all arms, and twelve mountain guns) into easy railway communication with Shanghae and Nanking.

The Peking–Hankow Railway (and branches to Tai-yüan-fu and Kai-fêng) facilitates the quick dispatch of reinforcements from Chih-li (Imperial Guards, 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 6th divisions, some 52,000 all arms, with 234 guns), Shan-si (4,500 all arms, and 18 mountain guns), and Ho-nan (6,200 all arms, and 30 guns).

Turning to other available forces in the west of China, but more isolated owing to defective communications, Yünnan comes first, where there is a division (19th) of regulars, about 10,000, all arms, and fifty-four mountain guns, at Yünnan-fu (less one regiment of infantry at Linan and one at Tali-fu). I have no authentic information regarding the numbers of the provincial troops in Yünnan, or whether they have been reorganised as modern "hsün-fang-tui." I hope to have details of them in a few weeks from my American colleague, who is now in those parts. The possibility of trouble on the French (Tonkin) border and along the railway would probably cause reluctance to denude Yünnan of regular troops.

Yünnan is distant from Garthok (via Tali-fu, Chien-chuan, and Atuntzu) about seven weeks' march (673 miles).

Shênsi has a "mixed brigade" of regulars (about 3,300 all arms, and eighteen mountain guns) at Hsian-fu, about a fortnight's march from the railhead at Honan-fu. The provincial troops in the province number about 3,800.

Kan-su has a "mixed brigade" of regulars (some 5,300 of all arms, and eighteen mountain guns), and about 8,200 provincial troops.

Besides the above forces, Canton, Kuang-si, Kuei-chou, Fu-kien, Hsin-chiang, and Manchuria have contingents, of various strengths, of regulars and provincial troops, but owing to their distance and various local conditions I have left them out of consideration with regard to operations in Thibet.

There have been persistent reports in the native press of the intention of the military authorities to dispatch the Wu-Wei-Tso-Chün (a fine body of provincial troops of all arms, about 7,500 strong) to Thibet, but they are still here at Tung-chow, and I can get no confirmation of the rumour.

There are, in addition to the troops above mentioned, some 18,000 reservists available for recall to the colours.

The provincial troops, I should add, are only to a very limited extent available for use outside their own provinces, lacking as they do the necessary organisation, and being required for the maintenance of internal order within their own regions.

M. E. WILLOUGHBY, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché, Peking.

March, 5, 1910.

[10611] No. 50.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Peking, March* 14, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the memorandum which his Excellency Nat'ung had promised to send me, explaining in detail the reasons which have prompted the Chinese Government to depose the Dalai Lama, and amplifying the information on this point already conveyed to you in my telegram No. 45 of the 6th instant. The memorandum contains a recital of the deposed Pontiff's alleged misdeeds, but the explanations and assurances are not really so detailed and definite as those given me verbally by the Grand Councillor Nat'ung. Allowance must, however, be made for the style of Chinese official documents, which are invariably loosely worded according to our western ideas, and appear to lay as much stress on generalities and vague assertions as on definite statements of fact.

I have been unable to obtain any further information from the Wai-wu Pu as to events taking place in Lhassa, though his Excellency Liang Tun-yen told me on Friday that, as far as they knew, everything was quiet there; that there was no truth in the report that three members of the Thibetan Council of State ("Kablens") had been dismissed; on the contrary, some high Thibetan officials appointed by the Dalai Lama before his flight had been confirmed in their offices, while the Assistant Amban Wen had been summoned to the frontier to report to Chao Erh-feng.

I have been much struck with the arguments contained in a memorandum prepared by the Indian Government for the use of this legation on the question of the import of Indian tea into Thibet. This memorandum was forwarded to the Secretary of State for India in the Indian Government Secret despatch of the 10th February, 1910, and I venture to draw your attention to the following references to China's failure to exercise proper influence over Thibet:—

Paragraph 3.—"China promised compliance, but was unable to influence the Thibetans."

Paragraph 6.—"But again, as in 1886-88, China's influence over the Thibetans was shown to be elusive."

Paragraph 7.—"In each case, before taking drastic action, resort was had to China, and her intervention with her feudatory State requested, and that in every such instance China failed in any way to modify the actions or to abate the pretentions of her unruly vassal."

Paragraph 8.—"All that India asked in return for the loss of life which she had to face and the worry and expenditure which she has twice had to incur in consequence of Chinese inability to control her own feudatory was reasonable security for the development of trade across the Indo-Thibetan border."

These statements, it appears to me, might well be used by the Chinese Government in support of their present action in Thibet, which, as I have already reported, they state is undertaken principally with the object of exercising the necessary control over the Thibetan Government to force them to observe their treaty obligations. I notice that the Indian Government, in their telegram of the 12th instant, take exception to the statements made by his Excellency Nat'ung to the effect that His Majesty's Government had insisted on a Thibetan delegate signing the Trade Regulations of 1908 in order to ensure their observance by the Thibetans. They qualify this statement as evasive and misleading, and suggest that any misapprehension on this point may be removed. The statement is, as far as I can ascertain from the archives of this legation, not quite accurate, but it has occurred to me that Nat'ung, who only made this remark in conversation, and did not repeat it in the memorandum which he subsequently sent me, may have been thinking of a statement made by Sir John Jordan in a note to

Prince Ch'ing, dated the 11th January, 1908, copy of which was enclosed in his despatch No. 35 to you of the 22nd January. The statement was as follows :—

"His Majesty's Government desire to have a Thibetan text in order to ensure that the Thibetan delegate fully comprehends what he is signing, and in order to safeguard the observance of the regulations in the future by Thibet."

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure in No. 50.

Wai-wu Pu to Sir J. Jordan.

ON the 25th February an Imperial decree was issued depriving the Dalai Lama of his office and rank, and setting forth in detail the various ways in which he had recklessly defied the Imperial commands. The board has now the honour again to explain point by point the real nature of his crimes.

Since the Dalai Lama took over the civil administration in 1895 he has behaved in a high-handed manner, and has shown himself both proud and dissolute; in short, he has broken all bounds. He has taken up arms and caused many agitations, with the result that he is extremely detested by the people. His Minister for Military Affairs, Chiang Pa Tan Tseng—a man equally loathed—assisted him in his schemes. This man did not keep his troops properly in hand, and they oppressed the whole country and robbed as much as they pleased. In any place they passed through nine out of ten houses were stripped bare. In April 1904 Colonel Younghusband sent a despatch from Gyantze to the resident in Thibet proposing to negotiate. The Dalai Lama not only refused to furnish men and horses, but actually dispatched Chiang Pa Tan Tseng to raise a disturbance. Subsequently the resident ordered the Dalai Lama to return to the Potala and carefully guard the sacred portrait of the Emperor Kienlung, but the Dalai refused to obey, and in July 1904 actually fled away from Thibet in the night. At that time the resident, Yu T'ai, denounced him on several counts, and the Dalai was temporarily stripped of his rank by Imperial decree. Since that date he has wandered about for over two years, first to Urga and then to Si-Ning. He committed extortion on his journey, and had no intention of returning to Thibet. But the throne, continuing to hope that he would reform his ways, ordered the local authorities to show him every attention, and at the same time urged the Dalai to begin his journey back to Thibet. In 1908 he reached Peking, and was received in audience, whereupon the Emperor, ignoring his past offences, bestowed upon him an honorary title and showered presents upon him. The Dalai, after his return to Thibet, ought to have scrupulously cultivated the practice of his religion, and thus, by showing his gratitude, might have hoped to repay the Imperial favour, but he continued in his stupidity, and did not reform.

On the Dalai's arrival in Thibet the resident went to receive him. But he only saw him once, as, although he invited the Dalai Lama several times to discuss important affairs, the latter always made an excuse for not seeing him. Moreover, the Dalai frequently stirred up the Thibetans and moved troops about and invaded China. San Yen was first attacked, and subsequently a reconnaissance was made towards Batang, Yen Ching, and other places. The resident several times ordered him to withdraw the troops, but the Dalai would not do so.

The real object of the entry of Ssuch'uan troops into Thibet is to protect the trade marts and tranquillise the country, and they only number 2,000 men. Moreover, they have advanced by detachments, so that there was no ground for any apprehension on the part of the Dalai. The latter, however, failed to furnish supplies as he was bound to do, and actually sent secret orders to the Thibetan troops to oppose the advance of our men. He also burnt or stole the supplies at Chiamdo, and robbed and slew some of our soldiers and people. Further, the Dalai dispatched troops to the Mo Chu Kung barrier with the object of obstructing our advance, and although successive attempts to reason with him were made, he paid not the slightest attention.

When the first detachment of Ssuch'uan troops arrived in Lhassa the Dalai immediately fled away in the night. Thus the details of his perverseness and past misconduct stand out clear, so that there was no help for it but to deprive the Dalai of his rank and title and proceed to select a successor to him so as to protect the Yellow Church. From first to last the Emperor has treated the Dalai Lama with the utmost leniency.

[10737] No. 50*.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.—(*Communicated by India Office, March* 29.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 26, 1910.

YOUR telegram of 24th [? 23rd] instant regarding Thibet.

We forwarded memorandum of Prime Minister of Nepal with weekly letter, dated the 17th instant, from Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. My views will be communicated as soon as possible. Advice as desired by you is being given to Prime Minister of Nepal. It does not appear possible to define precisely the boundaries of Nepal and Bhutan with Thibet, which have not been demarcated. Boundary between Thibet and Sikkim follows a clearly defined natural watershed, as laid down in article 1 of the 1890 convention, but political officer, Sikkim, is being asked whether more precise information is available.

A written statement, justifying his action, has been received from Dalai Lama. Statement, a copy of which will be sent to Peking by post, has been forwarded by weekly letter to the India Office.

At Yatung a notice signed by Mr. Cheung has been posted, by which, under orders from Chinese Popon at Pipithang, import of silver into Thibet is forbidden, and traders are threatened if orders are disobeyed by them. Instructions have been sent to agent at Yatung to ask Mr. Cheung for what reason this order has been issued, and to point out that the commodities in which trade can be prohibited under article 3 of the 1893 regulations do not include silver.

A memorial against Chinese action in demolishing monasteries and in acts of sacrilege and treatment of Dalai Lama has been presented to me by the Maharaja, council, and people of Sikkim; memorial states that deepest sorrow and disgust are caused among Buddhists by indignities offered to his Holiness, and prays for mediation with China for maintenance of free internal administration of Thibetan Durbar. In reply I have said that the situation is being considered.

Political officer has been instructed to take a suitable opportunity, without being obtrusive, of obtaining a list of specific acts of alleged sacrilege and of monasteries alleged to have been destroyed.

(Repeated to Peking.)

But the Dalai is the chief of all the Hatakhtus, and his special duty should be the propagation of his religion—a religion which loves peaceful seclusion. Yet the Dalai, being a man fond of making war, is not a fit person to be trusted with the control of the Yellow Church. Again, he has disobeyed the Imperial commands, and has several times dared to leave Thibet. It is impossible to pardon him a second time.

Now, in the reign of K'ang Hsi, the sixth Dalai Lama, Yi Hsi Cha Mu Su was deposed, and the title was given to Ko Le Tsang Chid Mo Ts'o, who also became the sixth Dalai Lama. Thus, in deposing the present Dalai Lama and choosing a successor, the precedent set in K'ang Hsi's reign is being followed. Further, the deposition merely personally concerns the Dalai Lama as a man, and in no way affects the internal administration of Thibet.

A telegram has now been received from the resident, Lien, stating that on the arrival of the Ssuch'uan troops they were kept under strict discipline, and that the Lamas are performing their devotions as usual, and that the civil administration is being carried on as before.

The general situation, therefore, remains entirely unchanged, and the Chinese Government will of course, in respect to the foreign relations of Thibet, carry out the provisions of the Anglo-Thibetan treaties.

The board has the honour, therefore, to set forth the reasons for the deposition of the Dalai Lama, and transmits this memorandum in order to dispel popular suspicion.

March 9, 1910.

[10838] No. 51.

India Office to Foreign Office—.(*Received March* 30.)

Sir, *India Office, March* 30, 1910.

WITH reference to my letter of the 25th November last on the subject of a proposal made by the Chinese Government that 1,000 Chinese troops should be admitted to Thibet from India, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India, from which it appears that three Chinese military officers have arrived at Darjeeling, and wish to proceed to Lhassa. Viscount Morley is of opinion that to allow these officers to cross the frontier in present circumstances (besides being open to the objection taken by the Viceroy) would involve a departure from that strict neutrality which it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to observe, and, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, he proposes to instruct the Government of India accordingly.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 26, 1910.

SEE my telegram dated the 22nd November, 1909. Three officers of the Chinese army have arrived Darjeeling, and desire to go on to Lhassa. It would be tantamount to allowing Chinese troops to pass through our territories if we were to allow them to cross inner line at present, and misunderstanding might be caused in Thibet, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. It is proposed that, pending the clearing up of the situation in Thibet, grant of pass under Bengal frontier crossing regulation should be refused.

[10899] No. 52.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March* 31.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 23rd March, relative to the Thibetan situation.

India Office, March 30, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 52.

Viscount Morley to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March* 23, 1910.

THIBET. See your telegram dated the 12th March.

As regards China, Foreign Office is being communicated with. Prime Minister's memorandum and your views are awaited in regard to Nepal. Prime Minister should be advised in the meanwhile to refer to you before taking any action. Please inform me, in view of questions that may arise on the point, whether it is possible to define precisely the boundaries of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal.

[10967] No. 53.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 31.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 31st March, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, March 31, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 31, 1910.

A LONG and interesting account of events following Dalai Lama's flight has been sent by Nepalese representative. Conciliatory attitude was adopted by representatives left by Dalai Lama towards Amban. The latter, however, lost his temper, and denounced the Lama, saying that the Government could get on without him if he does not come back soon and take up the administration. The Emperor's orders must be obeyed; the coming of the Chinese troops was not like the coming of the British. A Chinese military officer said, in conversation, that, on seeing the near approach of the British, China decided that protection must be afforded to Thibet, and as this could not be done by Thibetans, it must be done for them by the Chinese. Importance of avoiding conflict with Thibetans has, according to Nepalese representative, impressed itself on Chinese authorities at Lhassa.

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[11015] No. 54.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

Sir, *India Office, March* 31, 1910.

IN continuation of previous correspondence, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward copies of a telegram and a despatch from the Government of India on the subject of Chinese operations in Thibet.*

2. It appears to Viscount Morley that the Chinese Government is deliberately making its suzerainty over Thibet effective, and that the result of its proceedings will be the substitution of a strong internal administration for the feeble rule of the Dalai Lama. It is necessary, therefore, to consider how this change will affect in the first place British-Indian relations, commercial and political, with Thibet, and secondly, the relations of the three States of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, lying outside the administrative border of British India but under British control or protection, with the Government of India and with their neighbour in Thibet.

3. As to the first of these questions, it seems to be sufficient at this stage to take note of the assurance of the Chinese Government that it will fulfil all treaty obligations

* Enclosure 1 already printed (see No. 46); Enclosure 2 not printed.

affecting Thibet, and to inform it that His Majesty's Government will expect that pending negotiations and representations on the subjects of tariffs, trade agents, monopolies, tea trade, and so forth will not be prejudiced by delay or by any change of administration. If this is clearly understood it will not be necessary in the present state of disturbance to pursue at once the matters discussed in the despatch of the Governor-General in Council, Secret, dated the 10th February, 1910.

4. The second question is, however, one of greater urgency and importance, because delay may create mistrust in the States concerned, and even encourage China to raise claims which will hereafter lead to trouble. The State of Nepal, as Sir E. Grey is aware, possesses a military strength and an independence which no other State in India can claim. In 1854 it made war upon Thibet and acquired by treaty certain rights, tributary and commercial, and in 1873 it broke off diplomatic relations with that country and obtained redress in Lhassa, while in its ordinary relations with Thibet it has readily enforced respect on its frontier. At the same time it has committed itself in former times to an admission of allegiance to the Emperor of China. To these admissions the British Government has, however, given no countenance, and its own treaties with Nepal establish relations of perpetual friendship and peace with that State. In other respects the Nepalese Government renders valuable services to India. Its subjects are largely enlisted in the Indian army of His Majesty and valued not only for their military qualities but even more for their detachment from those political, racial, and religious influences which complicate and embarrass the military system of the British Government in India. The maintenance of friendly intercourse with the high-spirited Gourkhas is therefore an object of high importance. If for the Thibetan authorities is now substituted the Chinese Government, Nepal, with its somewhat uncertain frontiers on the side of Thibet, will inevitably require very careful handling, and therefore the hint thrown out in the telegram dated the 12th March last of a complete surrender of its external relations with China to the control of the British Government offers a solution of inevitable difficulties which will deserve full consideration as soon as the further communication of the Prime Minister's proposals has been received, especially in view of Nepal's direct engagements with Thibet and the condition set out as to guarantee " of existing relations." But in the meanwhile it seems to be advisable that a clear intimation should at once be made to China that the British Government cannot allow any administrative changes in Thibet to affect or prejudice the integrity of Nepal or the rights of a State so closely allied to the Government of India. In regard to Sikkim there is no difficulty, since it has long been under British protection. But with Bhutan the case is somewhat similar to that of Nepal, with, however, two exceptions. The first of these is that Bhutan is very weak, and its boundaries are even more indefinite than those of Nepal, and the second point is that by a recent treaty the foreign affairs of Bhutan are under the control of the British Government. The communication, therefore, which it is proposed to make to the Chinese Government relative to Nepal may well cover the other two States on the borders of British India. While, then, it is suggested that the Chinese Government should be informed that the British Government expect the treaty obligations of Thibet and China in respect to Thibet to be scrupulously maintained, and, moreover, are prepared to protect the integrity and rights of their allies the States of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, the Secretary of State for India proposes to instruct the Viceroy to examine without delay the question of the external limits of the three States, and to check any action on their part which is not authorised by the Government of India. I am to enquire whether Sir E. Grey approves of the action proposed and is prepared to make to China the intimation suggested. On the other hand, the assurances which the Government of India would demand from China seem to Lord Morley to go too far in the direction of questioning her admitted suzerainty, and interfering with the internal affairs of Thibet. Should China fail in performing her treaty obligations in Thibet after the receipt of the intimation proposed above, the breach of agreement can form the subject of precise protest and negotiation. But in the meantime it is undoubtedly desirable to press the Chinese Government to send strict orders to their local officials to co-operate with our own officers in a friendly manner, since without such friendly relations (of which there has recently been a marked absence) friction between the two Governments is certain to arise. It might also be well to impress upon the Chinese the inadvisability of locating troops upon or in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and the adjoining States in such numbers as would necessitate corresponding movements on the part of the Government of India and the rulers of the States concerned. The Thibetans, though ignorant, are peaceable

people, and it is unlikely that a very large Chinese force will be necessary for such simple police arrangements as are contemplated by article 12 of the Trade Regulations.

I have, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[11535] No. 55.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of the following papers relative to the affairs of Thibet: Letter from Secretary to Government of India, dated the 17th March, 1910, and enclosure; diary of Gyantse trade agent, February 1910;* enclosures in covering letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 17th March, 1910.*

India Office, April 4, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 55.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Very Confidential.) *Calcutta, March* 17, 1910.

I ENCLOSE a note of what passed at the private interview accorded by the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama on the 14th March.

H. BUTLER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 55.

Note respecting Interview of the Dalai Lama with the Viceroy.

HIS Excellency the Viceroy received the Dalai Lama in private audience at Government House, Calcutta, this afternoon at 5 P.M. There were also present Mr. Bell, political officer, Sikkim, who acted as interpreter, and myself.

After compliments, in the course of which the Dalai Lama expressed his cordial thanks for the hospitality extended to him and the kindness of his reception, his Holiness said that he had had a trying time in his journey from Lhassa, and was in danger from the Chinese soldiers who pursued him. At the time that he left Lhassa there were 500 of the old Chinese troops and forty newly arrived troops, the advance guard of a force of 2,000 men who were then distant only two days' marches from Lhassa. In all, 2,700 troops had come into Lhassa and its neighbourhood lately according to the information which he had received. The total number of Chinese troops in Thibet was not required for Thibet alone. The Chinese had designs on Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, which they intended to subdue, and would thus destroy the last vestiges of the Lamaist religion. The Chinese had more than once interposed to prevent amicable direct relations between Thibet and the British Government. The Sikkim trouble of 1888 and Younghusband mission of 1904 were entirely due to the action of the Chinese. When at Peking his Holiness had asked the British Minister to eliminate the harmful intervention of the Chinese. The constitutional position of the Amban was to take charge of foreign relations, leaving internal affairs to be administered by the Thibetans. But the Amban had encroached and, in spite of the promise of the Emperor, had taken over charge of the internal administration. Chao Erh Feng has destroyed monasteries and killed monks in Eastern Thibet, and desecrated the religion of the Thibetans. Being anxious for the establishment of direct relations with the great British Government, and realising the hostility of the Amban, he had come to India and appealed for the intervention of the British. Under the trade regulations of 1908 direct relations between the British and Thibetan Governments had been assured, and he appealed to us to see that the rights of the Thibetans in this matter were observed.

* Not printed.

He asked that he might be restored to the position of the 5th Dalai Lama who had negotiated with the Emperor of China as the ruler of a friendly State, and he also asked that the Chinese troops be withdrawn. Questioned by his Excellency as to whether he knew the terms of the treaties into which the British Government had entered into with China and Russia, his Holiness said that he was studying them. The Thibetan Government claimed the right of direct dealing with the British Government, and did not recognise the 1890 and 1906 treaties to which they had been no party. He had had no communication with the Chinese at Lhassa since he left Phari. He would not return to Lhassa under the present political conditions there, as the promises made to him at Peking had been disregarded. He would not trust the written word of the Peking Government, as they had violated the promises given him by the Dowager Empress. Questioned by his Excellency as to what he intended to do if he did not return to Lhassa he said he could not say at present, but unless his matter was satisfactorily settled he would not return to Lhassa. More than this he could not say.

He denied that he had intrigued against China. He had only been two months in Lhassa before he left. The Amban was altogether hostile. He had come away with his Ministers and the seals of office. He had left with the regent whom he had appointed (the incarnated head of the Tso-mo-ling monastery) the seal which was used in signing the 1904 treaty. But his own seal was with him. He had had no intercourse with the regent since he left. The Chinese intercepted all official letters, and he had had no official communication with Thibet. Some private letters had come through. But any communication had to be secret.

Questioned by his Excellency as to what were the real facts of his treatment of Lord Curzon's letter brought to him by Rai Bahadur Ugyen Kazi, he said that Ugyen Kazi had come into his presence, but that he had told him that he could not receive the letter except through the Amban, and he advised Ugyen Kazi in his own interests to go away quietly, as the Amban would deal hardly with him. Very few people knew anything about this incident. As to Dorjieff, he was now in his own country. He was one of seven assistants to his chief spiritual adviser, and had never had anything to say to any but spiritual matters.

At the end of the interview his Holiness said that he had made his appeal, and asked what would be the answer. His Excellency the Viceroy said that he was very glad to have the opportunity of entertaining his Holiness and of meeting him, and had given instructions that every consideration should be shown to him, but political questions of importance required due consideration, and that he could not say more than that he would communicate his Holiness's remarks to His Majesty's Government.

The Dalai Lama then repeated his expressions of gratitude to his Excellency and took leave.

[11533] No. 56.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 4th April, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, April 5, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 56.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic). P. *April* 4, 1910.

SEE my telegram dated the 26th ultimo as to Thibet. The following is text of translation of letter, dated 8th day of second month (19th March 1910), giving information regarding destruction of monasteries, which has been addressed to Mr. Bell by Thibetan Ministers:—

"Chao-erh-feng, Tin, and their Chinese soldiers have plundered and destroyed the following monasteries in Do-me under the three monasteries in Dre-pung, Se-ra, and Ga-den of the Dalai Lama. Do-yang-tee monastery, Gong-Kar-Lam-ling monastery, Sam-peling monastery in Char-tin, and the monastery of Cho-de in Ba (Ba-tang) were entered by many soldiers, who destroyed some of the monasteries. In some public property was plundered and images destroyed. Administrative power of the De-ba of Li-tang was taken over. They quartered Chinese soldiers in the great monastery of [? Li]-tang, although it submitted to the Chinese, and reduced the monastery's income, and, as a consequence, also the number of its monks, of whom it used to contain more than 3,000. Monastery of La-wa and the monasteries of Bu-to and Lhun-drub in Jo-gan were plundered and destroyed. These monasteries were under Thibetan Government's jurisdiction. Monasteries are made untenable for monks by action of Chinese. Without any enquiry the Chinese supported the elder brother in the dispute between the brothers of Der-ge, and brought troops in order to kill younger brother and his party; Der-ge is a country under joint Thibetan and Chinese jurisdiction. Younger brother's party was attacked by Chinese in the Se-shin monastery, property of which was plundered and destroyed, the Buddhist religion thus suffering harm. The deputy, Dro-nyer Jam-yang Gyal-tsen, died the same night he was wounded. As regards Pun-keng Te-chi, who was wounded at Lhassa recently, it is not known whether he will live or not. Monastery of K-sam was plundered and images and property of monastery taken away against all law and custom by the soldiers sent by the Amban, Len, after the Dalai Lama. Most important of all, all letters and baggage of the Dalai Lama and party are being stopped by the Amban, Len. It is requested, therefore, that, after consultation with China, Amban may be withdrawn. On receipt of report from Lhassa a detailed account will be given."

(Repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Peking.)

[10838] No. 57.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 5, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo, relative to the case of certain Chinese officers who have arrived at Darjeeling, and wish to proceed to Lhassa.

Sir E. Grey has no hesitation in concurring in the proposal that these officers should be refused permission to cross the frontier as long as the present unsettled conditions continue in Thibet; but he would suggest that the refusal should be based upon the misunderstanding which it is anticipated that their passage might give rise to amongst the frontier States rather than upon any question of the observance of neutrality. It would seem to Sir E. Grey that no consideration of neutrality can officially be put forward, since, technically speaking, no state of belligerency exists.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[11015] No. 58.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 5, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, enclosing copies of a telegram and a despatch from the Government of India relative to the Chinese proceedings in Thibet, and discussing the effect which may be produced by the establishment of a strong Chinese administration in Thibet upon the relations between that country and the Government of India and the three States of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan respectively.

Sir E. Grey entirely agrees with the views held by Viscount Morley, and he has accordingly caused the enclosed draft telegram to be prepared,* which, subject to his

* Draft telegram.

Lordship's concurrence, he proposes to address to His Majesty's charge d'affaires at Peking.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[11905] No. 59.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 8.)

Sir, *India Office, April 7*, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 5th instant, enclosing draft of a telegram which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs proposes to address to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking in regard to Chinese relations with Thibet and its neighbours.

In reply, I am to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the terms of the draft, but would suggest the addition of the words "interests and" before "rights" at the end of paragraph 3, since His Majesty's Government may find themselves obliged to support Nepal in measures which may be thought necessary to protect commercial interests falling short of actual rights.

I am to add that Lord Morley ventures to think it important that the proposed communication should be made in writing. Oral communications of the same general purport have already been made to and assurances given by the Chinese Government; and the object which Lord Morley had in view in suggesting that that Government should again be addressed was to clinch these oral statements by something of a more permanent and binding nature.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[11905] No. 60.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April 8*, 1910.

THERE is no longer any doubt that China is actively making her suzerainty over Thibet effective, and it is therefore necessary to consider how the change will affect (1) British Indian relations, both commercial and political, with Thibet, and (2) the relations of the three frontier States of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan with both India and China.

As regards (1), the Chinese Government have already given assurances that they will scrupulously fulfil all treaty obligations affecting Thibet, and it will therefore be enough for the moment to inform them that His Majesty's Government will expect that the treaty obligations of China and Thibet in respect of the latter will be scrupulously maintained, and that the pending negotiations and representations on the subject of tariff, trade agents, monopolies, tea trade, &c., will not be prejudiced by delay or by any change of administration.

The second point is, however, of greater urgency, both in view of the military strength of Nepal and of her value to India as a recruiting field, and, as delay might create mistrust in all three States and even encourage China to raise claims in their regard, it will be necessary to make a clear intimation to China that we cannot allow any administrative changes in Thibet to affect or prejudice the integrity either of Nepal or of the two smaller States, and that we are prepared, if necessary, to protect the interests and rights of these three States.

The assurances which the Government of India would demand from China (see the Viceroy's telegram of 12th March) are considered to go too far in the direction of questioning her admitted suzerainty over Thibet and of interfering in the internal affairs of that country, and it will be sufficient for the time being if you address a note to the Wai-wu Pu in the sense of this telegram.

You should at the same time press the Chinese Government to send strict orders to their local officials to co-operate with our own officers in a friendly manner, since without such friendly relations (of which there has recently been a marked absence) friction between the two Governments is certain to arise. It would also be well that you should impress upon them the inadvisability of locating troops upon or in the

neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and the adjoining States in such numbers as would necessitate corresponding movements on the part of the Government of India and the rulers of the States concerned. His Majesty's Government are unable to believe that the presence of a large Chinese force can be required for the simple police duties contemplated in article 12 of the trade regulations.

[12259] No. 61.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th April, relative to the desire of Chinese military officers to proceed to Lhassa viâ Darjeeling.

India Office, April 9, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 61.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, April* 7, 1910.

I APPROVE proposal in your telegram of the 26th ultimo as to Chinese officers.

[12471] No. 62.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of three telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 11th April, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, April 12, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 11, 1910.

FOLLOWING telegram received from Mr. Bell:—

"It is stated by Thibetan Ministers that, whereas normal Chinese garrison of Lhassa and surrounding country is only 500, there are now altogether 3,400 Chinese soldiers there, viz., 2,400 in Lhassa, 500 at Gyamda, ten days' journey east of Lhassa, and 500 at Lharigo, fourteen days' march north-east of Lhassa. Ministers also state that intention of dismissing Ministers who accompanied Dalai Lama to India has been announced by Amban Lien. They point out that such a dismissal would be interference of very serious kind with Thibetan Government's functions. Dalai Lama's palace near Lhassa, known as Norbu Lingka, is stated by them to have been taken possession of by Chinese soldiers, who are endeavouring to construct barracks, capable of holding 1,000 Chinese troops, at Lhassa. They hope that the dispatch of a British officer to Lhassa, in order to help Buddhist religion, would be agreed to by Russia, which itself has Buddhist subjects. They say in conclusion that struggle to maintain the freedom of their country is the only offence of themselves and the Thibetan people."

Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 11, 1910.

MR. BELL telegraphs as follows:—

"In a recent interview I was asked by the Thibetan Ministers that a British officer to inquire into Chinese conduct in Thibet might be sent to Lhassa or Gyantse, and that an alliance, under which each party should help the other on the same terms as arrangement which they say exists between Government of India and Nepal, might be concluded by Government of India with Thibet. In reply, I said that their request would be reported by me to the Government of India as usual."

Enclosure 3 in No. 62.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 11, 1910.

COPY of a letter to Tashi Lama from Amban at Lhassa, in which passage to following effect occurs, has been obtained by resident in Nepal:—

"The Potala Lama, who is now void of rank, will not be made to suffer any injury, even to a hair of his head, or any loss to his wealth and property, if he returns to Lhassa at once, and officers to bring him back are being sent to India; you will also, I hope and trust, send officers to Tale Lama and explain matters to him, and endeavour to persuade him to come back. I spoke orally to Jasa Lama as regards other matters; you will, I hope, bear them in mind and work accordingly."

[13272] No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 125.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 14, 1910.

I HANDED to the Chinese Minister to-day a memorandum embodying the substance of the instructions conveyed to you in my telegram No. 58 of the 8th instant, to acquaint the Chinese Government with the views of His Majesty's Government on the recent events in Thilet, and with the consequent stipulations which they consider it necessary to make in so far as these events affect British Indian relations with Thibet, and the relations of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan with India and China.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[14521] No. 64.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)

Sir, *India Office, April* 27, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams from the Government of India reporting the views of the Bhutan Government and the Thibetan ex-Ministers as to the position in Thibet.

Viscount Morley would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that the time has now come when it is desirable to inform the Dalai Lama and his followers that His Majesty's Government do not propose to take any action on their behalf. It does not appear to be fair to them to leave them under a misapprehension which in the meantime may be preventing them from taking independent action for the furtherance of their

cause. It would also seem desirable at the same time to give Bhutan and Sikkim assurances of protection in the terms of Sir E. Grey's instructions to Mr. Max Müller.

He therefore proposes, if Sir E. Grey concurs, to send to the Government of India the telegram of which a draft is enclosed.*

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 64.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 18, 1910.

MR. BELL telegraphed on the 16th instant as follows:—

"Oral message has been sent through Ugyen Kazi by Maharajah of Bhutan, in which he asks for reduction of Chinese troops in Thibet and restoration of power of Dalai Lama, respectively, to what they were before mission of Colonel Younghusband; he also requests that power to send British officer to Lhassa from time to time should be taken by Government, that number of Indian troops at present stationed at Yatung and Gyantze should be increased, and that trade marts should be policed by us instead of by Thibetans or Chinese."

Enclosure 2 in No. 64.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 21, 1910.

FOLLOWING telegram, dated the 18th instant, received from political officer, Sikkim:—

"Following recent acts of Chinese authorities in Peking in interfering in internal administration and *status quo ante* are reported by Thibetan Ministers:—

"Chinese police are being posted throughout the country by the amban, and where Thibetan police exist they are being dismissed. He has removed thirty good rifles from Thibetan armoury, has closed Thibetan arsenal and Thibetan mint, and proposes the confiscation of all rifles throughout the country in the possession of Thibetans. Regent has been forbidden by him to perform his religious duties, amban saying that another Lama will be chosen for this purpose. He has broken open sealed doors of Dalai Lama's palace at Norbuling, near Lhassa, is taking steps to deprive Ministers who accompanied Dalai Lama to Darjiling of their appointments, and has posted soldiers in most of their houses.

"Ministers request that aggression of Chinese may be stopped while discussion between British and Chinese Governments is in progress, and that permission to communicate with their deputies at Lhassa may be given to the Thibetan Government in Darjiling; failing this, they request the dispatch to Lhassa of British officers with soldiers to enquire into and discuss with Chinese the present condition of affairs."

[14819] No. 65.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)

Sir, *India Office, April* 29, 1910.

IN my letter of the 31st March, on the subject of Chinese operations in Thibet, was enclosed copy of a letter from the Government of India, dated the 10th February, 1910, regarding certain breaches by the Chinese and Thibetan Governments of the Anglo-Thibetan and Anglo-Chinese conventions and of the trade regulations. It was suggested that it would be sufficient for the present to inform the Chinese Government

* See No. 68.

that His Majesty's Government will expect that, pending negotiations and representations on the subject of tariff, trade agents, monopolies, tea trade, and so forth will not be prejudiced by delay or by any change of administration; and it was thought unnecessary to pursue at once the matters referred to in the Government of India's letter.

Viscount Morley is inclined to think that the time has now come when those matters should be taken up.

The policy which underlay the Anglo-Thibetan convention of 1904, and which from that time onwards His Majesty's Government have consistently observed, aimed solely at securing effectually the commercial facilities already conceded to us under earlier agreements and such reasonable extension of them as the normal and unhindered growth of commerce between two contiguous countries was likely to involve. It is not and it has never been part of the policy of His Majesty's Government to seek to exercise political influence or to guide the course of political events in Thibet, and they have carefully respected the desire of the Thibetans for isolation from the disturbing influences of Western civilisation.

But, as the recent Chinese action in Thibet has seemed to afford no reason for departing from that policy of abstention, so it must be recognised that nothing has occurred to cause His Majesty's Government to abate anything from the legitimate rights secured to them by the Anglo-Thibetan convention and formally confirmed by the Chinese Government. It appears to Lord Morley that a clear understanding of this fact by China is a necessary condition of those friendly relations which it is the avowed desire of both Governments to maintain.

As Sir E. Grey is aware, a number of cases have accumulated in which it is claimed that the terms of the convention have been violated. In the correspondence ending with Sir A. Godley's letter of the 1st April, 1909, it was decided that His Majesty's Minister at Peking should address the Chinese Government on the subject of the admission of Indian tea to Thibet. It will be seen from the Government of India's letter that they desire now to separate this question from that of a general tariff. As explained in Sir A. Godley's letter of the 17th February, 1909, the view hitherto taken has been that Indian tea is admissible to Thibet, under the trade regulations of 1893, at a rate of duty not exceeding that which is applied to Chinese tea imported into Great Britain. The Government of India find, however, that this duty is prohibitive, and propose that in future the rate should be that applied to Chinese tea imported into India, viz., 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, though they are willing to consider a higher rate if necessary.

This proposal appears to be reasonable in itself, and the way is opened for negotiations upon the new basis proposed by the fact reported in the Viceroy's telegram of the 10th February, 1909, that the Chinese Customs officer stated that "he had received orders from Peking that no Indian tea was to enter Thibet until a tariff had been arranged." Such a prohibition appears to be contrary to article 4 of the trade regulations of 1893 and the convention of the 27th April, 1906. At the same time the Secretary of State for India leaves it to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to decide whether the Chinese Government should be pressed, under present conditions, to take into consideration the whole question of the admission of Indian tea into Thibet.

The Government of India further wish to address the Thibetan high authorities at Lhassa in accordance with the procedure described in article 3 of the trade regulations of 1908 on three other matters. The restrictions imposed on trade between Garhwal and Thibet and the levy of duties in Thibet are, in Viscount Morley's opinion, infringements of articles 2, 9, and 12 of the Thibet Trade Regulations of 1908. It is understood that the wool monopoly has in the meantime been revoked by the Chinese, but in any case the grant of such monopolies appears to be inconsistent with the last of these articles and with the whole spirit of the treaties and regulations which were designed to promote and not to strangle trade.

Lord Morley therefore proposes, if Sir E. Grey sees no objection, to authorise the Government of India to address the Thibetan Government upon these points.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[14521] No. 66.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 3, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, and to inform you that he agrees with Viscount Morley's view as to the undesirability of allowing the Dalai Lama and his followers to remain longer under a misapprehension as regards the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the internal affairs of Thibet.

Sir E. Grey accordingly concurs in the draft telegraphic instructions which Lord Morley proposes to send to the Government of India in regard to this point and in respect to the question of giving assurances of protection to Sikkim and Bhutan in the terms of the communication which His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking has been directed to address to the Chinese Government.

I am to ask that the Government of India may be instructed to repeat Lord Morley's telegram to Mr. Max Müller.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[16007] No. 67.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 122.)

Sir, *Peking, April* 22, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note which in obedience to the instructions contained in your telegram No. 58 of the 8th instant, I addressed to the Chinese Government, giving the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the effect which the recent action of China in Thibet might have on the political and commercial relations of our Indian Empire with Thibet, and also on the position of the three neighbouring States of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan in regard both to India and China.

The reply, copy of which I have also the honour to enclose, is on the whole more conciliatory than I had expected in view of the rather stiff tone in which I had purposely couched my communication. The reference to the sovereign rights of China was inevitable, as it is now the stock phrase of every Chinese official no matter what the subject of discussion with the foreigner may be.

Mr. Campbell, who has given special care to the translation of these two notes, tells me that the sentence "as for the Nepalese, they are properly (or originally) feudatories of China" is the nearest possible rendering of the Chinese text, and that a character is made use of which can be translated either "properly" or "originally." In regard to Nepal it was hardly to be expected that the Chinese Government would say less, when it is remembered that it is only two years since the last Nepalese tributary mission was in Peking, and that they had to travel in China in the garb of Chinese officials. The quinquennial tribute may, as I believe is the case, be looked upon by the Nepalese as a mere compensation for privileges allowed them in Thibet, but it is certainly regarded by the Chinese as the offering of a subject state. A similar mission is not, I understand, due for another three years, and it is useless to speculate what the attitude of the Nepalese and Chinese Governments will then be in regard to the question.

In regard to the grant of monopolies, his Excellency Liang Tun Yen informed me that the Wai-pu Pu did not understand the reference to this in my note, and I therefore furnished him with a memorandum based on reports received from India, and his Excellency promised to telegraph to Lhassa to ascertain the exact facts.

I regret that, owing to the failure of the Chinese Government to supply me with information as to the progress of events in Thibet, or in regard to their intentions in that country, I am not able to supply you with authentic information as to the policy which China is likely to pursue there. (I have mentioned in two letters to Sir Francis Campbell, of the 1st and 17th instant, the various reports which have reached me, or which have been published in the native papers, but I do not consider any of them sufficiently well authenticated to embody in a despatch.) Liang Tun Yen, when I asked him for news on the 20th instant, merely informed me

that everything was quiet at Lhassa and in Thibet generally, and that three children had been discovered with the miraculous signs, so that the selection of the Dalai Lama might be proceeded with, adding that the Chinese Government had no fear as to the result of such action on their numerous Lamist subjects in Thibet and Mongolia. However, the cumulative effect of the reports that have reached me, taken in conjunction with our knowledge of actual events in Thibet during the past months, only confirms the accuracy of the conclusion that China is actively making her suzerainty over Thibet effective.

Some of the reasons advanced by the Indian Government for believing in the general forward policy of China, have struck me as inconclusive, or based on inaccurate information, *e.g.*, the dispatch of a Chinese inspector of schools to Singapore and Burmah, or newspaper reports as to foreign loans for building railways in Thibet and Mongolia (see telegram af Indian Government of March). Evidence is not wanting of China's forward policy and of her determination to affirm the shadowy rights she has always possessed in theory over her outlying provinces, Mongolia, Thibet, and even distant Turkestan. This policy has been clearly indicated by the process of reduction of the Thibetan marches that has been going on for two years under Chao Erh Fang, and the presence of Chinese soldiers at Pienma, in the unadministered territory on the Burmah–Yünnan frontier claimed by Great Britaim seems indicative of a similar policy. A policy which consists in subjugating outlying dependencies before the Central Government is in a position to exercise proper control over the provinces of China proper may appear strange and contradictory from the western point of view, but in China we are in the land of contradictions, where the men dress as women and the women as men.

It is highly probable that the Chinese Government have no clearly defined policy in Thibet, and that their action will be largely influenced by the force of circumstances, the opposition they encounter and the strength and determination of the officials on the spot, but there can be no doubt as to their general intention which is that Thibet shall become a province of China, in fact if not in name, thus aggravating the responsibilities of the Indian Government and emphasising the necessity for watchfulness on our frontier and in the three neighbouring frontier states.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 67.

Mr. Max Muller to Prince Ch'ing.

Your Highness,[1] *Peking, April* 11, 1910.

I DULY communicated to my Government a copy of your Highness' note of the 27th February by which you informed me of the determination of the Chinese Government scrupulously to fulfil all their treaty obligations in regard to Thibet. This determination of the Chinese Government was expressed to me in even more explicit terms at the interviews which I had with their Excellencies Liang Tun-yen and Na'tung on the 25th February and the 5th March respectively, and the Chinese Minister was instructed to inform Sir Edward Grey that "China will observe the treaty provisions, maintain local peace and make no changes in the *status quo* of Thibet."

I am instructed to inform your Highness that His Majesty's Government have taken note of these assurances and that they will expect that the obligations of the Chinese and Thibetan Governments in regard to Thibet will be scrupulously observed, and that any negotiations and representations now pending in regard to a Thibetan customs tariff to the trade agencies, to the grant of certain monopolies in Thibet, to the import of Indian tea, and other similar questions, shall not be delayed or in any way prejudiced by a possible change in the administration of Thibet.

In the note which I addressed to your Highness on the 26th February, I referred to the intimate relations existing between Thibet and certain neighbouring States on the frontier of our Indian Empire, and I stated that His Majesty's Government could not prevent the Nepaulese Government from taking such steps to protect their interests as they might think necessary in the circumstances. In obedience to instructions from His Majesty's Government, it is now my duty formally to warn your Highness that His Majesty's Government cannot allow any administrative changes in

Thibet to affect or prejudice the integrity of Nepaul or of the two smaller States of Bhutan and Sikkim, and that they are prepared, if necessary, to protect the interests and rights of these three States.

I am at the same time to urge the Chinese Government to send stringent orders to their local officials, to co-operate with the British officers in a friendly manner. Without such friendly relations, of which there has lately been a marked absence, friction between the Chinese and British Governments is sure to arise.

His Majesty's Government are unable to believe that the presence of a large Chinese force can be required for the simple police duties contemplated in article 12 of the Thibet Trade Regulations of 1908, and I desire therefore to impress on your Highness the inadvisability of locating Chinese troops in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India or the adjoining States in such numbers as would necessitate corresponding movements of troops on the part of the Government of India or of the rulers of the States concerned.

I avail, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 67.

Prince Ch'ing to Mr. Max Müller.

(Translation.)

Sir, *April* 18, 1910.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 11th April, the contents of which are noted. The statements of the Ministers of Wai-wu Pu and of the Chinese Minister in London, as mentioned therein, were unreserved communications of the present state of affairs in Thibet, and of the real intentions of the Chinese Government in sending troops into that country, and were made because of the close and friendly relations existing between Great Britain and China. Nevertheless, the sovereign rights of China in Thibet cannot on account of these communications suffer the least abatement or injury. The Thibetan customs tariff, the trade agencies and the import of Indian tea are all questions which the Wai-wu Pu have long desired to settle by negotiation, but the reference to the grant of monopolies is not understood.

As for the Nepalese, they are properly (or originally) feudatories of China, and Bhutan and Sikkim are both States in friendly relations with China. In the event of steps being taken in the future for the reorganisation of the internal Government of Thibet, such would have no other object than the advancement of progress and order in Thibetan territory, and should not affect those States in any way.

With regard to the question of police, a telegram has now been received from his Excellency Lien, the resident in Thibet, stating that a system is being gradually introduced, and this will be limited to what is sufficient to repress disturbance and maintain public order. Then the stations of Chinese troops on the frontiers will be arranged only to keep the peace of the districts, and there being no intention of stationing a large number, our views again prove to be in unison.

To sum up, there are treaties relating to the affairs of Thibet which both China and Great Britain have to observe scrupulously, and as regards the request in the note under acknowledgment, to send orders to the local officials to co-operate with the British officials in a friendly manner, the Wai-wu Pu are bound in all matters affecting international relations to issue instructions for the fulfilment of the treaties. At the same time I would beg your Excellency to communicate in this sense to His Majesty's Government, so that orders may be sent to the British officers on the frontier to transact business matters amicably with the local Chinese officials, to the advantage of both countries.

I have the honour to request that your Excellency will be so good as to communicate the above to His Majesty's Government.

I avail, &c.

Prince CH'ING.

[16349] No. 68.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 4th May, 1910, respecting the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, May 9, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 68.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, May 4, 1910.*

THE following telegram relating to Thibet should be repeated to His Majesty's Minister at Peking. See your telegram dated the 21st ultimo. Definite intimation should now be made to Dalai Lama that there can be no interference between Thibetans and China on the part of His Majesty's Government. Such steps will be taken by His Majesty's Government to enforce the Anglo-Thibetan and Anglo-Chinese conventions as may be considered desirable; but His Majesty's Government can only recognise the *de facto* Government, as the above conventions specifically preclude them from interfering in the internal administration of the country. Dalai Lama and his followers will be treated with respect so long as they choose to remain in India, and any arrangements they may wish to propose regarding place of residence, &c., may be listened to by your Excellency.

With reference to your telegram of the 18th ultimo, an intimation to the same effect may be made to Maharajah of Bhutan, and the latter may be assured, if you consider it desirable to do so, that no administrative changes in Thibet will be permitted by His Majesty's Government to affect or prejudice Bhutan's rights and integrity. You can judge whether a similar communication is required to Sikkim, having regard to the agreement of 1861 with that State. I will address you separately with regard to Nepal.

[16787] No. 69.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 12.)

Sir, *India Office, May 11, 1910.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram which has been received from the Government of India regarding the relations of Nepal with Thibet.

The Prime Minister of Nepal's memorandum referred to therein was sent to you in this Office letter of the 4th April.* It will be seen that the Government of India propose to answer in the negative the two questions asked by his Excellency as to the effect of the Anglo-Chinese and Anglo-Russian conventions on his relations with Thibet.

As regards the first question, Viscount Morley is of opinion that the Government of India are right, and that there is nothing in either convention to prevent Nepal from infringing the territorial integrity of Thibet or necessitating the intervention of either Great Britain or Russia in such an event. But such action on the part of Nepal might prove highly inconvenient, and it would, in Lord Morley's opinion, be most undesirable that it should at any time be undertaken in circumstances that would preclude the possibility of a previous understanding between this country and Russia.

As regards the second question, it is less clear what the answer should be. For though it may be argued that Nepal is not a "foreign Power" for the purpose of article 9 (*d*) of the Anglo-Thibetan Convention—just as she admittedly is not for the purpose of article 9 (*c*)—it cannot be denied that she is a "State other than China," which is the expression used in article 3 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention.

On the whole it seems to Lord Morley to be preferable to avoid giving an authoritative interpretation of the treaties, and to reply to both questions, in quite

* See Annex.

general terms, that the position of Nepal *vis-à-vis* Thibet and her rights in that country are not in the opinion of His Majesty's Government prejudiced by either convention. It should, at the same time, be explained to the Maharajah (as the Government of India propose) that we cannot be indifferent to disturbances near our border, and that in view of our obligations to Russia and China, and of our close and peculiar relations with Nepal, we expected to be consulted by his Highness before any action is taken by him which might involve Nepal in armed conflict with China and Thibet.

As regards the question whether an attempt should now be made to negotiate with Nepal a treaty whereby her foreign relations should be placed under our control, Lord Morley agrees with the Government of India that it is better to wait until the Prime Minister makes overtures in that direction. As at present advised his Lordship is of opinion that, advantageous as such a treaty might be in many respects, the responsibility of enforcing our control—in the event of Nepal at any time proving recalcitrant—is one which it would certainly be inconvenient and probably difficult to discharge. In these circumstances, he would suggest that if the Prime Minister shows any uneasiness the resident might inform him that so long as he preserves his present correct and friendly attitude, consults us before committing himself, and follows our advice when it has been given, His Majesty's Government will not allow any administrative changes in Thibet to affect or prejudice the integrity or rights of Nepal.

If Sir E. Grey concurs in these views Lord Morley proposes to send to the Government of India the telegram of which a draft is enclosed.*

I have, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 69.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 1, 1910.

REFERENCE is invited to Prime Minister of Nepal's memorandum, dated the 11th March, 1910, which was transmitted with letter dated the 17th March, 1910, from Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. Resident wrote demi-officially on the 11th April that he had asked Prime Minister whether rumour of movement of Nepalese troops had any foundation. In reply, Prime Minister said it had no foundation, and that without Resident being informed not a single soldier would be moved. If, he added, 4,000 troops, whom Thibetans had prepared to receive, had been sent by him to their assistance, an appeal would have to be made to England by the Chinese before removal of troops could have been effected. Such a chance would not have been missed in old days, but he saw that it would be wiser to refrain, and that complications would have been caused by such action. Memorandum dated 24th February, 1910, from Foreign Office to Japanese and Russian Embassies uses language indicating that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, Nepal is free to take action. As regards substitution of word "State" for "Power," referred to by Prime Minister, there is nothing to show reason for change. It is therefore proposed to reply in the negative to two questions at end of Prime Minister's memorandum, informing him at the same time that if disturbances took place near our border we could not be indifferent spectators, and that, in view of our close and peculiar relations with Nepal and of our obligations to China and Russia, we should expect that, before taking a line of action which might involve Nepal in armed conflict with Thibet or China, he would consult us. It is proposed at the same time cordially to acknowledge correct and friendly attitude Prime Minister has hitherto taken up.

There arises the question whether an attempt to conclude a treaty with Nepal should now be made. Reference is invited to telegram dated 10th March from Resident. Without interference in internal administration of Thibet, it would be difficult to secure present relations as to trade between Thibet and Nepal under the treaty of 1856. It would seem better for the present that, before question of treaty is considered, overtures from Nepal should be awaited. There may be advantages in leaving Nepal free to act in the event of China becoming aggressive. But Nepal could not be allowed by us to suffer at China's hands, and instructions might be sent to Resident that, if subject is referred to by Prime Minister, we should be prepared, if Nepal gave us control of her external relations, to guarantee Nepal's territorial integrity and independence in internal affairs.

* See No. 73.

Annex.

Lieutenant-Colonel Manners-Smith to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Nepal Residency, March* 12, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, with reference to the concluding passage in paragraph 2 of my letter No. 29, dated the 8th March, 1910, the memorandum by the Prime Minister of Nepal, which he presented to me personally yesterday afternoon.

2. Maharajah Sir Chandra Shumshere came to see me late in the afternoon, and without sending previous notice. It will be seen that he has addressed the paper to me personally, and that throughout its course the freedom of Nepal to take independent action in defence of her rights is implied.

3. I do not feel that I am in a position to judge to what extent it would be advantageous in the present negotiations with China to make use of Nepal's ostensibly independent position as a lever to press for the enforcement of Thibetan autonomy but of one point I feel confident, which is that there is no present fear of the Nepal Durbar carrying on secret negotiations with China or of desiring a closer connection with that Power.

Memorandum for perusal of Lieutenant-Colonel Manners-Smith.

For some time past the flow of events in Thibet has been anything but smooth, and the state of affairs there has gradually changed from what it was before, till a sudden and rapid development which has taken place there within the last few months has rendered it uncertain, and perhaps unsafe, to venture an opinion as to how matters may turn out in the near or some distant future. All important information that I could gather from various sources as to the course of events in and concerning Thibet had from time to time been forwarded to you confidentially, and these would have shown the trend that things were taking there.

Having an extensive contiguous boundary and intimate trade relations from a very long time with Thibet, and consequently possessing considerable stake in that country with valued political rights and privileges, and a standing position of no small importance, Nepal is naturally anxious and desirous that her interests there might not suffer in any way. The question, which is one of vital importance to this country, has been exercising the minds of this Government, and has been looked at from all possible standpoints to determine how best to safeguard her rights, privileges, and position in case these or any of these be threatened from any source. Conscious of being unfettered in any way to seek redress for any grievances against Thibet, the Government of Nepal could afford to view with calmness the progress of events there so long as it did not disturb the state of things which obtained previous to this unsettled condition, reversion to which would in itself go a good deal to guarantee our vested interests and set at rest any further speculation on the subject. As matter stands a minute examination of the general position has become imperative, because of the uncertainty of what may happen at any time in view of the present unsettled state of things in that country.

The Ambas at Lhassa have given a general assurance to our representative of their good intentions; but the difficulty arises as to what extent these assurances, which may be taken to be of a rather vague and limited character, can be relied upon, the more so when the Thibetans, rightly or wrongly, which only futurity will determine, accuse the Chinese of bad faith and evil designs of scheming for the usurpation of all powers from their hands. The 1,000 soldiers being imported into Thibet are expressly intended for police work and to do guard duty, both of which purposes, the Thibetans maintain, can be served with better facility and equal efficiency by their own people. While considering the probable motive of China in this matter I happened to think of the "Amended Thibet Trade Regulations of the 20th April, 1908, concluded between Great Britain and China," and on referring it was found that in it, having made China responsible for the maintenance of telegraph lines and postal communications to the trade marts, an engagement was taken from her in clause 12 to arrange effective police measures at the marts and along the routes to the marts, on the due fulfilment of which only Great Britain undertook to withdraw its trade agents' guards at the marts and to station no troops in Thibet. Though the clause does not definitely state that Chinese soldiers should be requisitioned for the duties enumerated therein yet it

is quite possible that it was perhaps to hasten the withdrawal of the British guards in question, whose presence in the country she could not look upon with equanimity, that China, not relying upon the slow-moving Thibetans, has drafted her own troops for the purpose, or it will not be surprising if the move has resulted from a desire to convert Thibet into one of her provinces, as the report went, to realise her suzerainty so pointedly mentioned in the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, and in that case the apprehension of the Thibetans that many more troops might follow must be considered to have some foundation. Be that as it may, the fact remains there that the Chinese and Thibetans are slowly drifting apart, and this may throw this country into a vortex of trouble, or China may, with her superior strength and existing position in the country and by the moral support given her by the treaties with other Powers, bring Thibet under her absolute sway. At all events, there is of course our treaty with Thibet which should protect our interests from being meddled with or injured not only by the Thibetans but also by the Chinese, the then Amba at Lhassa having recognised and accepted its terms and expressed his assent to its conclusion, and subsequently intimated the approval of His Majesty the Emperor of China also to it. The Thibet Government, whether its absolute autonomy is preserved or it passes into the hands of the Chinese, is expected any way to respect the terms of the said treaty, but if these just expectations are not realised the Government of Nepal will have, as a matter of course, to take proper care and try to preserve and maintain its rights by every possible peaceful means and friendly negotiations, or, in the event of diplomacy failing, by all the other resources at its command. I hope and pray that such a contingency may never arise, but should it become inevitable, it is only prudent that this Government should be aware of the exact interpretation of the treaties that exist among the Powers. In article 2 of the Anglo-Chinese convention of the 27th April, 1906, China has undertaken not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Thibet as against the negative obligation on the part of Great Britain of not annexing the Thibetan territory or interfering in its administration. And in article 1 of the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 Great Britain and Russia engaged to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet, implying a negative obligation on each. Now, if the territorial integrity of Thibet is threatened from quarters other than India and Russia, say, from the Nepal side, do these articles quoted above bring any positive obligation upon Great Britain or Russia to intervene? Again, in article 3 of the said Anglo-Chinese convention the word "State," which, perhaps, is more elastic than the word "Power," is used apparently in place of "Power" used in article 9 (*d*) of the convention of 1904. Is this substitution supposed to bring Nepal under this article? The interpretations of these articles seem to be closely related to our interests, and were not, so far as we know, made clear at the time when these treaties were concluded, and the Government of Nepal would feel highly obliged by your kindly furnishing them with the same.

CHANDRA SHUMSHERE.

Nepal, March 11, 1910.

[14819] No. 70.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 19, 1910.

SECRETARY Sir E. Grey has had under his consideration your letter of the 29th ultimo, in which you suggest, under instructions from Viscount Morley, that negotiations might now be opened with the Chinese Government with a view to the conclusion of an arrangement permitting of the importation of Indian tea into Thibet, and in which, at the same time, you ask Sir E. Grey's concurrence in the proposal of the Government of India that they shall be authorised to place themselves in communication with the Thibetan high authorities at Lhassa, as provided in the Trade Regulations of 1908, in order to secure the removal of certain local restrictions placed on the trade between India and Thibet.

The opportunity has been taken of the presence in England on leave of His Majesty's Minister at Peking to obtain the benefit of his advice upon the matters raised in your letter.

As regards the question of the importation of Indian tea into Thibet, Sir J. Jordan

anticipates that great difficulty would be experienced in inducing the Chinese Government to treat this matter separately from that of the establishment of a customs tariff on articles of import generally as contemplated by the Trade Regulations of 1893. The Chinese are aggrieved at the refusal of His Majesty's Government to assist them in obtaining an increase of the maritime customs duties in China as provided in the Commercial Treaty of 1902, and Sir J. Jordan considers it very improbable that they would be prepared to make any concessions in Thibet in favour of an article which would compete with a long-established industry of their own. If, however, the question of the importation of Indian tea into Thibet were, as originally intended, to be coupled with that of the introduction of a customs tariff there, there might, in Sir J. Jordan's opinion, be a fair prospect of a successful outcome of the negotiations. The Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1881 will expire next year, and the Chinese are believed to be anxious to impose duties on the frontier trade with Russia. A land tariff between Thibet and India might, therefore, be welcomed by them as a useful precedent in negotiating with the Russian Government.

Sir E. Grey fully shares the views of Sir J. Jordan as to the unlikelihood of its being possible, except as part of a more comprehensive arrangement, to secure the agreement of the Chinese Government to the importation of Indian tea into Thibet under conditions more favourable than those contemplated in article 4 of the Trade Regulations of 1893. It would, therefore, seem to him that, if the matter be raised at all with any hope of an agreement being arrived at, His Majesty's Government must be prepared either to agree to the imposition of a duty at a rate equivalent to that imposed on Chinese tea entering this country, or else that proposals should be made to the Chinese Government upon the larger question of the establishment of a tariff on imports from India into Thibet in general. In adopting this standpoint, Sir E. Grey has not lost view of the statements in regard to the latter alternative contained in the despatch of the Government of India enclosed in your letter of the 31st March last.

A copy of your further letter of the 29th ultimo will be sent in due course to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking for his information and guidance.

As far as concerns the question of authorising the Government of India to place themselves in communication with the Thibetan high authorities at Lhassa with reference to certain restrictions placed upon trade, Sir E. Grey can see no objection to the necessary authorisation being given, though, as Lord Morley is aware, it appears unlikely that much power is at present exercised by the Thibetan Regent and Acting Ministers nominally charged with the government of the country. Should this reference to the Thibetan authorities prove unavailing, it would, of course, in the terms of the Trade Regulations of 1908, be open to His Majesty's Government to refer the matters requiring settlement direct to the Wai-wu Pu at Peking. If this step were taken, it would provide an occasion for giving the Chinese Government to understand, as suggested in your letter, that nothing has occurred to cause His Majesty's Government to abate anything from the legitimate rights secured to them by the Anglo-Thibetan Convention, and that, in view of the Chinese professions that their action in Thibet has been undertaken principally with the object of securing the observance by the Thibetans of their treaty obligations, His Majesty's Government have no hesitation in inviting the Chinese Government to make good their written assurance that they would "carry out the provisions of the Anglo-Thibetan treaties," and will be unable any longer to admit their inability to exercise over the Thibetans the influence necessary to produce this result.

I am to take this opportunity of forwarding to you a copy of a despatch from Mr. Max Müller,* enclosing a translation of the reply of the Chinese Government to the note addressed to them in accordance with the instructions contained in Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 58 of the 8th ultimo, which was based upon your letter of the 31st March last.

The Chinese reply is in the main satisfactory, as Lord Morley will observe, but it contains a reference to Nepal which would seem strongly to emphasise the necessity for the conclusion of the proposed treaty with that State placing its external relations under the control of His Majesty's Government.

Sir E. Grey will await a further letter from your department before sending any instructions to Mr. Max Müller with regard to the matters forming the subject of your letters under reply.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

* No. 67.

[16787] No. 71.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 21, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, enclosing, for Sir E. Grey's concurrence, the draft of a telegram which Viscount Morley proposes to address to the Government of India with reference to the reply to be returned to the enquiry made by the Prime Minister of Nepal through Lieutenant-Colonel Manners-Smith relative to the question of the applicability to Nepal of article 2 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of April 1906 and article 1 of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

Sir E. Grey shares Lord Morley's view that the best course will be to reply in entirely general terms to his Highness's enquiry, and he accordingly concurs in the terms of the draft telegram.

At the same time Sir E. Grey would observe that, as His Majesty's Government have put forward the necessity of avoiding any cause for intervention on the part of Nepal as one of the chief reasons for their anxiety regarding, and interest in, Chinese action in Thibet, and in view of the confidential relations existing between the Government of India and the Nepal durbar, it would, apart from any question of the precise scope of the articles referred to, be a matter of difficulty for His Majesty's Government satisfactorily to explain their position to the Russian Government or to dissociate themselves from the Nepalese Government in the event of the latter entering upon hostilities with the Chinese in Thibet.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[18893] No. 72.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 26th May, 1910, relative to the action of the Chinese at Rima.

India Office, May 27, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 72.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May* 26, 1910.

GOVERNMENT of Eastern Bengal and Assam telegraphed as follows, the 24th instant:—

"According to report made at Sadiya by Tungno Miju, chief of Pangim, longitude 96° 42′, latitude 28°, Thibetans who have arrived in his village report arrival at Rima of 1,000 Chinese troops who called upon Thibetan governor to pay taxes. On his refusing to obey, governor was put in prison. Orders from Chinese to cut track broad enough for two horsemen from Thibet to Assam were brought to Tungno by Thibetans. Tungno said he was a British subject, and refused to obey. Tungno was not authorised to declare himself a British subject, but orders were given him to return and report further steps."

Any further information that may be received will be communicated to you.

[19251] No. 73.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 25th May, 1910, relative to Nepal.

India Office, May 28, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 73.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, May 25, 1910.*

NEPAL. See your telegram dated the 1st May.

Reply is in the negative to first question asked by Prime Minister, but until His Majesty's Government had had opportunity of discussion with Russia, it would be most undesirable that Nepal should at any time take such action.

It is not so clear what should be answer to second question, since it cannot be denied that Nepal is a State other than China, although the intention of article 3 is plain. His Majesty's Government therefore prefer, rather than give an authoritative interpretation of articles of conventions which Prime Minister quotes before the occurrence of a particular difficulty, to approve your proposal cordially to acknowledge Nepal's correct and friendly action, and to give an answer in quite general terms to both questions, to the effect that conventions do not in their opinion prejudice Nepal's position *vis-à-vis* Thibet or her rights in that country. Reply proposed by you is approved with this modification.

His Majesty's Government share your view, as regards negotiation for a treaty, that overtures from Nepal should preferably be awaited. Resident may inform Prime Minister, however, if latter shows any uneasiness, that His Majesty's Government will not allow any administrative changes in Thibet to affect or prejudice Nepal's interests and rights, so long as Prime Minister preserves his present correct and friendly attitude, consults us before committing himself, and follows our advice when it has been given.

[20106] No. 74.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 156.)

Sir, *Peking, May 17, 1910.*

IN my despatch No. 122 of the 22nd ultimo, I had the honour to enclose a copy of a note which I had addressed to Prince Ch'ing in obedience to the instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 58 of the 8th ultimo. Among other things I pointed out in this note that His Majesty's Government would expect that any negotiations and representations now pending in regard to the grant of certain monopolies in Thibet should not be delayed or in any way prejudiced by a possible change in the administration of Thibet. Prince Ch'ing's reply, copy of which was also enclosed in my despatch above mentioned, contained a statement that "the reference to the grant of monopolies is not understood." I therefore deemed it advisable to enlighten the Chinese Government on this point, and on the 20th ultimo I addressed to the Wai-wu Pu the memorandum, of which a copy is enclosed herewith, embodying the information which I possessed on the subject of these monopolies, and which is contained in a memorandum furnished to this legation by the Government of India.

I have now received the accompanying reply from the Wai-wu Pu conveying the information that the Chinese resident in Thibet has taken steps to cancel the grant of these monopolies, and to warn all the Thibetan merchants that any breach of the trade regulations will be punished.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 74.

Memorandum communicated to Wai-wu Pu by Mr. Max Müller.

ACCORDING to information received by the Government of India from the Political Officer in Sikkim the Thibetan Government have farmed out the sole right of purchasing wool and yak-tails in Thibet to three merchants, namely, to the Kumsang family at Lhassa, to one, Pu-nye-chang, of the Pom-do-tsang family, and to Jimpa, trader of Chema, or, if the last refuses, owing to fear of the Chumbi Valley traders, to Garusha, a Lhassa trader. By the terms of the proclamation of the Thibetan Government, which was issued on the 26th May, 1909, any person other than the merchants referred to who buy wool or yak-tails will be punished, and his purchases confiscated. It has also been reported that a monopoly for the purchase of hides has been given to one, Ge-tu-sang, a wealthy trader of Eastern Thibet, for 20,000 rupees a-year. Further, it has been reported that the Chumbi Valley traders who protested against the monopolies have been given a half-share on payment of a fixed royalty to the Thibetan Government, and that the representatives of the leading wool traders of the Chumbi Valley, numbering eighteen in all, have left for Lhassa. The leading European and Indian merchants of Kalimpong, who control about half the total trade in wool between India and Thibet have petitioned against the monopolies, and have pointed out that their interests will suffer if these monopolies are maintained. The Cawnpore Woollen Mills Company and Mr. Manishanker R. Bhatt, a Surat trader carrying on business at Gyangtse, have pointed out too that the monopolies will completely ruin the present trade with Thibet.

The Government of India have pointed out that these monopolies constitute a breach of the Lhassa Convention and the Thibet Trade Regulations of 1908, and His Majesty's Government consequently expect that the Thibetan authorities will revoke their grant.

British Legation, April 20, 1910.

Enclosure 2 in No 74.

Memorandum communicated to Mr. Max Müller by Wai-wu Pu, May 4, 1910.

ON the 20th April the Board had the honour to receive a memorandum from Mr. Max Müller stating that the Thibetan Government have farmed out the sole right of purchasing wool and yak-tails to three merchants, namely, to the Kamsang family at Lhassa, to one, Pu-nye-chang, of the Pom-de-tsang family, and to Jimpa, trader of Chema.

Further, that a monopoly for the purchase of hides had been given to one Ge-ta-sang, a wealthy trader of Eastern Thibet. Mr. Max Müller pointed out that these monopolies constituted a breach of the Lhassa Convention and the Thibet Trade Regulations of 1908, and that His Majesty's Government consequently expected that the Thibetan Government would revoke their grant.

The Board accordingly telegraphed to his Excellency Lien Yü, the resident in Thibet, a telegram has now been received from him as follows :—

" Last year the administration gave a monopoly of the trade in yak-tails and wool to three Thibetan merchants. This was called 'k'un shang,' *i.e.*, monopolising trade. At the time I made several protests against this monopoly as being a breach of the trade regulations, and as tending to oppress the poor people. In March last I summoned the merchants in question before me and ordered them to return the capital they had collected from merchants, and to cease thenceforth from monopolising trade. They have obeyed my orders and given bonds. At the same time I caused it to be notified along the east and west roads as well as at the trade marts that if any Thibetan merchant should dare to break the regulations he would at once be arrested and punished. In the future there ought not to be any cases of interference with trade."

The Board have the honour to communicate the above.

[20217] No. 75.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to Viceroy, dated the 1st June, 1910, relative to tea duty in Thibet.

India Office, June 4, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 75.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, June* 1, 1910.

THIBET. See letter dated the 29th April, from India Office to Foreign Office, forwarded with letter of the 29th idem from Secretary, Political Department, India Office.

Foreign Office are satisfied, after consulting Sir J. Jordan, who is now on leave, that tea cannot, with any hope of success, be separated from general tariff. If two are coupled, on the other hand, there is fair prospect. Indo-Thibetan tariff would probably be welcomed by Chinese, as it would be a useful precedent for dealing with Russian Government, whose treaty with China expires in 1911. A statement of your case should therefore be forwarded to me if you think it worth while to take up whole question. You are authorised to address Thibetan Government in regard to the other matters mentioned in your letter of the 10th February, 1910. His Majesty's Government will be in a strong position to take up question at Peking, in event of satisfaction not being forthcoming. Your representation will presumably not include monopolies, which have been revoked.

[20646] No. 76.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 9th June, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, June 9, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 9, 1910.

BRITISH trade agent, Yatung, telegraphed on the 28th ultimo that it was highly probable, judging from disquieting reports, that, when Government's decision about Dalai Lama became known, there would be Thibetan rising against Chinese, and that strengthening of agency guard was very desirable.

On the authority of a Thibetan official just arrived from Changra he telegraphed on the 20th ultimo that there is unrest at that place, that an attack had been made upon the yamen of the Amban, who had taken to flight, and that 500 Chinese soldiers had been killed in fighting which had taken place at Kongpu. It was stated by Bell that information in later telegram should be received with caution; it had not reached Thibetan Ministers at Darjeeling.

Following telegram, dated the 4th instant, received from Bell :—

"Inspector Ladenla has been informed by Thibetan Ministers, on whom he is in attendance, that, when Government's decision to abstain from intervention in Dalai Lama's favour becomes generally known in Thibet, there would probably be Thibetan

uprisings against Chinese in Thibet. In the meantime, I have been requested by Ministers that, pending receipt of reply to their second appeal which is being forwarded to you in a day or two, decision of Government should not be published. In accordance with your orders, decision has been communicated by me to Dalai Lama, Maharajahs of Bhutan and Sikkim, and trade agents at Gyantse and Yatung, but the four latter have been requested that it should for the present be treated as confidential. Resentment will, on account of this decision, probably be felt against us by Thibetans, and it is probable that state of affairs in Thibet generally will be disturbed, and that our agencies may be subjected to isolated attacks. Macdonald and Weir, and Captain Brancker, deputy-assistant quartermaster-general, who has inspected Gyantse and Yatung posts, have been consulted by me on the situation.

"2. There should, in my opinion, be immediate increase of strength of escorts at Yatung and Gyantse. Two double companies containing, say, 350 men, should be sent to Yatung, from which detachment of fifty men to guard military telegraphists at Gnatong and similar number to guard military telegraphists at Phari should be detailed. To Gyantse a strong double company containing, say, 200 men, with two machine guns, should be dispatched. Fact of Yatung lying at the bottom of a valley renders above large increase necessary at that place. At Gangtok detachment should be increased to a full double company; there is barrack accommodation for this.

"3. Captain Brancker advises the increases recommended in paragraph 2, and his recommendation has my entire concurrence. Extra troops can be withdrawn as soon as country settles down, but it will not be safe in the meanwhile for our trade agencies to have fewer troops."

We are inclined to share views of Bell, which we are not in a position to discredit, that when Government's decision regarding Dalai Lama is generally known, isolated attacks on our agencies are probable. We are of opinion, however, that considerable risk would attend movement of small detachments such as Bell advises. We recommend, therefore, after consulting military authorities, that one battalion native infantry, two sections of mountain artillery, and a section of Sappers and Miners, should be immediately dispatched to Gyantse in order to ensure safety of our agencies; dispatch of one battalion and a section of Sappers and Miners to hold lines of communication is also recommended.

[21086] No. 77.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 10th June, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, June 11, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 77.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, June* 10, 1910.

THIBET. See your telegram of the 9th June.

If persuaded that it is absolutely necessary for protection of their officers, His Majesty's Government would of course be prepared to sanction movement of troops into Thibet. But it will have embarrassing consequences politically. Recent diplomatic communications with Chinese Government have resulted in our acceptance of view of latter that responsibility for maintenance of order at Gyantse and elsewhere rests with them. If we send troops result may probably be that every nerve will be strained by Chinese to send force there sufficient to justify a claim on their part that our escort should, under article 12 of Trade Regulations, be completely withdrawn. A further possibility is that ignorant Thibetans may take advent of our troops to be intervention against Chinese authority on their behalf. An attack by them upon the Chinese may follow, in the event of which it will be necessary for our troops, by whom attitude of neutrality will obviously have to be

maintained, to look on during subsequent reprisals by Chinese. The disagreeable moment will also occur when, on termination of danger or establishment by Chinese of sufficient force for maintenance of order, our troops will have to be withdrawn. Troops, it must be remembered, cannot be moved by us into Thibet without previous explanations of our action being given to the Chinese Government. Explicit statement will have to be made by us that protection of our officers is our sole object, that there will be no interference in any way by our troops as between Thibetans and Chinese, and that as soon as circumstances permit troops will be withdrawn.

With regard to reports by Mr. Bell, it is not easy to see why Thibetans should be impelled to attack our agencies owing to our decision not to intervene on Dalai Lama's behalf. Perhaps it might be explained to Ministers of Lama that maintenance of our hospitality to Lama will be rendered difficult if agency is attacked by Thibetans, that Chinese will ultimately inflict punishment for attack, and that if troops are sent by us protection of our officers will be the sole object, and that, whatever happens, there will be no intervention on our part to save Thibetans from Chinese punishment. In their own interests Dalai Lama and his Ministers should be urged to use all their influence for prevention of hostile action towards our agencies on the part of the Thibetans.

Disturbed state of country may, I recognise, lead to irresponsible bands attacking our posts. Political disadvantages of moving troops are, I am sure, realised by yourself no less clearly than by His Majesty's Government. Their dispatch will be sanctioned by His Majesty's Government if they are satisfied, on further consideration by you, that risk is such that no alternative is left; but beyond purely preparatory measures you should take no action till this telegram has been replied to and decision of His Majesty's Government has reached you.

Strength of force proposed is a further point on which I am not satisfied. View of my military advisers here is that strength proposed by Bell will be sufficient. I request that this may be considered and your views furnished to me.

I should be glad if you could inform me—

(1.) Whether there are any Chinese soldiers or police in Chumbi and at Gyantse.

(2.) Whether Chinese force at Lhassa would permit of dispatch to those places of strong detachments.

[21149] No. 78.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received June* 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th June, 1910, relative to Bhutan.

India Office, June 13, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 78.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 12, 1910.

WE are receiving reports of instances of attempts on part of Chinese to interfere with Bhutan. It is stated by Bhutan agent at Phari that letter has been sent to Maharajah by Amban at Lhassa demanding an explanation of Dalai Lama's men having been permitted by him to pass, with goods for the Lama, through Bhutan territory to India. Reply has been sent by Maharajah that men should be prevented by Amban from leaving Lhassa with goods for Dalai Lama, but that he, the Maharajah, cannot stop them once they reach Bhutan territory. A fine, nominally for not paying respects to Chinese Popon but really for helping to provide transport for provisions sent for Dalai Lama, has been inflicted upon the Jongpen of Phari. People in Yatung have been told by Chinese that when Chao arrives at Lhassa with his force soldiers will be sent to Bhutan, as it is under China, to guard the country. A translation has been sent by Bell of a letter addressed to Ugyen Kazi by Chinese frontier officer at Pipitang, in which was enclosed proclamation by Amban at Lhassa

giving orders that circulation in Bhutan of Chinese Thibetan rupees must be permitted. It is proposed that Bell should be instructed to direct Yatung trade agent to inform Chinese frontier officer that he is replying instead of Bhutan Government, as Government of India control external relations of Bhutan, and that any communication frontier officer may wish to address to Bhutan Government should be sent in future through British trade agent, by whom it will be forwarded to Mr. Bell for transmission; that Government of India cannot agree, as regards the present proclamation, to instruct Government of Bhutan that circulation in Bhutan of Chinese rupees must be permitted, the matter being one in which Bhutanese must act as they please. Please say whether this has your approval.

[21452] No. 79.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.(—Received June 16.)

(No. 164.)

Sir, *Peking, May* 25, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 147 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu enclosing another letter from Mr. Muir, which contains information regarding the Chinese troops in Thibet.

From Mr. Wilkinson's despatch it would also appear that the Chinese advance into Thibet was opposed to a greater extent than the Chinese Government have been willing to admit.

I have, &c.
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 34.)

Sir, *Chengtu, May* 5, 1910.

REFERRING to my despatch No. 31 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to enclose copy of a letter which Mr. Muir has sent me from Kiangka (Gartok), in Eastern Thibet.

The Bomi country, to which Mr. Muir refers as the scene of Chinese operations, is marked in Chinese maps as Mu, or Pomi, forming part of the Thibetan province of Kang (Kham), adjacent to Szechuan. Pien-pa and Kiangtah (Giamda) are both on the main road from Chiamdo to Lhassa, the former near the west frontier of Kham, in about latitude 30° 50′ north, longitude 92° 40′ east; the former just south of the Tola Pass, in about latitude 30° 2′ north, and longitude 93° east.

Mr. Muir's account of the disposition of the Chinese troops in Eastern Thibet tallies with a note given in a recent number of the semi-official "Chengtu Jih-pao" ("Chengtu Daily News"), where those sections of the chung-lu (central district) of the hsun-fang chun (mobile forces or militia) that are under the orders of Commandant (t'ung-ling) Chang Chi-liang are said to be stationed thus:—

The 2nd battalion at Giamda.

The 6th battalion at Chiamdo.

The 1st battalion at Derge, whether it has recently been moved up from Tachienlu as a reserve for the 2nd and 6th.

In my despatch No. 25 of the 24th March last I gave a translation of a telegram from Commandant Chung-ying, published officially, which asserted, in effect, that his expedition had been unopposed. The two following extracts from the same journal ("Chengtu Jih-pao") show, however, that Mr. Muir's report—that the expedition had "suffered considerably"—was nearer the truth:—

April 22.—For bravery in repelling the attacks of the Thibetans at Chiangta (Giamda) and elsewhere, a captain named Ch'en Ch'ing has been promoted to be colonel by Lien-yü (the Amban).

April 24.—Chung t'ung-ling (Commandant Chung-ying) has requested the Governor-General to sanction a compassionate grant to the family of the captain in command of the rear company of the 3rd battalion, who was severely wounded in the engagement at La-li, and has since died of his wounds.

La-li is Lhari, the seat of a Chinese commissary (liang-t'ai) on the high road north of the Tola Pass. It is evident that the Thibetans made a stand in at least these two places, Lhari and Giamda, and inflicted some loss on the Chinese.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

Rev. Mr. Muir to Consul-General Wilkinson.

Dear Mr. Wilkinson, *Kiangka (Gartok), April 5, 1910.*

I AM bound for Chiamdo with the permission of the Chinese officials, given with some reluctance. I did not know till I got here if they would let me go any further. I will probably see Chao Erh-feng at Chiamdo. He is still there, but they seem to have the whole road to Lhassa under control. The Lu-chün new troops (land forces) are probably in Lhassa now with Lien Amban. I do not know that any others are there. One battalion is stationed at Pien Pa, and one at Kiang Tah (see "Hsi-tsang T'unglan," p. 103).

That is all that I can find that have passed Chiamdo, but I may have to modify all this when I get there.

As to this district: there is one battalion stationed here, and that is all between here and Batang. This is an artillery battalion, and they have one piece called a k'ai-hua p'ao—I should say a Gatling, but I am not up on guns. I saw it to-day in the yamên of the officer who has been relieved; he has not yet turned over the gun to his successor. They just walked into this place without firing a shot.

As I said before, the Thibetan officer here fled, and he has not yet been found. He is supposed to have gone to Lhassa through the Bomi country on a road that runs almost due west from here. The officer who was at Yen-ching has gone in from there, and operating along that road. It is, I believe, a district entirely unknown to the world. This officer is now some days from Yen-ching, and may have designs on the country I have mentioned, known as "Bomi," of which I know little. He has not reached there yet. His present base is at a place called in Thibetan Sa Nga Chu Tsong. The two officials at that place were hanged. One hundred odd men were sent to Tsa-yi, five days further in, to capture the official there. The brave officer named Ch'eng, with perhaps less than 500 men and no artillery, is subduing a whole district in which the Chinese formerly had little or no interest. The district was governed from Lhassa.

Now it is safe to say that in South-East Thibet, *i.e.*, beyond the old recognised border, there are only two battalions, each with less than 500 men, which is supposed to be their complement, and one gun. This does not include those between Tachienlu and Batang, which I will give when I recapitulate on my return to Batang.

The rumour that the Dalai Lama fled is repeated here, but it is uncertain whether he went to Russia or to the Indian frontier. The prevailing idea is towards the latter.

Perhaps that is enough from here. I hope to be able to get a full report to you by the middle of June. I will telegraph my arrival back in Batang.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN R. MUIR.

[23163] No. 80.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 27.)

Sir, *India Office, June 27, 1910.*

WITH reference to correspondence ending with the letter of this Office dated the 19th April last, communicating copy of the Secretary of State's secret despatch to the Government of India, dated the 15th April, 1910, regarding the treaty concluded this year with the Government of Bhutan, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India as to recent attempts that have been made by the Chinese to interfere in the affairs of Bhutan.*

* See Enclosure in No. 78.

The reply proposed by the Government of India to be given to the Chinese frontier officer with regard to the proclamation as to the circulation of Chinese Thibet rupees appears to go somewhat further than the circumstances warrant, and, subject to Secretary Sir E. Grey's concurrence, the Secretary of State for India would propose to address to that Government the telegram of which a draft is enclosed herein.*

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[23163] No. 81.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 30, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant relative to the attempts of the Chinese authorities in Thibet to interfere in the affairs of Bhutan.

Sir E. Grey concurs in the terms of the communication to be made by the British trade agent at Yatung to the Chinese frontier officer at Pipitang, subject to the amendments embodied in the draft telegram enclosed in your letter.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[23729] No. 82.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of the following telegrams, regarding the situation in Thibet :—

From Viceroy, dated the 27th June (two telegrams).
To Viceroy, dated the 29th June.

India Office, July 1, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 82.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 27, 1910.

THIBET. See your telegram dated the 10th June.

Having fully reconsidered in council situation in Thibet, after further consultation with local authorities, we are satisfied that outbreaks may at any time take place, and that Yatung and Gyantse escorts might be subjected to attacks which they are not capable of resisting.

We are, therefore, unanimously of opinion that it is necessary to take the following steps :—

1. Mobilisation without delay of a sufficient force, to be held in readiness at some point within our borders from which speedy relief of Gyantse can be effected.

2. That strength, stated in our telegram of the 9th instant, should be minimum strength of force.

3. That immediate arrangements should be made to collect at Gnatong three months' supplies for this force, and that, in order to assist this operation, one Pioneer battalion and one company of sappers and miners should be moved forward.

4. Concentration near Gnatong, from which, under favourable conditions, relief force can reach Gyantse by forced marches in about a week, of one battalion and two sections of mountain artillery, as soon as supplies are ready, and should the situation then require it.

* Draft of telegram to Government of India.

Above steps, while they admit of favourable interpretation by Thibetans, can, we trust, readily be explained to Chinese as being in conformity with your policy. In view of unsatisfactory position of our garrisons in Thibet and of time required for preparation, which is estimated at a month, we request that sanction may be given without delay to the foregoing measures.

Post at Gyantse for escort of trade agent on new trade mart site, which must be more defensible than post which present escort holds, is included in the immediate requirements. Unless orders were issued to them from Peking to facilitate construction, local Chinese would certainly make difficulties about supply of labour, apart from question of acquisition of site, as to which there has been much obstruction. It is therefore requested that arrangements may be made to bring pressure at Peking on Chinese Government to ensure both these questions being speedily settled.

With regard to your enquiries respecting forces of Chinese, there are thirty old drilled Chinese police armed with old breechloading rifles at Gyantse. There are 130 old drilled Chinese soldiers armed with Snider rifles and forty magazine rifles in the Chumbi Valley. Neither at Gyantse nor at Gnatong are there any new drilled Chinese soldiers. There are about 1,500 Chinese troops at Lhassa; 1,000 of these are armed with Wing magazine rifles and are new drilled; the remainder are armed with various old guns and are old drilled. Whether sufficient troops could be detailed by Chinese to defend our agencies as well as themselves we are unable to say. Detachments have recently had to be sent out from Lhassa by Chinese to Kongbu, where disturbance has occurred. Proposal is made by Mr. Bell that, pending completion of our arrangements, the communication suggested by you should not be made by him to Dalai Lama and Ministers, as the latter may hasten outbreaks in Thibet when once they understand that they have nothing to hope from us. To this I propose to agree. Couriers from Nyarong district of Thibet have arrived recently at Darjeeling, to ask permission of lama to rise against Chinese, and permission to fight has been asked for by other districts and monasteries; but they have hitherto been restrained by Ministers.

Enclosure 2 in No. 82.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June* 27, 1910.

SEE my telegram of the 27th instant regarding Thibet. Political officer, Sikkim, telegraphed 26th instant as follows:—

"Trade agent, Gyantse, telegraphed 25th instant as follows:—

"'It appears from an intercepted letter (translation of which follows by post) from Liusher, one of the few high officers of Lhassa, to the Dalai Lama, that Liusher has been imprisoned by the Amban, and that situation is ripe for revolt against the Chinese at Lhassa and Niarong in Eastern Thibet.'

"Probability of uprisings which I have already reported is thus confirmed. If assistance cannot be rendered by Government to Dalai Lama, reinforcement should be sent as soon as possible for our own escort."

Enclosure 3 in No. 82.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, June* 29, 1910.

THIBET. See your telegram dated the 27th June. You do not answer points raised in my telegram of 10th instant. Political, and possibly military, entanglement must result from presence of our troops in Thibet. Are troops to stand by while Thibetans are punished by Chinese, or while Chinese and Thibetans fight it out? Is it not inevitable that we shall be driven to take the part of the weaker side, with results that, whichever side it may be, will be equally embarrassing? Will it be possible, again, without loss of prestige in Nepal and border States, to withdraw when order is re-established? These are vital questions, and it is only in event of lives being really in danger that they can be put aside. There are no material facts in your telegrams of the 27th June to satisfy His Majesty's Government that lives are really in danger, and, as you do not contemplate dispatching reinforcements to posts immediately, I

gather that you yourself are not satisfied. If there is no immediate danger to posts, there seems no necessity for your proposals, and it is likely that massing of troops on frontier, by encouraging Thibetans to believe that we are going to help them, will even provoke disturbance. If there is immediate danger, posts should surely be reinforced immediately. Proposals of Mr. Bell seem preferable from this point of view. Undesirability of sending small detachments through difficult country is recognised, but risk must be run if there is real emergency, and is preferable to elaborate preparations on a larger scale, which news that attack is imminent may stultify at any moment.

Should you be satisfied, on further consideration, that immediate reinforcement on scale proposed by Mr. Bell is justified by circumstances, it will be sanctioned by His Majesty's Government. Would it not be possible, if reserves are necessary, to collect them with their supplies at some convenient centre on the railway, where attention of Thibetans is less likely to be attracted by them?

Please consider, as regards the construction of a new post at Gyantse, whether troops, if sent up, cannot make present post defensible, or build new one. Raising of fresh questions with Chinese is undesirable, and it is unlikely, moreover, that Chinese could compel Thibetans in existing conditions, while our popularity will not be increased if an attempt to do so is made.

[23790] No. 83.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 1st July, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 2, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 83.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 1, 1910.

FOLLOWING telegram, dated the 29th June, received from Mr. Bell :—

"I received call yesterday from Thibetan Ministers. Present tension in Thibet will, they apprehend, be increased by capture and imprisonment of Liushar by Chinese. Liushar and Regent form supreme Thibetan authority in Thibet. Regent can decide nothing of importance without consulting Liushar, who is Chief Minister's representative at Lhassa. Ministers fear that Liushar may be beheaded without trial."

Following telegram, dated the 30th June, received from Trade Agent, Yatung :—

"I have received information that people of Phari are coming in a body down to Yatung with a view to raising general protest against Chinese high-handed proceedings. They state that constant demand for transport animals and for supplies has harassed them. They mean to tell Chinese that they would leave their homes, as their sufferings have become unbearable. They state further that if Chinese use force they would fight them. Thibetan Agent at Yatung informs me that he has received report from village headman to the effect that Chinese tyranny cannot any longer be endured by people of Chumbi Valley. After consultation they have unanimously decided on rising against Chinese, and have planned that, on receipt of Thibetan Government's orders, they will pull down their houses. I will duly report further development."

[24129] No. 84.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards

herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd July, 1910, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 4, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 84.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 3, 1910.

THIBET. See your telegram of the 4th May.

Decision of His Majesty's Government was communicated in writing to Dalai Lama by Mr. Bell on the 23rd May (see his telegrams of the 23rd and 28th May, of which copies were communicated to you with letters of the 26th May and the 2nd ultimo from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department). We have now received a further representation from the Dalai Lama and his Ministers. In it are detailed breaches of treaties which Chinese have committed, looting and destruction of monasteries, and various acts of oppression, as well as their usurpation of administrative power in Thibet. Portions of Thibet already converted into a province of China are specified, and communication ends with request that His Majesty's Government will reconsider their decision, and will negotiate on behalf of Thibetans with Chinese Government.

It is proposed to reply through political officer, Sikkim, expressing regret of His Majesty's Government that their decision cannot be reconsidered. It is stated in representation that delivery of necessary supplies, &c., to Dalai and party at Darjeeling is prevented by Chinese. It is stated by Mr. Bell that Thibetans are forbidden to bring gold and silver, though they are now permitted to bring food supplies. Could Chinese Government be moved in this matter ? Heavy expenditure would be entailed on us by cessation of supplies.

We will send you by next mail a copy of the representation.

[24446] No. 85.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copies of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 5th July, 1910, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 6, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 85.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 5, 1910.

PLEASE see your telegram dated the 23rd February, 1910.

It is proposed that political officer, Sikkim, and trade agents in Thibet should be instructed that orders as to granting Chinese officials an asylum in the event their lives being in imminent danger apply in similar circumstances to Thibetan officials *mutatis mutandis*. Please say if this has your concurrence.

Enclosure 2 in No. 85.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 5, 1910.

SEE your telegram of the 29th ultimo regarding Thibet.

Points in your telegram of the 10th ultimo, to which you presumably refer, were regarded by us as your observations on the situation arising from our proposals rather

than as questions to which an answer was required. Following comments are now submitted :—

1. Chinese will do everything in their power, whether we send troops to reinforce our trade agency escorts or not, to send into Thibet force sufficient to justify claim on their part that our escorts should be completely withdrawn under article 12 of Trade Regulations. This we know to be local Chinese officers' ambition.

2. Possibility of course exists that ignorant local Thibetans might take advent of our troops as an intention to intervene against Chinese authority on their behalf, but both Thibetan and Chinese local authorities would be informed by us that protection of our agents is sole object of sending the troops, that latter will be withdrawn as soon as affairs settle down, and that, in event of any conflict taking place between Thibetans and Chinese, they will remain absolutely neutral.

3. Embarrassment which would otherwise be experienced when time comes for withdrawal of strengthened escorts would be avoided if the foregoing is carried out. Present escorts will have to be withdrawn in any case sooner or later. (See above, paragraph 1.)

4. Intervention by us on their behalf has been solicited, and is expected, by Thibetans. It is considered probable that they may wreak their disappointment and despair on any British subjects or property within their reach when they understand definitely that we do not intend to give Dalai Lama in his difficulties with the Chinese any assistance whatever.

5. It is recognised fully by us that political, and possibly military, entanglements may result from presence of additional troops. Unless attack on the agencies is either made or is imminent, we do not now propose to send troops into Thibet. Our answer, therefore, to the first two direct questions which your telegram of the 29th ultimo put is that we propose to proceed in accordance with the course indicated in communication which you suggested in your telegram of the 10th ultimo should be addressed to the Dalai Lama. It is not, in our opinion, inevitable that in the event of conflict between Thibetans and Chinese we should be driven to take the part of the weaker side.

6. If our intentions are distinctly announced before troops are dispatched, we do not consider that loss of prestige in Nepal and the border States will follow withdrawal. We are not able to say that an attack is imminent on either of our posts, but it is indicated by telegrams which we have recently sent to you that every day probability becomes greater of general Thibetan rising, and at any moment danger to our escorts may become imminent. To be prepared to meet that danger, if it becomes imminent, is the object we have in view. Relief would be brought to Gyantse within eight days if preparations proposed by us are made. Relief will take over a month without these preparations, and risk should not, in our opinion, be accepted.

[24824] No. 86.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 8, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to ask that you will call the attention of Viscount Morley to the notes exchanged with the Russian Government on the 18th (31st) August, 1907, whereby Great Britain and Russia undertook, for a period of three years, not to allow, except by previous mutual agreement, the entry of any scientific expedition into Thibet.

In view of the fact that this period is now approaching expiry, Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn Lord Morley's views upon the question of addressing a communication upon the subject to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[25054] No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 11.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 9, 1910.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 3rd May last, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram which has been received from the Government of India regarding a further representation made by the Dalai Lama.*

Subject to Sir E. Grey's concurrence, Lord Morley proposes to approve the answer which the Government of India suggest should be returned to the lama.

As regards the action of the Chinese in cutting off the lama's supply of gold and silver, it would not be unnatural that they should consider that, by his flight, he has forfeited his private property. But if Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the good offices of His Majesty's Government could with advantage be used in his favour, Lord Morley would suggest that Mr. Max Müller should be instructed accordingly.

The Government of India have been requested to repeat their telegram to Peking.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

[25105] No. 88.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 9th July, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 11, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 88.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 9, 1910.

FOLLOWING telegram regarding Thibet, dated the 7th instant, received from resident in Nepal:—

"I have been informed by Prime Minister that object of visit to Khatmandu of Thibetan Depon is conveyance of an oral message, asking Nepal Durbar's advice as to his return to Thibet, from the Dalai Lama. Depon intends to leave Khatmandu seven or eight days from now. Enquiry is made by Prime Minister whether Government of India desire him to give any special advice. He proposes, if this is not the case, to advise Dalai Lama to return, on the ground that he considers that by regaining Thibetans' confidence Lama may hope to re-establish his position, and that he will not be deprived of spiritual powers. Return to Lhassa of Dalai Lama and Thibetan Government, now at Darjeeling, would, in Prime Minister's opinion, improve present political situation in Thibet."

Reply to following effect has been sent by me to-day:—

"Prime Minister should be thanked for his communication, and informed that it is not the wish of the Government of India to influence the Maharajah in any personal advice as to returning to Thibet that he may think fit to give the Dalai Lama, but that, while they would feel that direct advice from them to the Dalai Lama to return was precluded, for fear lest regrettable personal consequences to Lama himself should result from such return, they feel that, provided Lama feels assured of his own safety, he would be well advised to meet Chinese half-way, in the event of the latter making a genuine attempt to induce him to return."

* No. 84.

A difficult position may, in our opinion, be solved if Dalai Lama returns to Thibet with approval of Chinese, and such approval is understood to be a condition of advice which the Prime Minister proposes to give. It was, of course, on supposition that Lama returned as an act of hostility to Chinese, that Captain Weir expressed opinion that general rising against Chinese would probably follow return of Lama. (See telegram of the 18th ultimo from Political Officer, Sikkim, forwarded with letter of the 23rd ultimo from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.)

[25200] No. 89.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 12.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 11, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India regarding the grant of asylum to Thibetan and Chinese officials in Thibet.*

In Viscount Morley's telegram of the 23rd February last the Government of India were instructed that "any Chinese who take refuge with our officials to save their lives should accept the condition that they leave the country if the Thibetans demand it." The Government of India propose to apply these instructions *mutatis mutandis* to Thibetan officials, and Lord Morley is disposed, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, to approve the proposal.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[25496] No. 90.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 206.)

Sir, *Peking, June* 21, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 164 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Chengtu, enclosing a preliminary report by Mr. Muir, who returned to Batang on the 3rd May from his journey in Thibet and the Marches.

Mr. Muir gives interesting information in regard to the numbers and distribution of Chinese troops in Thibet, and attributes the successful subjugation of the country with such a small force and so little bloodshed entirely to the remarkable personality and influence of the Warden Chao Erh-feng. His Majesty's consul-general states that he is writing to the Governor-General of Szechuan to protest against the measures adopted by the Warden to restrict the travels of missionaries in those parts of the Marches that have been officially declared to be now under the direct rule of China.

I have, &c.
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 90.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Chengtu, June* 1, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 34 of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Mr. Muir returned to Batang on the 3rd ultimo. On the 11th he sent me the letter, of which, as of its enclosures, I have the honour to forward copy. It forms, as you will observe, a preliminary report on his journey; a more detailed account is promised by Mr. Muir later on.

Meanwhile, Mr. Muir's list of the Chinese troops operating in Thibet and the Marches is of much interest. It fully confirms the estimate I gave (in my despatch No. 19 of the 28th February) of the strength of this force, which, as I note from the "Morning Post," Mr. Fergusson still declares to number 25,000 men. As a matter of

* See Enclosure 1 in No. 85.

fact, 2,000 would appear to be the highest possible figure at which the Chinese troops now west of Pien-pa can be placed, while those under the more direct command of Chao Erh-feng—whose head-quarters continue to be at Chiamdo—cannot exceed 5,600. Mr. Muir is of opinion that if we reckon the Chinese forces in Thibet proper (that is, apart from the province of Kham) at 1,200, and elsewhere, in Kham and the Marches, at 3,600—or a total, say, of 5,000—we should not be far wide of the mark.

As regards the Chinese casualties in this expedition, the accounts published in the local press are somewhat conflicting. (I append a series of extracts compiled by Mr. Toller.) That some casualties occurred is beyond question, for the reasons given in my earlier despatch, but there was no serious check to the Chinese arms.

You will note Mr. Muir's strong conviction that no other Chinese official could have done what Chao Erh-feng has done, and reduced to subjection with so little bloodshed so great a tract of land. He believes that the transfer of his Excellency would jeopardise the position gained for China in Thibet almost solely through the personal influence of the Warden. In this, as you will see from the accompanying letters, Mr. Edgar concurs.

I learn with regret that, so far from having authorised, or even countenanced, Mr. Muir's journey to Chiamdo, Chao Erh-feng is taking measures to restrict the travels of missionaries not merely in Thibet, but in the Marches. I can only suppose that he does not wish his work to be inspected by foreigners until it is complete, or that there is some basis for the complaints of the Thibetans that the lamas of the eastern province have been treated with undue severity. The latter supposition, however, is not borne out by Mr. Edgar's letters, or, indeed, by Mr. Muir's. Meanwhile, I cannot admit, in face of the memorial reporting the establishment of Chinese government in Derge (see my No. 25 of the 24th March), and the verbal assurances of the Governor-General that all is quiet in that part of Szechuan, that it is reasonable to hamper the movements of so experienced and pacific a missionary as Mr. Edgar, and I am writing to Chao chiht'ai in this sense. I am not, of course, claiming for Mr. Edgar the right to travel in Thibet, but merely in those parts of the Marches that have been officially declared to be now under the direct rule of China.

I have, &c.

W. H. WILKINSON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 90.

Rev. J. R. Muir to Consul-General Wilkinson.

Dear Mr. Wilkinson, *Batang, May* 11, 1910.

I ARRIVED back from Chiamdo on the 3rd May, but I have had little time as yet to get to work. I sent a letter from Chiamdo for you, but it just missed the mail here and is now waiting to be sent. Though it is such a scrawl, I am sending it on.

I include a copy and translation of Chao's letter, and a list of the forces at work on the frontier and at Lhassa, according to a recent request of yours.

Please excuse haste this morning.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN R. MUIR.

Enclosure 3 in No. 90.

Rev. J. R. Muir to Consul-General Wilkinson.

Dear Mr. Wilkinson, *Chiamdo, April* 19, 1910.

I AM now in the city where Chao Erh-feng has his temporary quarters. From Kiangka I wrote to you and had Mrs. Muir telegraph that I was coming in with Chinese permission. When I get back to Batang I will explain the matter more fully, but now it seems that the official here, under Chao's directions, takes the stand that I had no right to come. It is true that the Batang official did not give me permission, but the official acting at Kiangka had offered a few days previously to let Dr. Shelton come on to Chiamdo, so I took it for granted that he knew what he was up to, and with his escort and the "ula" provided by him I came to Chiamdo. That is why I wired to you as I did.

The official refuses me permission to return to Batang viâ Derge as I wish to do. I accept his decision, and will return to Batang as I came. However, I will tell him to-morrow that I do so under protest. A Chinese official having arranged for my coming in here, I do not see why I should be treated as a culprit.

Now, may I hastily outline what I have found here? I will embody everything in a full report after I reach Batang. Chao Erh-feng has done a wonderful thing here in Thibet. He has come in with a very small army, and without striking a blow has subdued the whole country. The Thibetans fear the little man as if he were possessed of some superhuman power. There is no reason to doubt the reports that thousands of Thibetans, outnumbering the Chinese by at least two to one, and perhaps by a much larger number, were gathered at such points as En Tah (three days west of here), Draya, Kiangka, &c., to wait for the Chinese. They had been gathered from the respective districts, as I have mentioned, by officers sent from Lhassa. Some of them were lamas. These officers never stood for a single engagement. The stories are really laughable. A few hundred Chinese soldiers with their repeating rifles would cause the Thibetans to scatter in all directions. One Chinese officer with 200 men captured four of the Thibetan officers, and brought them here to Chao. In all, over ten have thus been captured, two arriving the day before yesterday. Chao has cautioned them all, given them some good advice, and with a safe-conduct and provisions for the road he has sent them home to Lhassa.

One man who promised to disperse his men could not do so in time to get out of the way of the Chinese. When they arrived his men left everything, like some of the flights we read of in the Bible. The Chinese found the camp as it was, with horses tied, arms and camp utensils thrown everywhere, and not a Thibetan to be seen!

The practical results are as follows: The former Thibetan rulers in Derge, Chiamdo, Draya, and Kiangka, and in many places to the west, have been, or are about to be, replaced by Chinese officials. China has shown a disposition really to govern this country. As long as Chao Erh-feng is on the field at least she will be successful. But at present it seems to be almost a hypnotic influence that this man exercises over the Thibetans. I will refer to this again, but I am wondering if you could let Peking know that it is actually the presence of the man himself, and not his insignificant army, that has wrought all this. If he is not kept here, they may undo all he has done.

There may be a disposition on the part of the people to accept the situation and let China rule them, but the lamas will not be content to sit down and see their authority taken from them like this and be happy. As long as their institutions cover the country as they now do, China will have trouble with the Thibetans unless a strong man, or a much stronger army, is kept here on the ground. It is not to be expected that China in her poverty will send in any more troops.

Before I complete this letter I will give you a list showing how many soldiers there are in the district. Chao Erh-feng will remain here until he sees the official power taken from the present lama rulers in Chiamdo and Draya and vested in Chinese officials. His reason for objecting to my coming at present is that this has not beeu done. It has been done at Kiangka and at Derge. From the tone of his proclamations it would seem as if it had been done here, and it was only when I reached Draya and Chiamdo that I found otherwise. This change is expected to take place inside of two months, as soon as his troops that have been operating further west return here. I have no reason to think that there will be any opposition from the Thibetans. The lamas have no army now with which to oppose the move.

There is one other part of his programme at which I can do no more than hint at present. The districts where even Lhassa has had no authority are to be dealt with severely, and Chao has shown an inclination to make a clean sweep of everything in what we now call Thibet. His present authority extends as far west as Pien-pa. You will find these names in the "Hsi-tsang T'ung-lan," published by the Board of Education. Pien-pa will be found on p. 102, second half.

To the west of that the country is under Amban Lien in Lhassa. Though I have given so much credit to Chao, Lien deserves a great deal of credit, though I think he is second to Chao. As far as I can find out, only 2,000 of the Lu-chün (land troops) under an officer less than 30 years old, have gone to Lhassa. When they reached this place they were so frightened that they refused to go on unless Chao's own soldiers went before and made a way for them. This was done, and the only real fighting was that reported to yeu by wire as soon as we heard at Batang. It occurred at Kiangta (p. 103) about nine days from Lhassa. It is said that the Thibetans there were armed with modern rifles. Only a few were killed, and the Chinese say that they lost none From there to Lhassa the Lu-chün had a few brushes with Thibetans that amounted to

nothing, and they reached Lhassa with no further opposition. It is evidently quite true that the Dalai Lama fled.

The Lu-chün carried no wireless outfit. Such a thing is unheard of in these parts. The wire from Batang to Chiamdo will be put up as soon as the country is thoroughly quiet. They probably have six mountain guns mounted in pieces on mules. One gun requires eight animals. The gun holds five rounds. In all, the Lu-chün was supposed to have a complement of 4,400 men, including 400 cavalry and 12 guns. They have, in fact, only three instead of nine battalions of infantry. If they have more than 120 cavalry it will be a surprise to me, and, as I say, they probably have six instead of twelve guns. Now, this is typically Chinese. The young commandant ("t'ung-ling") is less than 30 years of age. He was supposed to have raised a full "hsieh" (4,400), but when he arrived at Derge he asked the Amban to permit him to make up his complement from the ranks of the eight battalions that the Amban had. He was promptly reprimanded, and his request refused. So he has gone to Lhassa with only 2,000 men. This number includes three battalions of infantry, one of cavalry, one of artillery, the commandant's personal guard, and all camp followers, such as cooks, &c. They are all that have gone to Lhassa to police the road between there and India. They are all inexperienced men, and the older veterans here laugh at their inability to rough it and their fear of the Thibetans.

Besides them there are supposed to be between Tachienlu and Lhassa 5,600 men of three different divisions, and the Amban's personal force. I will give this list more perfectly from Batang :—

1. Hsin-chün Hsün-fang (five battalions of five companies each)—		
Chung ying (Batang)	500	
Ch'ien ying (Thibet)	500*	
Hou ying (Yen-ching)	500	
Tso ying (Hsiang-ch'eng)	500	
Yu ying (scattered)	500	
	—	2,500
2. Hsi-chün (three battalions of six companies each)—		
Chung ying (Thibet)	600*	
Tso ying (Kiangka)	600	
Yu ying (Derge)	600	
	—	1,800
Of these, the Tso ying carries ordnance. I know that they have one gun, but they are supposed to have six.		
3. Hsün-fang Tui (three battalions of three companies each)—		
2nd ying (Kakong, boundary between Derge and Chiando)	300	
4th ying (Tachienlu)	300	
6th ying (Derge)	300	
	—	900
4. Amban's personal (Chiamdo)—		
Bodyguard (Wei-tui)	200	
Cavalry	120	
Artillery†	80	
	—	400
Total		5,600

* These escorted the Lu-chün as far as Kiangka. They are now returning here to Chiamdo. There will then be no one between here and Lhassa.

† This artillery is supposed to have six guns. Only one is here in Chiamdo, and the other is said to be at Derge! Who knows?

It is not to be supposed that the complement is complete. I know of companies where there are only 80 instead of 100 men. There has been little or no recruiting for those who have died, deserted, gone because of sickness, &c. Perhaps only a very few have been killed in action. One company of the Hsi-chün, tso-ying, is here; two companies are at En Tah, which left only three to engage at Kiangta. I suppose that all of the other battalions are more or less scattered like this. In conclusion, I give as my opinion that there are now 2,000 men in Lhassa and 5,000 scattered between Tachienlu and Lhassa. In a little while all these will be east of Chiamdo, except the Hsi-chün hou ying, now operating west of Yen-ching, as explained before.

April 22, 1910.

I am leaving Chiamdo and returning to Batang to-day, but this ought to go faster than I do, so I am sending it on ahead. I hope that what I have written will be of some interest. I know that it is hasty and incomplete, but it is the best I can do on

the road. I think you will probably like to have this as soon as possible, so I am not waiting until I can make a proper report. Please forgive my poor writing and all evidences of haste.

JOHN R. MUIR.

Enclosure 4 in No. 90.

Rev. J. R. Muir to Consul-General Wilkinson.

CHINESE troops operating with his Excellency Chao Erh-feng on the frontier and with Amban Lien at Lhassa, April 1910 :—

Hsi-Chün (three battalions of 600 each): Commandant, Chao Erh-feng, Chiamdo:		
Personal guard—		
Infantry	200	
Cavalry	120	
Artillery	80	
Battalion of the centre, Major Ku (this man and one or two others are only "yu-chi," but I have used the term "major" throughout)—		
Kiangta	200	
En Tah	200	
Chiamdo	100	
Batang	100	
Battalion of the right, Major Yu—		
Litang	200	
Badly scattered	400	
Battalion of the left, Major Ku—		
Kiangka	300	
Draya	100	
Bamutang	100	
Batang	100	
	—	2,200
Hsin Chün Hsün Fang (five battalions of 500 each): Commandant, Feng, Batang:		
Battalion of the centre, Captain Liu—		
Batang	300	
Chung-ngai	100	
Yen-ching	100	
Battalion of the front, Major Chang: So Pan To	500	
„ rear, Major Ch'eng: Sa Nga Chu Tsong	500	
„ right, Major Chu: Derge [?]	500	
„ left, Major Liu: Hsiang Ch'eng	500	
	—	2,500
Hsün Fang Tui (three battalions of 300 each): Commandant, Chang, Derge:		
Second battalion, Major Su: Ka Gong	300	
Fourth „ Major —: Tachienlu	300	
Sixth „ Major Ch'eng: Derge	300	
	—	900
Total		5,600

These are all operating under his Excellency Chao Ehr-feng. The Hsi-chün has six companies in a battalion, but the sixth in each case is made up of Manchurian soldiers from Chengtu, and none of them are seeing any service. Two companies of them are here and one at Litang. I have given the official number which calls for 100 men in a company, but in every case I feel sure that there are not more than 70 men active in service, if, in fact, there are that number in every case. That would mean that instead of 5,600 men there are only about 3,600.

The Hsi-chün, tso-ying, carries ordnance. They are said to have six pieces that I would call Gatling guns. Only one is at Kiangka. They say there are two here and two at Litang. I do not know where there is another. The present operations of that battalion do without ordnance. The personal artillery at Chiamdo is also supposed to have six pieces, but there are not so many at Chiamdo. Some are said to be at Derge. No use whatever has been made of these large guns in the campaign, so it is impossible to find out just what they have. I am of opinion that twelve pieces in all

would suffice for all there are in these parts. I have put 100 cavalry at Chiamdo, but I doubt if there are actually more than twenty or thirty.

Lu Chün (land forces): Commandant, Chung, Lhassa:

Three battalions of infantry of 400 each.
One battalion of cavalry of 400.
One battalion of artillery of 400.

First battalion, Major Ch'in	400
Second battalion, Major Chang	400
Third battalion, Major —	400
Total	2,000

Chug was supposed to have about 5,000 men, but he left Chengtu with his number very much in arrears, and he asked the Amban when he got to Derge to allow him to make up from his experienced soldiers. This request was refused. He has gone to Lhassa in that way. It is very doubtful if he has in all 2,000 men. If his companies have only 70 instead of 100 men, as is the rule, he probably has actually only about 1,200. His cavalry is known to have had only a few more than 100 men and no horses when they came through Chiamdo. They were supposed to have twelve pieces of ordnance, but it is not likely that they have more than six mountain guns. They are carried on trained mules, and it takes about eight animals for a gun. They hold five rounds a-piece.

A map would make the situation clearer. I hope to be able to send you one next time I write.

Enclosure 5 in No. 90.

Translation of a Document received while en route *to Chiamdo from the Military Official Li, acting as Prefect at Kiangka.*

INSTRUCTIONS have been received from his Excellency Chao, Warden of the Marches, stating that though there is now an army operating in the Kiangka district they have not been long in the district, and the inhabitants have not yet come under the jurisdiction and control of the Chinese officials. Moreover, the army may be ordered any day to remove to Gonjoh (a district bordering on the San Ngai country, just east of Draya), so that they will not be in Kiangka for any length of time. His Excellency has now heard that there is a foreigner come forward to Kiangka to preach, but is not furnished with any definite news. He therefore calls on the Shou-pei (captain) to furnish the information required.

The warden finds that a communication has been received from the Wai-wu Pu stating that all foreign missionaries in dangerous places on the frontier are not permitted to travel at will to preach without a passport from the Viceroy or himself, and yet, after all, they travel in districts that are not subject to him, which is in violation of treaty privileges. The traveller must therefore be urgently requested to stop, and return as speedily as possible to Batang. Should the traveller refuse to listen and any trouble arise, the Chinese officials cannot undertake to protect him. Let all take notice and act accordingly.

These instructions having been received the Shou-pei takes note thereof, and orders information to be given to the foreigner, exhorting him to return without delay. Do not disobey.

He further instructs the Pa-tsung (at Draya) to ask Mr. Muir to remain at Draya a few days till the matter is further reported to the commandant at Chiamdo, to see what the mind of the warden is. Do not disobey these important instructions.

This communication is sent from Pa-tsung Liang at Draya.

Hsuan-t'ung, 2nd year, 3rd moon, 3rd day
(*April* 12, 1910).

Received by me at Wang K'a (two days north of Draya and within a few days of Chiamdo), 16th April, 6 A.M.

JOHN R. MUIR.

Enclosure 6 in No. 90.

Thibetan Campaign : Extracts from Chengtu Newspapers.

"*T'ung-su Jih-pao*," *April* 22.—Governor-General Chao has telegraphed to the Board of War, stating that there has been a rising among the barbarian priests (lamas). A series of engagements has taken place, the victory being now on one side, now on the other. The armaments of the forces are insufficient, so he requests that the Wuchang and Kiangnan arsenals may be ordered with all speed to furnish further supplies to Szechuan. The Board of War has given instructions that the necessary articles be sent to Szechuan without the least delay. Chin taotai, director of the Reorganisation Office (Shan-hou Chü) at Wuchang, is to visit the arsenal there personally, get the guns and ammunition ready, and send them under pass and in charge of a deputy to Szechuan.

In its number of the 2nd May the same journal quotes a private telegram sent by Chao chiht'ai to the Governor-General at Nanking, describing the campaign. His Excellency says that the Thibetans did not wish to obstruct the Chinese advance, but were compelled to do so by the Dalai. He further states that the Imperial troops reached Lhassa without any great difficulty, and that the campaign was undertaken in order to open up trading marts in Thibet, a proceeding repugnant to the natives.

On the 7th May the "T'ung-su Jih-pao" printed an excerpt from the "Shun-t'ien Shih-pao," to the effect that, in a telegram to the Board of Dependencies, the Amban had reported the ambushment and annihilation of a column of sixty odd men sent in pursuit of the Dalai. The disaster occurred some five days out from Lhassa. A list of the men killed was sent, and permission requested to issue compassionate grants.

This story is contradicted in the "Chengtu Jih-pao" (15th May). This journal's bersion of the incident is that, when the Dalai fled, Lien Amban sent a few score of his vodyguard to escort him back. These troops, however, turned back just before reaching Yatung. A categorical denial is given to the tale of the "Shun-t'ien Shih-pao."

Enclosure 7 in No. 90.

Rev. J. H. Edgar to Consul-General Wilkinson.

Dear Mr. Wilkinson, *Litang, May* 16, 1910.

SOME time ago I wrote to you about a trip to Chamdo. When writing I understood Mr. Muir had gone in under official escort and with full knowledge of the responsible officials. That was written in perfect good faith, but I am sorry to say his Excellency the Warden of the Marches actually forbade the latter part of the journey, and has now given instructions which must seriously hamper our movements. Mr. Muir, I am sure, commenced the journey in perfect good faith, but there was a mistake somewhere. In any case, I have been definitely refused permission to go to Chiangka or Derge any time, and yesterday the Litang official refused, without any reason, to allow me to visit a district two days south of Litang. He was exceedingly suspicious, and seemed to connect me with the Chiangka-Chamdo affair.

All I can say is that I am sorry that, unwittingly, I gave you and our mission a wrong impression about Chamdo. I am exceedingly sorry, also, that I am included among those who would take advantage of the minor officials. I have always been careful not to go beyond bounds, and have given little trouble to anyone. It seems hard, therefore, to be refused now the right to travel in regions completely under China, and regions where I have passed through in perfect safety. I wonder if his Excellency Chao knows that I am the only Britisher west of Tachienlu ? And could you arrange for my (*a*) travelling south of Litang, (*b*) and in Derge ?

With the exception of the suspicious attitude of the officials the country seems quite quiet, and the Dalai's escape is not troubling anyone.

Yours, &c.

J. HUSTON EDGAR.

Enclosure 8 in No. 90.

Rev. J. H. Edgar to Consul-General Wilkinson.

Tachienlu, May 23, 1910.

I ARRIVED in Tachienlu on Saturday and read your communication with great interest. You cannot understand how grateful I am to you for your assistance, and you may be sure that I shall never do anything knowingly which will interfere with the Government programme. Needless to say, also, I quite understand how our Government might find it necessary to act as she has been doing in regard to Thibet. But I am just afraid the local officials are just to glad to take advantage of every small matter, and needlessly restrict us from travelling in regions quite safe and technically open.

As far as I can see, the Chinese are treating the Thibetans kindly. His Excellency Chao seems a just and compassionate man, and his conquests have been made with little bloodshed. Of course, just what will happen when Chao is removed is quite a problem for Chinese, Thibetans, and Europeans to muse about. Thibetan rulers, I understand, advise submission while Chao is here; later on, rebellion, &c. But when the time comes they may know just enough to appreciate the superiority of Chinese Government.

With kind regards, yours, &c.

J. HUSTON EDGAR.

[25200] No. 91.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 14, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant with reference to the grant of an asylum to Thibetan officials by the British trade agents at Gyantse and Yatung.

Sir E. Grey concurs in the view that Thibetan officials, who are in danger of their lives, should be permitted to take refuge at the British trade agencies, but it appears to him that it would be somewhat harsh treatment if, as suggested in your letter, such refugees were required to give an undertaking to leave their own country at the bidding of the Chinese authorities in Thibet.

I am to suggest that this consideration should be placed before the Government of India.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[25573] No. 92.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 15.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 14, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams which have been received from the Government of India regarding the possible return of the Dalai Lama to Thibet, together with papers received from India by this mail regarding the general situation in that country.*

There is no doubt that the situation is extremely embarrassing. Before the Chinese sent in their troops upon an alleged errand of pacification the country was tranquil; but in the papers and telegrams that have been periodically sent to your department there is evidence of a growing tension of feeling between the Thibetans and Chinese, which, on some chance occasion, may easily lead to an outbreak. And although there is a lack of precise information as to what is taking place, it seems doubtful whether the attempts of the Chinese to consolidate their position in defiance of the wishes of the people is meeting with very rapid success.

In these circumstances it is probable that the Dalai Lama's absence from Thibet is embarrassing to them, especially as it is understood that they have been unsuccessful in their efforts to find a successor for him. It is possible, therefore, that they might

* Government of India, June 23 (Inclosures); ditto, July 9, 1910.

welcome his return ; and it appears from Mr. Bell's letter of the 7th June (which was sent to you on the 5th instant), that Chinese and Thibetan officials were expected to come to Darjeeling before very long to invite him to return to Lhassa. It is not clear from the present telegram whether they have already done so, or whether the deputation to the Prime Minister of Nepal was sent in anticipation of their arrival.

It is by no means certain that the return of the Dalai Lama to Thibet would result in an improvement of the situation of the British agency at Gyantse. On the one hand, there is the possibility indicated in Captain Weir's telegrams of the 1st June last* and the 9th July, that his return without British support would cause the Thibetans to attack our agencies. And though, as the Government of India pointed out in their telegram of the 9th instant, Captain Weir's opinion was expressed on the supposition that the Lama would return as an act of hostility to China, it seems not improbable that, if he were to return as the result of an agreement with China, Chinese influence would not be exerted to restrain any excesses that his followers might be tempted to indulge in, while the efforts of the Thibeto-Chinese combination would certainly be devoted to making the position of our agents untenable.

As Sir E. Grey is aware, the question of reinforcing the agent's escorts has for some time been under Lord Morley's consideration. The objections to any such measure are obvious ; but the possibility hinted at in the telegrams now under discussion has confirmed him in the opinion already arrived at on other grounds, that, though immediate reinforcement is not necessary, it is desirable that the Government of India should be in a position to send up troops the moment that the risk of attack on the agencies is declared to be imminent. He has accordingly authorised, in the telegram of which copy is enclosed, the measures proposed by the Viceroy.

These measures necessitate a communication to the Chinese Government, and Lord Morley would suggest that the opportunity be taken to refer to the subject of the Dalai Lama's return. It might be explained to them that, in consequence of the reports that have reached them, His Majesty's Government have found it necessary to take measures that will enable them to reinforce the escorts in Thibet in the event of the risk of an attack becoming imminent, and that for this purpose a force is being stationed at Gnatong ; that this force is intended solely for the protection of our officers ; that it will not cross the frontier unless they are endangered ; and that it will not intervene between the Chinese and Thibetans. It might be pointed out that Thibet was quiet before the arrival of the Chinese troops, and that though the present highly embarrassing situation is no doubt the immediate result of the Dalai Lama's flight, their own somewhat precipitate proceedings and the tactlessness of the Amban Len were not likely to reassure him as to his security if he remained. His Majesty's Government must therefore hold them responsible for any damage that may be done to British interests and property. If, however, as is now understood, they wish for the Dalai Lama's return, on conditions satisfactory to him, His Majesty's Government will place no difficulties in his way ; but they must understand that if, as the result of their treatment of him on his return, or for any other reason, disturbances ensue in which the lives and property of British subjects are endangered, the force stationed at Gnatong will at once enter Thibet for their protection.

Subject to Sir E. Grey's concurrence, Viscount Morley proposes to approve the answer given by the Government of India to the Prime Minister of Nepal's enquiry. It is, of course, for the Dalai Lama to satisfy himself as to the good faith of the Chinese in any overtures that they may make to him, and to require suitable safeguards of them, and it should be made quite clear, in any further advice that the Government of India may be called upon to give on this subject, that His Majesty's Government take no responsibility for his safety if and when he leaves India.

I am to enclose copy of a telegram which, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, Lord Morley proposes to send to the Government of India in this sense.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 92.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P *July* 13, 1910.

THIBET. See your telegram dated the 5th instant.

His Majesty's Government, though their policy is to avoid military and political entanglements in Thibet, place above all other considerations the obligation to ensure

* Quoted in telegram from Political Officer in Sikkim, dated June 18, 1910.

our agents' safety. Force of objections to reinforcements on scale recommended by Mr. Bell is recognised, and alternative proposed by you is accepted, on the understanding that a portion of the force can make a dash for Gyantse in case of emergency arising before completion of preparations for whole force. There remains the political objection that crisis which we most desire to avoid may be precipitated by collection of force on frontier. But if troops for protection of agents have to be moved by us into Thibet, there are, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, objections so serious as to be insuperable to keeping troops there for any length of time. Moreover, it must be remembered that return of our agents and escorts when disturbances end and trade revives need not be prejudiced by their temporary withdrawal. It is therefore desire of His Majesty's Government that withdrawal of agents with safety and with least possible delay should be the object of movement should it be necessary. In these circumstances, question is whether future risks should not be obviated by dispatch of force at once to Gyantse, after troops have reached frontier, to withdraw agent, whatever may at the moment be the state of the country. I request that this may be considered and your views communicated to me, it being borne in mind that withdrawal, if effected at once in combination with show of force on frontier, will be less open to misrepresentation than if carried out after attack has been made on our post. Further complications seem to be indicated by overtures of Dalai Lama to Nepal as to his return to Thibet. Limitations as to object of movement of troops should therefore be made perfectly clear by Bell and agent at Gyantse, and a communication should be made to Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal to this effect. A strong hint should also be given to Dalai Lama and his Ministers that unless they exert themselves in the cause of peace their presence near the frontier will not be tolerated.

[25551] No. 93.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th July, 1910, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 14, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 93.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 13, 1910.

FOLLOWING telegram, dated the 11th instant, received from trade agent, Yatung :—

"Protest against Chinese proceedings was made by inhabitants of Phari and Chumbi Valley. They were entertained at a feast by local Chinese officials, who promised that their grievances would be remedied, and that in due course orders of Amban would be communicated. People have returned to their homes in the meanwhile."

[25696] No. 94.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 122.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, July* 16, 1910.

THIBET. Do you wish me to approach the Chinese Government on the subject of the Dalai Lama's supplies mentioned in the Government of India telegram of the 23rd June ?

[25696] No. 95.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1910.

YOUR telegram No. 122 of 16th July.

It is to be hoped that supplies necessary for maintenance of Dalai Lama and followers will not be cut off.

You may approach Chinese Government if you think desirable.

[26073] No. 96.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th July, 1910, regarding the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 18, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 96.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 18, 1910.

FOLLOWING telegram, dated the 15th instant, received from Mr. Bell:—

"I was yesterday informed in course of conversation by Dalai Lama of the arrival at Phari, *en route* for Darjeeling, of Palha Kenchen and two other officials, with the object of asking Dalai Lama to go back to Lhassa. Dalai Lama said that, since promise of late Dowager Empress had been broken, he was doubtful whether he could depend on any Chinese promise, but that he would ask me to advise him what to do, after hearing what the officials said on their arrival here. The fresh troops should be dispatched as soon as possible, as Dalai Lama and his Ministers are becoming impatient for reply to their request to Government that their case should be considered."

Bell has already been instructed how to act in event of visit of deputation to Darjeeling to invite Dalai Lama to return. (See telegram of the 14th ultimo to him, copy of which was enclosed with letter of the 16th ultimo from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.) But before Dalai Lama is allowed to return to Lhassa we consider that we ought to feel thoroughly certain that Chinese Government approve his return. Can this be ascertained? Chinese Government have formally deposed Dalai Lama, and difficulties we wish to avoid might be provoked by lama's return to Thibet without approval of China. If China approves, on the other hand, it might help solution of present difficult position as stated in our telegram dated the 10th instant As regards last paragraph but one of telegram from Bell, your orders on our telegram of the 3rd instant, proposing to reply that decision of His Majesty's Government cannot be reconsidered, are awaited. Before making general communication to Bell, we should be glad to receive these orders.

[25054] No. 97.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant, enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Government of India relative to the Dalai Lama.

Sir E. Grey concurs in Lord Morley's intention to approve the answer which the Government of India propose to return to the further representations received from his Holiness and his Ministers.

A copy of the telegram addressed to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking, with reference to the supplies furnished to the Lama from Thibet, was forwarded to you in the letter from this department of the 16th instant.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[25573] No. 98.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 19, 1910.

THIBET. Telegram of Government of India of 9th July and reply of India Office repeated to you.

In consequence of the reports which have reached them, His Majesty's Government have found it necessary to take measures which will enable them to reinforce the escorts in Thibet in the event of the risk of an attack becoming imminent. For this purpose a force is being stationed at Gnatong. The force is intended solely for the protection of our officers, and will not cross the frontier unless their lives are endangered. It will not intervene between the Chinese and the Thibetans.

You should inform the Chinese Government, and at the same time point out to them that Thibet was quiet before the arrival of the Chinese troops, and that, though the present highly embarrassing situation is no doubt the immediate result of the Dalai Lama's flight, their own precipitate action and the unconciliatory attitude of the Amban Len were not calculated to reassure him as to his security if he remained. His Majesty's Government must therefore hold them responsible for any damage that may be done to British interests and property. If, however, as is now understood, they wish for the Dalai Lama's return, on conditions satisfactory to him, His Majesty's Government will place no difficulties in his way; but the Chinese Government must understand that, if, as the result of their treatment of him on his return, or for any other reason, disturbances ensue in which the lives and property of British subjects are endangered, the force stationed at Gnatong will at once enter Thibet for their protection.

[25573] No. 99.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 19, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant relative to the situation in Thibet.

In accordance with Viscount Morley's wishes, Sir E. Grey has addressed the telegram, of which a copy is enclosed, to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking,* directing him to acquaint the Chinese Government with the measures which the Government of India are about to take to enable them, if necessary, to reinforce the escorts of the British trade agents at Gyantse and Yatung, and to inform them that they will be held responsible by His Majesty's Government for any damage that may result to British interests and property from disturbances in Thibet consequent upon the Chinese proceedings in that country.

A memorandum in the sense of this telegram will be communicated to the Russian and Japanese Ambassadors.

I am at the same time to state that Sir E. Grey concurs in the terms of the telegram which Lord Morley proposes to address to the Government of India with reference to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the question of the return of the Dalai Lama to Thibet.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

* No. 98.

[26270] No. 100.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 123.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, July 20, 1910.*

THIBET. Acting on your telegram No. 103 of the 16th instant, yesterday I pointed out to the Wai-wu Pu the injustice of the action of the Chinese authorities in interfering with the supplies sent from Thibet to Darjeeling for the Dalai Lama, especially those of gold and silver.

The Wai-wu Pu undertook to make telegraphic enquiry at Lhassa.

[26560] No. 101.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 23rd June, 1910, relative to the affairs of Bhutan.

India Office, July 21, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 101.

Mr. Bell to the Government of India.

Sir, *Camp Darjeeling, June 9, 1910.*

WITH reference to your letter dated the 11th March, 1910, I have the honour to submit herewith a letter from His Highness the Maharajah of Bhutan to his Excellency the Viceroy, with a translation. The letter is of great importance, for it may be taken as confirming his acceptance, given verbally before me, of his Excellency's conditions that he (the Maharajah) will not enter into any agreement with the authorities of foreign States without the consent of the British Government, and that he will not, without the same consent, permit agents or representatives of foreign Powers to reside in Bhutan, or part with land to the authorities, representatives, or officials of any foreign State.

2. I submit also a translation of a letter from His Highness to my address, forwarding the above letter, for the information of the Government of India. The question dealt with in the second paragraph of His Highness's letter has been reported separately.

3. I would request that a copy of the *kharita* from his Excellency the Viceroy to His Highness the Maharajah of Bhutan may be sent to me for record in my office, as through oversight no copy of it was kept in my office before its despatch to its destination.

I have, &c.
C. A. BELL,
Political Officer in Sikkim.

Enclosure 2 in No. 101.

Petition of the Maharajah of Bhutan.

(Translation.)

To the throne of the precious Viceroy and Governor-General of India, who moves everything between heaven and earth by his power, and who showers on me boundless kindness.

THIS petition is submitted by me, the Maharajah of Bhutan, with many salaams. I thank you very much for your precious letter received through Bell Sahib, and also for the ratification of the treaty between the British and the Bhutanese. Thanks very

much for the fifty thousand rupees and other large presents that you so very kindly sent to us. These have now saved us from the trouble of poverty. The great kingdom has been very kind to us so far, and we pray that these kindnesses may be continued to us.

Petition submitted from Bom-tang, Bhutan, with a "Patrochin" on date of the 4th month (May–June.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 101.

Letter addressed to Mr. Bell by the Maharajah of Bhutan.

(Translation.)

To 5 Shris my friend, Bell Sahib, the great commissioner, in good health, with salaams from Ugyen Wangchuk, the Maharajah of Bhutan.

THE two letters and the copies of the treaty which you, my friend, sent to me, gave me as great pleasure as if we had met personally. I thank you very much for your kindly informing me that you are in good health and that your work is prospering. Here I and my subordinates are also in good health as before, through the kindness of you, my friend.

Purport of the letter. I thank you very much for your kindly saying that you will help the Dalai Lama as much as possible. I am sending herewith a reply to the letter sent by His Excellency the Viceroy with the copies of the treaty. You, my friend, would know whether this should be submitted or not. If it should be submitted, please submit it, and if not, please keep it.

I have recently received a letter from the Chinese stating that their coin, which has a Chinese head on it, should be circulated by us here without any protest. I have sent a copy of their letter to you through the Deb Zim-pön.* Kindly see the letter and advise me what is best to be done, as you are from a great kingdom, and also let me know whether any reply should be given to their letter, and if so, what reply should be given, as I have not yet replied to their letter.

Submitted with a "Patrochin" from Bom-tang in Bhutan, on date of the 4th month (May–June.)

[26528]

No. 102.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 22.)

Sir,

India Office, July 21, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India regarding the site for the British trade agency at Gyantze.

The annual rent and fees demanded by the Thibetans for the area of 30 acres is 28,050 rupees, with an initial fee of 300 rupees. It is impossible, of course, here to form an independent opinion on the subject, but there is no reason, *primâ facie*, to suppose that the local British officials are not nearer the mark in their estimate of the value of the land and the appropriate fees.

The Trade Regulations provide no machinery for settling a difference of opinion between the trade agent himself and the lessors. They merely provide, in the case of British subjects generally, that "in the event of a disagreement between the owner and lessee as to the amount of rent or the period or conditions of the lease, the case will be settled by the Chinese and Thibetan authorities, in consultation with the British trade agent." It is apparently consistent with Chinese ideas of procedure that in the present case the trade agent should be both a party to the dispute and an assessor to the court that decides it, but Viscount Morley is of opinion that such a method of settlement is not practicable. He would therefore suggest that, if Sir E. Grey sees no objection, Mr. Max Müller should be instructed to explain the facts and point out the difficulty to the Chinese Government. In his note of the 18th April Prince Ching stated that "the Wai-wu Pu are bound in all matters affecting international relations to issue instructions for the fulfilment of treaties." Mr. Max Müller might if necessary

* Rai Ugyen Kazi Bahadur.

refer to this, and remark that, if the Chinese officials show themselves accommodating in this matter, he has no doubt that a friendly compromise will easily be arrived at.

I am to enclose copy of a telegram which, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, Lord Morley proposes to send to the Government of India on the subject.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 102.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 13, 1910.

AFTER discussion between Chinese Thibetan authorities and Gyantze trade agent, which has extended intermittently for nearly four years, a site, about 117 acres in measurement, for the locality in which land for building houses and godowns might be leased by British subjects (see Trade Regulations, 1908, clause 2A), was accepted by British trade agent with our concurrence early in present year. Site for new British trade agency was to take up about 30 acres of this area. The "locality" was mapped and pillars placed to mark it; site of trade agency was decided upon, and the Chinese superintendent of the municipal office, Gyantze, gave a permit to lease it. This permit was not jointly signed by any Thibetan official. On subject of rent being discussed by trade agent, 27,000 rupees a-year, or about 900 rupees per acre, was claimed by stewards of Changlo, who alleged the ground to be rich and its cultivation to have been intended by them. Site is stated by British trade agent to be jungle land used for grazing purposes; he says that it has not a good soil, and that 8 acres at most represents total cultivable area. Villages pay 22 rupees per acre for similar land, while trade agency pays 5 rupees per acre for land at Yatung. 345 rupees per annum would be fair in Captain Weir's opinion, and 367 rupees in that of Mr. Bell, in addition to compensation for trees (1,100 rupees). Fees amounting to about 300 rupees initial and 750 rupees per annum are also demanded under municipal site leasing regulations. We might agree to 300 rupees initial and 300 rupees per annum, which are considered fair. Chinese Thibetan officials, on being consulted by Captain Weir, held that terms of Trade Regulations require that both parties to the lease should appear before, and settle the matter in, joint court; until lease is settled they refuse to issue permit to build, and no assistance is given by them. Extortionate demands are believed by Mr. Bell to be due to Changlo stewards acting under Thibetan Chinese officials. There is clearly no prospect of reasonable settlement, the attitude of local Chinese officials being as described, and it is very desirable that we should take over site of new agency and commence building. Last sentence of your telegram of the 29th has not been overlooked, but could pressure be brought to bear on Chinese Government with a view to their being induced to issue instructions for more reasonable attitude to be adopted by their own local officers? I propose to instruct political officer, Sikkim, pending satisfactory decision of this question, that negotiations in regard to rest houses should be kept open.

[26507] No. 103.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams to the Viceroy, dated the 19th and 20th July, 1910, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, July 21, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 103.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 19, 1910.

FOLLOWING telegram, and your telegrams dated the 3rd, 9th, and 18th July, should be repeated to His Majesty's Minister at Peking. I approve reply which you

propose to make to Dalai Lama respecting his further representations. Authority has been given to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, if he thinks desirable, to approach Chinese Government in regard to supplies for Dalai Lama. Your answer to Prime Minister of Nepal, and instructions to Bell as to return of Dalai Lama to Thibet, contained in your telegram of the 14th ultimo, are approved. In any advice, however, that Bell may give Lama it should be made plain to him that, if and when he leaves India, His Majesty's Government take no responsibility for his safety. Instructions will be sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking to explain to Chinese Government reasons for collecting troops at Gnatong, as stated in my telegram of the 10th June, to point out that their own action caused by the flight of Dalai Lama and consequent troubles, and to say that His Majesty's Government will of course place no difficulties in the way of his return if, as is now understood, Chinese Government wish for it, but that force stationed at Gnatong will at once enter Thibet for protection of British subjects, if disturbances ensue, in which lives and property of latter are endangered, either as result of Dalai Lama's treatment of Chinese on his return, or for any other reason.

Probable result of this communication will be to elicit from Chinese whether or not return of Dalai Lama has their approval; but His Majesty's Government are not in any case disposed to incur any responsibility, direct or indirect, for safety of Lama, or to negotiate with Chinese on his behalf.

Enclosure 2 in No. 103.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 20, 1910.

THIBET. See your telegram of the 15th instant.

As regards Chinese, orders in my telegram of the 23rd February hold good. But difficulty is felt by His Majesty's Government in requiring that Thibetan refugees should, at bidding of Chinese, leave their own country. Thibetans should therefore not be made subject to this condition.

[26592] No. 104.

Memorandum communicated to Count Benckendorff, July 22, 1910.

ON the 8th February, 1909, the Government of India telegraphed that a communication had been received from the Inspector-General of Chinese Imperial Posts, stating that the Chinese Government were desirous of establishing postal communication between the Chinese system and Thibet, utilising the intermediate carrying services of the Indian Post Office.

The Government of India, in reporting the matter to the Secretary of State, drew attention to the fact that, as China was not a party to the Universal Postal Union, she could not claim liberty of transit for mails across India. As, however, arrangements had already been made for the exchange of mails across the Burmah–Yünnan frontier, the Government of India considered that the extension of the Union principle to China in this case also would be unobjectionable, provided that the Chinese Post Office consented to the establishment of direct postal exchange between India and Lhassa, if desired by the Indian authorities. They also held that, pending the efficiency of the Chinese service being demonstrated, the exchange of mails should take place at Gyantse and Gartok instead of on the frontier, as had been proposed by the Chinese administration.

The Foreign Office were consulted by the India Office, and, after communicating with Sir J. Jordan, who anticipated objection being raised by the Chinese to the exchange of mails at Gyantse and Gartok, they expressed Sir E. Grey's general concurrence in the reply which the Government of India proposed to return to the Chinese communication. They expressed the opinion that any arrangement ultimately arrived at should be notified to the Russian Government, in view of article 4 of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 relative to Thibet.

Lord Morley accordingly approved the terms of the proposed reply, which was conveyed in a letter from the Director-General of Posts in India under date of the 7th May, 1909, and elicited a further communication from Peking, expressing thanks

for the readiness of the Government of India to meet the wishes of the Chinese Government. It was added that preparations were being made for the opening of post offices between Lhassa and the Indian frontier, and that the Indian postal administration would be informed as soon as it was possible for the service to begin on the conditions which they (the Indian administration) had laid down.

Since then, all that has been heard is that a certain Mr. Teng Wei-ping, of the Chinese postal service, was deputed in October 1909 to proceed to Thibet to make "the necessary preliminary arrangements."

In view of the recent developments in Thibet, it seems possible that the Chinese may have abandoned the idea altogether. There is reason to suppose that telegraphic communication exists between Peking and Lhassa, and it is known that much work has been expended on the improvement of the Lhassa road west of Chengtu. It is also probable that Chinese military posts have now been established all the way to Lhassa. It is consequently quite possible that a postal service may have been instituted already by the direct route across China, which, in spite of the absence of railway communication from Hankow onwards, may well be as rapid as the circuitous route viâ India.

Foreign Office, July 22, 1910.

[26528] No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 23, 1910.

TELEGRAM of Government of India of 13th July: Site for British trade agency at Gyantse, to be repeated to you.

Trade regulations provide no machinery for settling difference of opinion between trade agent himself and lessors (see Treaty Series No. 35, 1908, top of p. 3). It is apparently consistent with Chinese ideas of procedure that in present case trade agent should be both a party to the dispute and an assessor to the court that decides it, but such method of settlement does not seem practicable to us. Please explain facts and point out difficulty to Chinese Government. You might, if necessary, refer to Prince Ch'ing's note of 18th April last, whereby Wai-wu Pu bind themselves to issue instructions for fulfilment of treaties, and remark that if their authorities prove accommodating over this you have no doubt that a friendly compromise will be easily arrived at.

[26989] No. 106.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd July, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, July 25, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 106.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 23, 1910.

WE have repeated the following telegram to Peking, as well as the telegrams indicated in your instructions of the 19th instant. See your telegram dated the 13th instant. Except in case of grave emergency, it would in our opinion be fatal error to withdraw Gyantse trade agency. Not only would crisis in all probability be provoked, but our prestige on Thibetan frontier would be ruined, and in India worst possible effect would be produced, while aggressive policy of Chinese on Assam-Burmah border would certainly be encouraged.

Some slight amelioration has recently been apparent in situation, and if return of Dalai Lama is approved by Chinese Government there may be still further improvement. No probability of any immediate and dangerous agitation on Chumbi-Gyantse

line is indicated by recent information from Thibet, and in present circumstances we are opposed to any advance across frontier, though we adhere to necessity for the preparations recommended by us. It must be explained, however, that time for a force to reach Gyantse from Gnatong appears, from further enquiries as to collection of fodder in Thibet, to have been under-estimated in our telegram dated the 27th ultimo; at least twenty days will now be required after collection at Gnatong of sufficient supplies. If our reasons are publicly announced we do not consider that crisis will be precipitated by collection of supplies at Gnatong, and we will commence collection immediately on hearing from you. Necessary communication, as authorised in your telegram of the 19th instant and previous correspondence, will then be made to Dalai Lama.

[26528] No. 107.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant, forwarding a copy of a telegram from the Government of India respecting the site for the British trade agency at Gyantse, together with the reply which Viscount Morley proposes to return to the Viceroy's communication.

Sir E. Grey concurs in the terms of this reply, and he would be glad if both the telegrams from and to Calcutta might be repeated to His Majesty's charge d'affaires at Peking.

I am at the same time to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a telegram which was addressed to Mr. Max Müller on the subject on the 23rd instant.*

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[27202] No. 108.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 22nd July, relative to the prohibition of scientific expeditions to Thibet.

India Office, July 26, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 108.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 22, 1910.

PLEASE refer to notes regarding Thibet exchanged on 31st August, 1907, with Russian Government. It is pointed out by Foreign Office that period of three years is about to expire for which prohibition of scientific expeditions into Thibet was undertaken by the two Governments. Please let me have your views on question whether, in altered circumstances of Thibet, Russian Government should be pressed to extend period.

* No. 105.

[27447] No. 109.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 26th July, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, July 28, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 109.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 26, 1910.

THIBET.

The considerations submitted by you in the first paragraph of your telegram of the 23rd instant have not been overlooked by His Majesty's Government. You may begin preparations, but you must understand that if circumstances compel His Majesty's Government to authorise an advance it will be made with the view of withdrawing the agents.

[27517] No. 110.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 28th July, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, July 29, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 28, 1910.

ALTHOUGH I have no reason for supposing that flight back to Thibet is contemplated by Dalai Lama, it is necessary to consider the possibility of such an occurrence. General disturbances will almost certainly follow if he returns without concurrence of Chinese. Apprehension is felt by Mr. Bell lest resentment might be caused in Thibet, and impression that we are abandoning neutrality and siding with Chinese might be encouraged by any interference with movements of lama. This view is, in my opinion, of little weight, and of two evils, resentment of Thibetans is manifestly the lesser. Secret orders have therefore been issued in anticipation of your approval, as position is urgent, for discreet arrangements to be made which will ensure that lama cannot reach (and) cross frontier without permission, though they will have no appearance of interfering with his liberty. Your sanction will, I hope, be accorded.

[27593] No. 111.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 30.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 29, 1910.

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram which has been received from the Viceroy,*

* See No. 110.

describing the action that he has taken to prevent the Dalai Lama from recrossing into Thibet without permission.

This telegram raises a difficult and somewhat delicate question. On the one hand, there are certain obvious advantages in the presence of the Dalai Lama in India and disadvantages in his return to Thibet, whether with or without the approval of the Chinese Government. On the other hand, the Secretary of State for India is unwilling to depart from the attitude of strict neutrality to the extent involved in the Government of India's proposal, and he is inclined to think that, whatever the ultimate consequences may be, the Dalai Lama should not be detained against his will,* at all events for a longer time than is necessary to enable the Government of India to complete the military preparations which they are making for the possible contingency of relieving the British trade agencies.

I am to add that under the Bengal Eastern Frontier Crossing Regulation the Local Government may prohibit any persons from crossing the frontier without a pass.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

[27682] No. 112.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 1.)

(No. 215.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, August* 1, 1910.

TROUBLES in Thibet.

In a conversation which I had with M. Isvolsky to-day, his Excellency mentioned that he regretted that the first indication which had reached him of the contemplated dispatch of British troops across the Thibetan border had been through the reports in the newspapers. He had hoped, in view of the Anglo-Russian convention, that he would have been given some information previous to the publication of the news in the press.

I said that I believed that the only step contemplated by His Majesty's Government was the collection in the neighbourhood of the frontier of a small force which would be held in readiness in case of our trade agencies in Thibet being attacked. If blame attached to any one for not having informed him in advance, then I must take it upon myself, for it had been my intention to suggest to you that some communication should be made, but it had slipped my memory.

I think M. Isvolsky's chief desire is to be furnished with something which he could, if necessary, show to his public as a proof that His Majesty's Government had not overlooked him or kept him in the dark, and I imagine that his mind would be set at rest if I could make some official communication to him as to the objects and intentions of His Majesty's Government.

[28030] No. 113.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 2.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 30, 1910.

IN reply to your letter of the 26th July, 1910, I am directed to inform you that Viscount Morley concurs in the terms of the memorandum which Sir E. Grey proposes to address to the Russian and Japanese Ambassadors in London, but would suggest that it is not necessary to communicate it unless the Russian or other Ambassadors should make enquiries.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

* Concurrence in terms of draft telegram to this effect was communicated verbally [see No. 119].

[27682] No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 411.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1910.

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 215 of 1st August: Thibet.

We have always intended to communicate with Russian Government on the subject, and a memorandum has been drawn up to be given to the Russian and Japanese Embassies, copy of which will go to you by bag to-morrow, to the effect that His Majesty's Government have found it necessary, in view of dangerous state of unrest in Thibet, to take measures which will enable them to reinforce the escorts of their trade agents at Gyantse and Yatung in the event of the risk of an attack upon them becoming imminent.

A small force is being stationed for the purpose near the Thibet frontier at Gnatong. It is, however, intended solely for the protection of His Majesty's officers, and will not cross into Thibet unless their lives are endangered, nor will it intervene between the Thibetans and Chinese.

The memorandum goes on to say that if the Chinese Government should wish for the Dalai Lama's return on conditions satisfactory to him His Majesty's Government will place no difficulties in his way.

His Majesty's representative at Peking was informed of above on 19th July, and instructed to bring matter to the notice of the Chinese Government. Some delay has, however, occurred in preparing the memorandum for the Russian Embassy, owing to the necessity for consulting the India Office respecting its terms; their concurrence has, in fact, only been received to-day. Moreover, the matter was not considered pressing in view of the improbability at least at an early date of any advance of our troops into Thibet.

As there may be a statement in the House of Lords to-morrow as to what has passed between His Majesty's Government and the Chinese Government in the matter, you should lose no time in communicating with Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of this telegram, explaining why we did not communicate with his Excellency earlier. (End of R.)

(Confidential.)

The present intention of His Majesty's Government is not to pursue a forward policy, but to use reinforcement for the purpose of temporarily withdrawing trade agent and escort.

We do not wish Chinese Government to know this, so you must be careful how you communicate this to the Russian Government. We are further unwilling to come under any obligation to others to use the reinforcements for this purpose only.

[28119] No. 115.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 3.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 2, 1910.

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India (dated the 28th July) regarding an edict issued by the Chinese Amban at Lhassa, together with a copy of the edict in question.*

Although some of the propositions advanced by the Amban may admit of argument, Lord Morley is of opinion that the spirit of the Thibet trade regulations and of British conventions in regard to Thibet justifies a strong representation to the Chinese Government.

The Chinese have, for good or evil, by their action in Thibet made themselves our neighbours. While we have observed the strictest neutrality, we have certainly never given them reason to believe that we, on our side, have wished to be other than friendly neighbours. But our wishes are apparently not reciprocated by those who represent the Chinese Government on the spot. Other instances have already been brought to their notice. In the present case, the stress laid on Shabdung Lama's relations with us shows

* Not printed.

beyond doubt that his real offence in the eyes of the Amban was his friendliness to the British, and, not content with forbidding the Thibetans to communicate direct with our officials on political matters, the Amban has extended the prohibition to "any communication whether on State or private affairs." The British Government have never sought political advantages for themselves in Thibet, and have no political aims there; but neither the Anglo-Thibetan Convention nor the Anglo-Chinese Convention provide for the interposition of the Chinese Government between His Majesty's Government and the Thibetan authorities upon any subject whatever.

This is not the first occasion on which it has been necessary to call the attention of the Wai-wu Pu to the attitude of their local officials; and it might perhaps be suggested to them that since the avowed purpose of their intervention in Thibet is the pacification of the country and the carrying out of its treaty obligations, that purpose might be better served by the appointment of an Amban more sympathetic to the inhabitants and less unfriendly to the friends of his Government.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 28, 1910.

THIBET. Please refer to the letter from the political officer, Sikkim, dated the 26th June last, enclosed in letter from Foreign Secretary of the 14th July. The orders of the Chinese resident, Lhassa, under which the Thibetan Government, the Tashi Lama, and the people of Tashilhunpo are forbidden, under heavy penalties, to hold any direct communication whatsoever with any foreigner, and it is maintained that the application of article 12 of the Thibetan Trade Regulations of 1908 is simply to communications between the people of Thibet and the British trade agents on matters of trade, are apparently a clear infraction of the article cited. The subject will, I trust, be brought by His Majesty's Government to the notice of the Chinese Government, and the cancellation of the orders of Amban Len be demanded. The terms in which he orders the gift of land to our late Thibetan employé to be cancelled, and forbids the grant to a foreigner of any part of Thibetan territory, all of which he declares to belong to the Emperor of China, show the spirit with which the Amban is imbued.

[28197] No. 116.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 216.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, August* 3, 1910.

YOUR telegram No. 411 of the 2nd August: Troubles in Thibet.

I made a communication to M. Isvolsky to-day in the sense of your telegram No. 411, and his Excellency asked me to express to you his best thanks. I refrained from saying anything with regard to the confidential information contained in the last paragraph of your telegram, as it might perhaps be better to communicate this later on, should circumstances render its communication desirable.

[28030] No. 117.

Memorandum communicated to Count Benckendorff and Mr. Kato.

IN consequence of the reports which have reached them with regard to the dangerous state of unrest prevailing in Thibet, His Majesty's Government have found it necessary to take measures which will enable them to reinforce the escorts of their trade agents at Gyantse and Yatung in the event of the risk of an attack upon them becoming imminent. For this purpose a force is being stationed at Gnatong, in close proximity to the Indo-Thibetan frontier. The force is intended solely for the protection of His Majesty's officers, and will not cross the frontier unless their lives are endangered. It will not intervene between the Chinese and the Thibetans.

His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking has been instructed to inform the Chinese Government, and at the same time to point out to them that, as Thibet was

quiet before the arrival of the Chinese troops, and as the responsibility for the flight of the Dalai Lama, which is, without doubt, the direct cause of the present highly embarrassing situation, lies mainly upon the Chinese, in view of their precipitate action and of the unconciliatory attitude of their commissioner at Lhassa, His Majesty's Government must hold them responsible for any damage that may be done to British interests and property.

Mr. Max Müller will also intimate to the Chinese Government that, if, as is now understood, they wish for the Dalai Lama's return, on conditions satisfactory to him, His Majesty's Government will place no difficulties in his way. He will, however, make it clear that, if, as the result of their treatment of His Holiness on his return, or for any other reason, disturbances ensue by which the lives and property of British subjects are endangered, the force stationed at Gnatong will at once enter Thibet for their protection.

Foreign Office, August 3, 1910.

[28228] No. 118.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 28th July, relative to the site of the Gyantse trade agency.

India Office, August 3, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 118.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 28, 1910.

SITE of Gyantse trade agency.

This telegram and yours dated the 13th July should be repeated to Peking.

Instructions to bring matter to notice of Chinese Government have been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Peking. If reasonable compromise is offered, Weir should be prepared to accept it.

[28231] No. 119.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 30th July, relative to the Dalai Lama.

India Office, August 3, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July* 30, 1910.

RETURN of Dalai Lama. See your telegram dated the 28th July.

I consider that Dalai Lama should not be detained against his will, and am unwilling to depart to the extent which your proposal involves from attitude of strict neutrality. It can doubtless be arranged, however, that, pending completion of your military preparations, lama's flight does not take effect.

[28030] No. 120.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo, conveying Viscount Morley's concurrence in the terms of the memorandum relative to Thibetan affairs which Sir E. Grey proposed to communicate to the Russian and Japanese Ambassadors.

Lord Morley will have observed from the telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, enclosed in the letter from this department of the 2nd instant, that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has referred in conversation with Sir A. Nicolson to the newspaper reports respecting the precautionary measures being taken by the Government of India on the Indian frontier. Sir E. Grey has accordingly thought it desirable to communicate the memorandum to the two Ambassadors without further delay.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[28376] No. 121.

Mr. Takaaki Kato to Mr. Tyrrell.—(Received August 5.)

My dear Mr. Tyrrell, *Japanese Embassy, London, August* 4, 1910.

I HAVE to thank you for your letter of yesterday enclosing a memorandum respecting Thibet. I shall be much obliged if you will convey to Sir Edward Grey my thanks for the information which he kindly directed you to send me, and tell him that I shall transmit the same to my Government.

Yours sincerely,
TAKAAKI KATO.

[28119] No. 122.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 277.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 6, 1910.

THE Government of India have drawn attention to an order, dated the 18th March last, issued by the ambans at Lhassa, which directs the cancellation of a grant of land to the Shabdung Lama, a former Thibetan employee of the British trade agency at Gyantse, and forbids the Thibetan Government and all lamas of Tashi-lhunpo, from the Tashi Lama downwards, from holding any communication with foreigners, whether on State or private affairs.

A translation of the order is enclosed herewith.

The prohibition imposed on the Thibetan Government and the lamas of Tashi-lhunpo from holding intercourse with foreigners appears to the Government of India to be in violation of article 12 of the trade regulations of 1908. Moreover, neither the Anglo-Thibetan convention nor the Anglo-Chinese convention provide for the interposition of the Chinese Government between His Majesty's Government and the Thibetan authorities upon any subject whatever. The tone of the order also clearly shows that it was issued by the ambans in a spirit of hostility towards this country.

The strictest neutrality has been observed by His Majesty's Government as regards the recent developments in Thibet, and they have certainly never given the Chinese reason to believe that they have wished to be other than friendly neighbours. The wishes of His Majesty's Government are, however, apparently not reciprocated by those who represent the Chinese Government on the spot, as the present and other instances already brought to the notice of the Chinese Government show, and the situation appears to the Secretary of State for India to warrant strong representations on our part.

In making such representations you might suggest to the Chinese Government that, since the avowed purpose of their intervention in Thibet is the pacification of the country and the carrying out of its treaty obligations, that purpose might be better

served by the appointment of an amban more sympathetic to the inhabitants and less unfriendly to the friends of his Government than the present Chinese commissioner at Lhassa, or, failing this, by the dispatch of stringent orders to Mr. Len to adopt a more conciliatory attitude in matters affecting the interests of His Majesty's Government and British subjects.

You will receive by next bag a copy of the letter from the India Office, together with its enclosures, which forms the basis of this despatch.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 122.

Order issued by Amban at Lhassa, dated March 18, 1910.

(Confidential.)
(Translation.)

I HAD received a report from Thawo-Dao-si-tsan some time ago that a Thibetan named So-ba-tong, in service under the British, by having recourse to the power and influence he had so gained, had used them in an underhand manner with the Tashi Lama for his own selfish ends, and that he got the lama to grant him an estate as a jagir. I issued orders from my residency to the Gyantse trade agent to thoroughly enquire and report the bare facts connected with that transaction. In reply, the Gyantse trade agent Ma Chi Fu reports recently that, since he and Wa-u-yon have jointly been ordered to enquire into the matter, they found the matter of such importance that they could not submit an accurate report without making secret enquiries in conjunction with the Wa-u-yon. Having started the enquiries, they have reported that the said So-ba-tong, called Shabdung Lama, was the So-pon of the Singchen Hotoktu Lama, who was dismissed twenty years ago, as he was concerned in the harbouring of one Isi Babu,* a native of India, who had entered Lhassa as a spy. This man, having been thrown into gaol on that account along with his master, escaped from prison and reached Darjeeling. The British officers afforded refuge to one who had been a political prisoner from political reasons. At that time Major O'Connor, being then a small army officer, took care of Shabdung for the purpose of teaching him Thibetan. After a long time Major O'Connor came to be employed in Thibetan affairs, and also attained proficiency in Thibetan. In the Wood-dragon year (1904), when the rupture between the British and Thibetan Governments occurred, the said Shabdung came to Thibet with O'Connor. The British proving victorious, the said Shabdung Lama won the confidence of the British, and became a trusted officer.

The next year O'Connor succeeded in inducing the Tashi Lama to visit India. This was mainly due to Shabdung's influence, because he was then the confidential agent. The punishment should have fallen on the Tashi-lhunpo Dza-sa Lama and the deceased Te-chi. As for the Tashi Lama himself, he did not go down of his own free will, because he is yet grateful to the great Government for its kind support and maintenance. On their arrival back from India the Tashi-lhunpo Dza-sa Lama, by means of prayers, induced the Tashi Lama to grant an estate as a free gift to Shabdung as a reward for having served the lama in India in the capacity of an interpreter, and also counting upon his future good service in their interest. So they conferred on Shabdung the estate called Trungshi, in Penam, yielding some hundreds of sangs per annum as revenue. Subsequently the said Shabdung applied to the lama to convert it into a permanent grant, but it is not known whether this was done or not. It was said that the India Tim-pu had given a speaking-machine, but as it was an unimportant matter I did not think it necessary to correct or verify it.

What Thao-Dao in his original report says about Shabdung's having been a dandywalla proves to have been a statement from hearsay only. But as this fact is not important, it need not be mentioned at all. At the same time, the question whether the said Shabdung is a recognised subject of the British Government being more important and weighty, Ma Chi Fu met Thao-Dao personally and enquired from him whether the above statement is true, and whether he has seen any authentic or reliable documents or list of British subjects, because it would only then be proper to mention it in a report. On being so questioned, Thao-Dao said that he had heard so from Un-ya-ai. The trade agent had heard that the said Un-ya-ai had gone to Lhassa. And as these statements seemed uncertain, further enquiries elicited various kinds of statements, none of which could be corroborated. So, taking advantage of some other

* Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Dass, C.I.E.

business, the trade agent and Wa-u-yon went together to pay a visit to Mr. Bailey. There they adroitly put the question to him, and in reply he (Mr. Bailey) said that Shabdung was one amongst those who had rendered distinguished service at Lhassa the previous year, for which the Government of India had conferred on him the title of Rai Sahib, and that he had been favoured with a sanad bearing golden letters ; that the title was of Indian origin, and means to denote a certain Indian officer's rank. Beyond the conferring of that rank, the Shabdung, being a native of Thibet and Thibet-born subject, could not be enrolled as a British or Indian subject, as there was no need for such enrolment.

As the above fact seems to be true, it should have been reported before, but, hearing that the said Shabdung was seriously suffering from some stomach complaint, it was delayed somewhat. But now that the said Shabdung has died of that disease, and his dead body has been disposed of on the hill-tops of Gyantse by being given to birds of prey on the 1st of this month, there appears no further need of any action in the matter. Yet though this small matter of the past does not require to be considered, what might occur in the future must be guarded against and reduced to a certainty ; it is therefore necessary to order the Tashi-lhunpo Dza-sa Lama, with a view to guard against future trouble, to resume the estate which had been granted to the said Shabdung, and also to direct that Government to appoint a competent and clever lama in the Singchen monastery to act as superintendent of the estate, who should be instructed to carefully keep out any one connected with the late Shabdung from obtaining any post of responsibility in the above monastery in future.

At the same time the Government itself should be warned that, if they send any letters to any foreigners, they must first submit the draft and fair copies of the letters they have received and intend sending to foreigners, and only after due perusal, enquiry, and approval by the great Minister amban will they be permitted to communicate. In that way only true loyalty to the supreme Government can be ensured and all doubts cleared. The Tashi-lhunpo authorities have erred once, so it is imperatively necessary that they should be bound down on a bond not to err again. So let orders be passed upon the Tashi-lhunpo Dza-sa Lama that no one of Tashi-lhunpo, from the Tashi Lama downwards, must hold direct communication with any foreigner, be it on State or private affairs. If any one transgresses these orders, and should it come to the knowledge of any of the Chinese officers or anyone give information, then a heavy penalty will be laid upon the Dza-sa Lama. By taking these steps we neither injure the internal political relations nor infringe the terms of the treaties, nor do any harm for the future in any way.

This joint report, in consultation with the Wa-u-yon, and a copy of Shabdung's sanad in English having been received here, I, the amban, have also endorsed the same. It is true that the said Shabdung was a So-pon, that he went down to India under certain circumstances, and that he received the English sanad conferring on him a title. But the said So-pon having been thrown into gaol and having escaped from imprisonment, and, instead of repenting, persisted in his evil course, richly deserved a heavy punishment, but his decease has rendered that unnecessary. Moreover, all the land of Thibet belongs to the Emperor of China, and to grant any portion of it to any person belonging to a foreign Power, as the Dza-sa Lama induced the Tashi Lama to do, is not right. It will create trouble in future. Therefore an order is solicited to the effect that the said estate must be resumed and an ecclesiastical officer of the Singchen monastery appointed as superintendent. There is already an old order in Thibet that no Thibetan along the old route must hold communications with any foreigners of their own accord. And the recent settlements that have been come to in the treaty of twelve clauses provides that the British trade agents at the trade marts, should they wish to hold any direct communication with the Thibetan officials or people of the place, the Chinese officers must not throw any obstacle in their way. That applies simply to trade matters and not to any political matters. So we, the great Minister's chen,* do issue this order on the Tashi-lhunpo Dza-sa, explaining to him the purport of both the former and the recent treaties, and requiring him to act in perfect accordance with the terms thereof. At the same time I require you, the Regent, to order the Dza-sa Lama to resume the said gift of land granted to the late Shabdung and to have an ecclesiastical officer appointed as superintendent of the Singchen monastery, who will effectually prevent anyone connected with the said Shabdung from obtaining any post of responsibility in the monastery. And, moreover, the Government, also abiding by the old observances, will refrain from holding any communication with

* Office.

foreigners on your own account so as to dispel any doubts or suspicions. It is most important that you should bear this in mind.

Dated the 1st year of the reign of Shontong, the 8th day of the 2nd month (18th March, 1910).

[28676] No. 123.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 238.)

Sir, *Peking, July 29, 1910.*

ON the strength of your telegram No. 103 of the 16th instant, I took the opportunity of an interview I had with the Wai-wu Pu on the 19th instant to draw their attention to the fact that supplies coming from Thibet and intended for the use of the Dalai Lama at Darjeeling were being interfered with, and I pointed out the hardship which these proceedings entailed upon his Holiness and the embarrassment which they caused to the Government of India. As reported in my telegram No. 123 of the 20th instant, the Wai-wu Pu promised to make telegraphic enquiry of the Amban at Lhassa on the subject.

I have to-day, in obedience to the instructions conveyed to me by your telegram No. 104 of the 19th instant, addressed a note to Prince Ch'ing, informing his Highness that a force is being stationed at Gnatong for the protection of the British escorts in Thibet; that the force will not interfere between Chinese and Thibetans, and will not cross the frontier unless British lives or interests are endangered; but that, in that event, it will at once enter Thibet to protect them.

I have the honour to enclose the text of my note.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure in No. 123.

Mr. Max Müller to Prince Ch'ing.

Your Highness, *Peking, July 22, 1910.*

IN my note of the 11th April I had the honour, under instructions from Sir Edward Grey, to impress on your Highness the inadvisability of locating Chinese troops in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India or the adjoining States of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim in such numbers as would necessitate corresponding movements of troops on the part of the Government of India or of the rulers of the States concerned.

Your Highness was good enough to reply to my communication on the 18th April in a note, in which you informed me that the stations of Chinese troops on those frontiers would be arranged only with a view to keeping the peace of the districts, and that there was no intention of stationing there a large number of men. I duly communicated the contents of your Highness's note to His Majesty's Government.

I have now received instructions from Sir Edward Grey to inform your Highness that, in consequence of reports which have reached them, His Majesty's Government have found it necessary to take measures which will enable them to reinforce the British escorts in Thibet in the event of the risk of an attack upon them becoming imminent. For this purpose a force is being stationed at Gnatong. The force is intended solely for the protection of the British officers in Thibet, and will not cross the frontier unless their lives are endangered. It will not intervene between the Chinese and Thibetans.

In informing your Highness of the steps which His Majesty's Government have been compelled to take, I am at the same time instructed to point out that Thibet was quiet before the arrival of the Chinese troops, and that, though the present highly embarrassing situation is no doubt the immediate result of the Dalai Lama's flight, the precipitate action of the Chinese Government and the unconciliatory attitude of the Amban Lien were not calculated to reassure his Holiness as to his security if he remained in Thibet. The situation has been aggravated by these circumstances, and His Majesty's Government must therefore hold the Chinese Government responsible for any damage which may be done to British interests and property. If, however, as is now understood, the Chinese Government wish for the Dalai Lama's return on

conditions which will be satisfactory to him, His Majesty's Government will place no difficulty in his way. At the same time, I am to give your Highness to understand that if, as the result of the Chinese Government's treatment of the Dalai Lama on his return or for any other reason, disturbances ensue in which the lives or property of British subjects are endangered, the force which is being stationed at Gnatong will at once enter Thibet to protect them.

I avail, &c.
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

[28668] No. 124.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, August 8, 1910.*

YOUR telegram No. 104 of 19th July: Thibet.

In reply to my note Chinese Government state that Thibet is now quiet, and that Resident has issued strict orders to the local authorities to quell any disturbances. Great Britain ean therefore rest assured as regards safety of escorts, as local authorities are responsible for the protection of British lives and property.

They state that if Dalai Lama returns now or at some future date to Thibet or China he will be treated with generosity by China, and need be under no apprehension.

[28908] No. 125.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 7th August, 1910, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, August 8, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 125.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 7, 1910.*

REFERENCE is invited to correspondence, ending with your telegram dated the 26th ultimo, as to Thibet. Necessary communications have been made by Mr. Bell to British trade agents at Gyantse and Yatung, to Maharajahs of Bhutan and Sikkim, and to Dalai Lama and his Ministers. Promise has been made by Lama and his Ministers that orders will be issued with a view to outbreak on our agencies being prevented.

[28926] No. 126.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr Max Müller.

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 9, 1910.*

YOUR telegram No. 138 of 8th August.

Have the Chinese Government given you any positive indication that they desire Dalai Lama's return, and does note referred to in your telegram contain any such indication?

Repeat your reply to India.

[29010] No. 127.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 8th August, relative to the Dalai Lama and Thibet.

India Office, August 9, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 127.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 8, 1910.*

SEE your telegram dated the 19th ultimo, relating to Thibet. Bell telegraphed the 6th instant as follows:—

"I received call on the 4th instant from three Thibetan delegates from National Assembly in Lhassa, who have arrived at Darjeeling. They were told by amban, from whom they were provided with passport, to invite Dalai Lama to return to Lhassa, and to assure him that he will suffer no injury in person or property if he returns; as regards his reinstatement, however, nothing was said. Delegates are at present doubtful whether Dalai Lama will [? return]; they appear to fear, as do Lama and his Ministers, that he will be treated as a State prisoner. I should be glad if you could tell me whether our Minister has been informed by Chinese Government whether return of Lama is desired by them. Every indication here points to conclusion that it is desired by them. Amban, for instance, appears to have brought charge of eleven offences against Linshar, one of which was that he refused to invite Dalai Lama to return to Lhassa, thereby disobeying amban's orders. Again, a letter telling them to bring Lama back was written by amban to Thibetan Government in Lhassa; and the servant of a Mongolian prince, who passed through Darjeeling recently *en route* to Mongolia from Lhassa, was requested by amban to ask Dalai Lama to come back.

"Lastly, in a telegram from the Chinese Government, which is apparently genuine, amban is directed to induce Lama to return by soft words.

"2. Question will probably be raised again by Ministers, who are coming to see me on the 8th.

"3. I was also informed by delegates that members of Thibetan Government in Lhassa had instructed them to express approval of everything that the members of Thibetan Government in Darjeeling had done. This was an oral message, but delegates being of high rank, oral message is usual."

Earliest possible intimation of Chinese Government's views as to return of Dalai Lama to Thibet is solicited.

[29313] No. 128.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 141.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, August 12, 1910.*

MY telegram No. 140.

I have just received a further note from the Chinese Government, communicating a telegram from the Resident in Thibet. Latter states: "As regards fear of British Government that Dalai Lama's presence in India might cause trouble, I propose to send Taotai Lo-chang-chi to India to persuade him to return to Thibet."

Wai-wu Pu request me to notify above to Indian Government, with a view to Taotai being duly received and given all possible assistance on his arrival in India. They add that on the receipt of my reply they will telegraph instructions for Taotai to start on his journey.

(Sent to India.)

[29209] No. 127*.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 11.)

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, August* 11, 1910.

THIBET. In reply to your telegram No. 115 of the 9th August, I beg to state that there is nothing in the note from the Wai-wu Pu to indicate a desire on the part of the Chinese Government for the Dalai Lama's return to Lhassa.

I received on the 26th July a private visit from a councillor of the Wai-wu Pu, who was sent by the Grand Secretary Natung to talk to me about my Thibetan note. I explained that the action of the Government of India should be regarded not so much as a threat against China, but rather as a precautionary measure. He stated that his Excellency Natung favoured the idea of the Dalai Lama's return to Lhassa if he could be induced to accept the position of spiritual head of the Church, abandoning all his temporal powers. I replied that I personally shared that view provided that the Dalai Lama could be persuaded by the Chinese to accept the proposal, but that His Majesty's Government would absolutely decline to bring influence to bear on His Holiness in either direction or to accept any responsibility. In reply to a further question, I said that if the Chinese Government wished to dispatch an emissary to Darjeeling I should be ready to apply for facilities for his journey through India.

The councillor promised that I should hear more on the subject. The information was by no means of a positive nature and the conversation was quite informal.

[29312] No. 129.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wilkinson.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 12, 1910.

HAVE you heard anything as to a report that 7,000 troops have been ordered to leave Szechuan on the 20th August for Lhassa ?

The Ministers with the Dalai Lama have made representations to us on the subject.

[29381] No. 130.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 11th August, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office. August 12, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 130.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 11, 1910.

SEE my telegram dated the 8th instant as to Thibet. Bell telegraphed 9th instant as follows :—

"I was to-day informed by Ministers that, in reply to invitation to return to Thibet, Dalai Lama is saying that, until Thibet is restored to its former position and Chinese troops are sent back to China, he cannot return. This reply will be delivered in Lhassa by Thibetan delegates about a month hence. This means that, for the next two and a-half months at any rate, Dalai Lama will not leave for Thibet, and it also means that, for the next two and a-half months at any rate, likelihood of disturbance in Thibet is lessened, having regard to strong hint which I gave to Lama, in pursuance of instructions in your telegram of 29th ultimo, that he cannot foment disturbance in Thibet from here. I was told by Ministers that British Government is their sole hope, and that later on, provided I am able to accompany them, one or two of them may possibly go to Simla and England to lay the case before Government. What they regard as a more friendly letter has been received by them from the Maharajah of Nepal through Derge General, with whom they state that Maharajah spoke about Thibetan affairs sympathetically. It is their intention to write again for help to Nepalese Government. It appears from above facts that, for the present, there is no intention on part of Dalai Lama of breaking connection with us, and that there has been improvement in situation to this extent. It is stated by Ministers that orders to start on the 20th August for Lhassa have been issued to 7,000 Chinese troops from Szechuan. Our consul-general at Chengtu could perhaps obtain more reliable information on this point."

Please let me have any information as to alleged dispatch of Chinese troops from Szechuan that may be obtainable from Chengtu.

[29313] No. 131.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 13, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram he has received from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking in regard to the return of the Dalai Lama to Thibet.*

* No. 128.

It will be observed that the Chinese Government are desirous of sending an official to persuade him to return.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with Lord Morley's views as to what reply should be returned to the Chinese Government.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[29547] No. 132.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Chengtu, August* 15, 1910.

THERE is a rumour here that three battalions are awaiting orders to start for the frontier shortly. These may, of course, be only going as a relief force. I have heard nothing definite as to the dispatch of 7,000 men from Szechuan referred to in your telegram of the 12th August.

[29566] No. 133.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Chengtu, August* 15, 1910.

YOUR telegram of the 12th August.

The Governor-General tells me the report you refer to is wholly without foundation. His Excellency said that the dispatch of British troops to Yatung would be most inadvisable, and took occasion to refer to Bhutan as being within Chinese territory.

Lolos rose last week, and his troops will be barely sufficient.

[30073] No. 134.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, August* 18, 1910.

MY telegram No. 123 of 20th July.

Chinese resident in Thibet has replied that Dalai Lama's supplies of clothing, &c., have invariably been released, and that there is no truth in the statement, although treasure sent from Thibet has been stopped by Chinese authorities.

(Sent to India.)

[30123] No. 135.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, August* 18, 1910.

MY telegram No. 138 of 8th August.

Wai-wu Pu informed me to-day that they considered that under the trade regulations it was the duty of China to protect British escorts in Thibet, and said that if the latter were threatened they would be ready to move troops for that purpose. I reminded them that they had deprecated a concentration of troops of both countries on the frontier on the ground that it might cause trouble, and I said that I believed that our reinforcements were ample protection.

The suggestion was in the nature of an offer, but I gathered the impression that they would like to see our reinforcements withdrawn, an idea which I discouraged in our conversation.

(Repeated to India.)

[30124] No. 136.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, August 18, 1910.*

MY telegram No. 141 of 12th August.

Chinese Government are anxious that the taotai should start on his journey to Darjeeling without delay, but are withholding instructions to him pending reply from India to [? above] telegram.

(Repeated to India.)

[30307] No. 137.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 18th August, 1910, relative to Chinese troops in Thibet.

India Office, August 19, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 137.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 18, 1910.*

FOLLOWING telegram, dated the 16th instant, received from Mr. Bell :—

" Telegram from trade agent, Gyantse, reports that it is intention of Chinese, with a view to preventing disturbances, to post a body of troops consisting of not less than 500 or more than 1,000 men, who will be distributed between Chumbi Valley, Gyantse, and Phari. Of these troops some have been dispatched to Chumbi Valley and Phari, while others have already reached Gyantse. Possibility of future outbreaks, as defined previously by myself and trade agents, has, it seems clear, been recognised by Chinese, and strengthening of their detachments has accordingly been decided on. It is stated by the Ministers that orders forbidding disturbances have been sent by them to Thibet. These orders are the result of the hint which, as I reported in my telegram of the 4th instant, I gave to the Dalai Lama and the Ministers."

[30392] No. 138.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 263.)
Sir, *Peking August 3, 1910.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the note which I addressed to the Wai-wu Pu in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 107 of the 23rd July, requesting their assistance in reaching a settlement of the difficulty with regard to the leasing of land for the trade agency at Gyantse.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of His Majesty's,
chargé d'affaires)
E. SCOTT.

Enclosure in No. 138.

Mr. Max Müller to Prince Ching.

Your Highness, *Peking, July 31, 1910.*

I HAVE been instructed by my Government to approach your Highness to ask for the friendly offices of the Chinese Government in settling a difficulty which has arisen between the British trade agent and the local authorities at Gyantse.

For the past four years the British trade agent at Gyantse has been intermittently discussing with the Chinese and Thibetan officials the choice of a locality in which British subjects may lease land for building houses and godowns as provided by clause 2A of the Trade Regulations of 1908. Early in the present year the trade agent, with the concurrence of the Government of India, accepted a site measuring about 117 acres, of which about thirty acres was to be reserved for the new British trade agency. The locality was duly mapped out and boundary pillars were erected; a site was fixed on for the agency, and the Chinese superintendent and the municipal office at Gyantse gave a permit to lease the site. When, however, the trade agent proceeded to discuss the question of the rent to be paid for the agency site, the stewards of Changlo claimed 2,700 rupees a-year, or about 900 rupees an acre. They alleged that the ground was rich, and that they intended to cultivate it. As a matter of fact the soil is not good, the whole site being jungle land, of which not more than eight acres are cultivable. The villagers only pay 22 rupees an acre, while at Yatung the trade agency only pays 5 rupees an acre rent. In the opinion of the British trade agent about 350 rupees an acre would be a fair rent, while 1,100 rupees should be paid as compensation for trees.

In addition to the above, an initial fee of 300 rupees and an annual fee of 750 rupees are demanded under the Municipal Site-leasing Regulations. I understand that the Indian Government consider that an initial fee of 300 rupees and an annual fee of 300 rupees would be a fair and acceptable charge.

The local Chinese and Thibetan officials have been appealed to in vain. They appear to hold that under the terms of the Trade Regulations the parties to the lease must appear before a court composed of the local authorities and the British trade agent, who would in the present case be both a party to the dispute and an assessor to the court. Such a method of settlement does not appear to His Majesty's Government to be practicable, and the Trade Regulations provide no further machinery for settling differences of opinion in regard to leases between the trade agent himself and the local authorities, who in the present case refuse either to issue the permit to build till the lease is settled or to give any practical assistance. It is very desirable that the site for the new agency should be taken over as soon as possible and building commenced, but, in view of the present attitude of the local Chinese officials, there is no prospect of reaching a reasonable settlement.

His Majesty's Government, relying on your Highness's promise contained in your note of the 18th April to the effect that the Wai-wu Pu are bound in all matters affecting international relations to issue instructions for the fulfilment of the treaties, have instructed me to approach your Highness and request your good offices to arrange a settlement of this difficulty. I have no doubt that if the Chinese authorities at Gyantse will only adopt a more reasonable and conciliatory attitude in this matter, there will be no difficulty in arriving at a friendly compromise.

I avail, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

[30733] No. 139.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 23.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 22, 1910.

WITH reference to your letter of the 13th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams exchanged with the Government of India regarding the proposed deputation of Taotai Lo-chang-chi to visit the Dalai Lhama.

Viscount Morley would suggest that the Chinese Government be informed that the necessary facilities will be given to the Taotai. It is not clear what the Amban means by the "fear of the British Government that Dalai Lhama's presence in India might cause trouble," and it might be worth while that the Wai-wu Pu should understand that His Majesty's Government regard his movements with indifference. From the Viceroy's telegram of the 22nd instant it may be inferred that he will be in no hurry to accept the Taotai's invitation.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 139.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 16, 1910.

TAOTAI'S visit to Dalai Lhama. See telegram dated the 12th instant from Mr. Max Müller. I shall be glad to receive your views by telegraph. It would, of course, be understood by Lhama that no responsibility of any kind for Taotai's mission, or its consequences, would be incurred by His Majesty's Government by any facilities we gave to the Taotai.

Enclosure 2 in No. 139.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 22, 1910.

I APPROVE instructions to Mr. Bell proposed in your telegram dated the 20th August regarding Taotai's visit to Dalai Lhama.

Enclosure 3 in No. 139.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 22, 1910.

AFFAIRS in Thibet. See your telegram dated the 16th instant. All reasonable facilities will be given to the Taotai, to whose proposed visit to Dalai Lhama I see no objection. It is proposed that Bell should be given instructions to inform Dalai Lhama that deputation by resident in Thibet of Taotai to induce him to return to Thibet is being ordered by the Chinese Government, that the Taotai will be given facilities for the journey, but that it must be understood by the Lhama that no responsibility of any kind for the mission, or its consequences, is incurred by us by the grant of these facilities. Bell should reply, if asked for his advice by the Lhama, that no authority to give any has been given him.

Enclosure 4 in No. 139.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 22, 1910.

SEE my telegram dated the 8th regarding Thibet. Following telegram dated the 19th instant received from Mr. Bell:—

"Oral message from Dalai Lhama to Amban was taken by the delegates, who left Darjiling on the 17th August for Lhassa, inviting Amban to come to Darjiling to discuss matters, detailing past grievances and refusing to return except on condition of restoration of Lhama's spiritual and temporal powers. The above are also the lines of the written reply sent by Lhama to Ti Rimpoche and National Assembly; this reply also states that the benefit of the Buddhist religion and of the whole world is object of Lhama's action throughout."

[30733] No. 140.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 118.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1910.

YOUR telegram No. 141 of 12th August: Mission of Taotai Lo-Chang-Chi to Dalai Lama.

Necessary facilities will be given to taotai.

Chinese Government should be made to understand that His Majesty's Government regard movements of Dalai Lama with indifference.

His Holiness has now informed the Chinese Amban that he will not return to Lhassa unless his temporal and spiritual powers are restored to him, and has invited latter to come to Darjeeling to discuss matters.

[31256] No. 141.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 27.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 27, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India regarding the military preparations for reinforcing the trade agencies in Thibet.

It will be seen that the Government of India are of opinion that if the safety of our officers at the agencies is the only consideration the mobilisation of the troops may reasonably be countermanded.

As Sir E. Grey is aware, the proposals of the Government of India were sanctioned with the sole object of protecting the lives of the British trade agents and their escorts, should an attack on them be imminent, and His Majesty's Government had no ulterior political motive of any kind. The fact, therefore, that the military preparations are thought by the Government of India to have had a good political effect does not, in Viscount Morley's opinion, constitute a sufficient ground for continuing them when the reason for which they were approved has ceased to exist. He accordingly proposes to authorise the Government of India to discontinue them. A copy of the telegram which, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence, he proposes to send is enclosed.*

In any communication which Mr. Max Müller may make to the Wai-wu Pu on the subject, he will doubtless make full use of this unsolicited demonstration of the good faith of His Majesty's Government, without, on the other hand, laying such stress on the responsibility of the Chinese for the safety of the agency as would be likely to lead to an inconvenient concentration of their troops in the Chumbi Valley.

I have, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 141.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 26, 1910.

REFERENCE is invited to my telegram respecting military preparations dated the 6th instant. Communication by railway will to-day be restored, and question of continuing preparations for advance must at once be decided. The 15th September is about the latest date by which the column must leave Gnatong so as to be able to proceed to Gyantse and back before closing of the passes; but it will take at least three weeks to fill the supply depôt at Gnatong, which must be done by the 15th September.

During the past few weeks the situation has undoubtedly improved. Responsibility for protecting trade agencies has been acknowledged by Chinese, and reports of the dispatch of troops by them to Chumbi Valley and Gyantse have reached us. Preparations might, I consider, now be cancelled if the only object under consideration were the safety of our officers at trade agencies. But announcement of our preparations appears to have had a good effect politically, and the opposite effect might be produced at Peking by their abandonment. This question is one for the decision of His Majesty's Government, but I think preparations may reasonably be countermanded if you see no advantage, apart from object with which they were originally undertaken, in their being continued.

* Draft of telegram to Government of India.

[31431] No. 142.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 274.)

Sir, *Peking, August 11, 1910.*

IN my despatch No. 238 of the 22nd ultimo, I forwarded to you the copy of a note which, in obedience to your instructions, I addressed to the Chinese Government, warning them that a force was being stationed by the Government of India at Gnatong, and that, if British interests were threatened, troops would be moved across the Thibetan frontier to protect them.

I am now in receipt of the Chinese Government's reply, copy of which I have the honour to enclose. They state that Thibet is now quiet, and that the resident has issued strict orders to the local officials to quell any disturbance of the peace. The local officials are responsible for the protection of British lives and property, and Great Britain can therefore rest assured as regards the safety of her escorts in Thibet. At the same time, the Chinese Government reiterate the fear that a concentration of British and Chinese troops on the frontier may cause trouble, in which event they decline to assume responsibility.

They add that, should the Dalai Lama, now or at some future date, return to Thibet or China, he will be treated with generosity, and need be under no apprehension. I had the honour of telegraphing to you the substance of the above note in my telegram No. 138 of the 8th instant.

It will be seen that, as stated in my telegram No. 140 of to-day in reply to your enquiry, there is no clear indication in the note that the Chinese Government desire the Dalai Lama to return to Thibet, but in view of possible developments, it is desirable that I should now record in an official despatch the substance of an informal conversation which I had with one of the councillors of the Wai-wu Pu some days before Prince Ch'ing's note of the 5th instant was dispatched to me, and which I have briefly summarised in my telegram of to-day.

On the 26th July Mr. Chou Tzu Chi came to see me on behalf of the Grand Secretary Na Tung, who was indisposed. After delivering messages on other subjects, he began to ask me for some explanations about the note which I had addressed to the Wai-wu Pu on the 22nd ultimo in regard to the intention of the Indian Government to send reinforcements to Gnatong. I took the opportunity of telling him that, in my opinion, the message from His Majesty's Government should not be construed as a threat against China, and was only meant as a warning to inform the Chinese Government of certain precautionary measures which the Indian Government had thought it prudent to take to ensure the safety of the British officers and escorts at the trade-marts in Thibet. He asked me if I knew of any grounds for this apprehension of danger to our escorts, as no news had reached the Chinese Government of any probable disturbances in Southern Thibet, and he was of opinion that the Chinese authorities there would be equal themselves to quelling any possible disturbance and providing protection for the British at the trade-marts. I replied that I had no definite information as to what had given rise to these apprehensions on the part of the Indian Government, but it appeared to me that troubles might well occur when it became generally known in Thibet that His Majesty's Government had definitely refused to intervene in any way on behalf of the Dalai Lama.

Mr. Chou seemed relieved at this interpretation of my note. He then continued that the Grand Council were considering the advisability of allowing the Dalai Lama to return to Lhassa as spiritual head of the Church, but without any temporal powers. He said that Na Tung favoured this solution of the present difficulty, and asked me if I thought that His Majesty's Government would regard it favourably. I replied that I could not answer for His Majesty's Government, but that personally I had for a long time considered this as the best solution, though I thought that they would have some difficulty in persuading the Dalai Lama to surrender his temporal powers. I felt entitled to add that His Majesty's Government would refuse absolutely to take any responsibility in the matter or to influence the Dalai Lama in one direction or the other. Mr. Chou said that the Grand Council were considering the question of dispatching a high official, preferably a Mongol, to negotiate with the Dalai Lama, and to offer him a full guarantee of personal security and most generous treatment if he would return to Lhassa. I said that in that case I would be prepared to ask the Indian Government to facilitate the journey of their envoy through India to Darjeeling. Mr. Chou promised to report what I had said to his Excellency Na Tung, and added

that I should hear further on the subject when I returned from Pei Tai Ho to Peking. The local papers have been reproducing various telegrams from India telling of elaborate preparations at Gnatong for an advance into Thibet, and leading articles describe our action as a direct result of the Russo-Japanese agreement. The papers have already conjured up secret clauses by which Japan is given a free hand in Corea and Russia in Mongolia, but now by a further stretch of imagination they explain that Great Britain has also acquired a free hand in Thibet as the price of her adhesion to the agreement.

It is hard to believe that even an irresponsible press should publish such fairy tales, but to my astonishment I discovered, from a conversation that I had a few days ago with the Austrian Minister, that both he and the German Minister placed some credence in them.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of His Majesty's
Chargé d'Affaires),
ERNEST SCOTT.

Enclosure in No. 142.

Wai-wu Pu to Mr. Max Müller.

(Translation.)

Sir, *August* 5, 1910.

HIS Majesty's Government are well aware that I have addressed frequent notes to you with reference to recent events in Thibet, pointing out that the Chinese Government were protecting religion, pacifying the country, and in every way were acting in accordance with treaty.

I have now received your note of the 22nd July, stating that, on account of apprehended trouble in Thibet, reinforcements of British troops would be stationed at Gnatong, but that they would not cross the frontier nor intervene between the Chinese and the Thibetans.

My Board are convinced that His Majesty's Government in making the above declaration are actuated by a due regard for the treaties and the friendly relations between the two countries.

But Thibet is now quiet, and the resident has issued strict orders to the local officials to quell any disturbance and to take measures to pacify the country; they were further ordered to take special care in guiding the masses of the people and prevent them from creating trouble through superstition. Great Britain can, therefore, rest assured as regards the safety of her escorts in Thibet, for the local officials are responsihle for the proper protection of British life and property.

I still hope that, as mentioned in former notes, the two countries will not station too many troops in the neighbourhood of the frontier. We shall thus avoid creating misapprehension among the people on the frontier. But if on this account suspicion should be created and trouble break out, then in such a case the Chinese Government cannot assume any responsibility.

As regards the deposed Dalai Lama, whether he now or at some future date returns to Thibet or whether he returns to other parts of China, he will be treated with generosity by China, and need be under no apprehension on this score.

It is my sincere wish that there should be peace on the borders between India and China, such a state of affairs being to the mutual advantage of both countries.

I have the honour to address this reply for your Excellency's information, and beg that you will communicate it to His Majesty's Government.

I avail, &c.
Prince CH'ING.

[31350] No. 143.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 360.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August* 25, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have to-day received from the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs a memorandum stating that information has reached the

Russian Buddhists of the trans-Baikal district to the effect that the Chinese amban has forbidden Russian pilgrims to enter Thibet.

The memorandum goes on to state that the Russian chargé d'affaires at Peking has been instructed to call the attention of the Chinese Government to the matter, and if the facts are as stated by the Russian Buddhists, to request that the order be rescinded.

I have, &c.
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[31496] No. 144.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 29.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 26, 1910.

WITH reference to Mr. Langley's letter of the 8th July, 1910, as to the prohibition of scientific missions in Thibet, I am directed to enclose copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Viceroy on the subject.*

Viscount Morley agrees that, in the altered circumstances, it is not necessary to press for an extension of the period of three years for which the British and Russian Governments, in the notes exchanged on the 31st August, 1907, undertook to prevent the entry of scientific missions into Thibet. He would leave it to Sir E. Grey to decide whether a formal intimation to this effect should be made to the Russian Government.

It will be remembered that the Wai-wu Pu, in their note (enclosed in Sir J. Jordan's despatch of the 14th October, 1907), replying to an invitation to impose upon themselves a similar self-denying ordinance, stated that "China has not hitherto permitted any foreigners of any description whatever to travel in Thibet, and must still continue to pursue this course." This prohibition, however, has been to some extent relaxed in the case of missionaries in Eastern Thibet, as pointed out by the Government of India, and proved futile in the case of Sven Hedin. It is perhaps not advisable or necessary to make any further communication to China on the subject until the Wai-wu Pu make enquiries. But it is for consideration whether some informal agreement should not be sought with Russia as to the attitude that the two Governments should adopt towards China in this matter. Having both of them admitted that Thibet is a part of China, will they consider her permission necessary before allowing or encouraging a scientific expedition to enter the country, and, if it is refused, will they ignore the refusal, or will the permission of the Thibetan Government be sufficient, or will no permission at all be considered necessary; or, again, will the two Governments stand aside and leave the individuals concerned to make their own arrangements on their own responsibility?

These are points on which it seems very desirable to arrive at an understanding beforehand, in order that circumstances may not arise in which British explorers might seem at a disadvantage as compared with Russians—circumstances that would naturally cause much adverse criticism in this country. It will be borne in mind that in Bengal and the Punjab persons are prohibited by law from crossing the frontier without passes from the local Governments, while in the United Provinces there are executive orders to the same effect. It would not be desirable for Government to deprive itself of the powers which it thus possesses, but the possession of them obviously makes it more difficult for us than for Russia to stand aloof.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 144.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 9, 1910.

THIBET. See your telegram dated the 22nd July.

We are strongly of opinion that, in altered circumstances of country, extension of term for which prohibition of scientific expeditions into Thibet was undertaken by British and Russian Governments is undesirable. Proceedings of Sven Hedin have shown that, in spite of present arrangement, individuals can enter Thibet. Permission

* See No. 108.

to visit Derge and Chiamdo, in Eastern Thibet, which have come under Chinese rule, has recently been given to missionaries, and eastern door will probably be thrown further open as control of the country by China is extended. No Europeans other than ourselves and Russians would, in these circumstances, be affected by extension of present prohibition. It will probably be the wish of China to prevent the entry of British scientific expeditions from India into Thibet, but if Anglo-Russian understanding is not renewed we should be able, in the event of our wishing to send an expedition, and objection being raised by China, to bring strong pressure to bear upon the latter by a strict enforcement against all Chinese desirous of entering Thibet from India of frontier-crossing regulation.

[31201] No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1910.

YOUR telegram No. 146 of 18th August: Thibet, and Government of India telegram of 26th August, and reply.

You should make full use with the Chinese Government of this unsolicited demonstration of the good faith of His Majesty's Government, without, however, laying such stress on the responsibility of the Chinese for the safety of the agencies as would be likely to lead to an inconvenient concentration of Chinese troops in the Chumbi Valley.

[31256] No. 146.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Government of India relative to the military preparations for reinforcing the trade agencies in Thibet.

Sir E. Grey concurs in the terms of the reply which Viscount Morley proposes to return to the Government of India, directing the discontinuance of these preparations, in view of the fact that the danger of an attack on the trade agencies is held no longer to be imminent.

I am to enclose a copy of a telegram which Sir E. Grey is addressing to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking, directing him, in accordance with the suggestion made in the final paragraph of your letter, to make full use with the Chinese Government of this unsolicited demonstration of good faith on the part of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[31708] No. 147.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 31.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 30th August, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, August 30, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 147.

Government of India to Viscount Morley,

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 30, 1910.

MR. BELL telegraphed on the 26th instant as follows :—

"Trade agent, Gyantse, received a visit on the 19th instant from Lo Chang Chi, who has come to Gyantse, and whom trade agent describes as chief secretary to Amban. Following telegraphic report has been received from trade agent regarding the interview :—

"'Lo stated yesterday, in the course of conversation—(1) that orders to secure the safety of our trade agency have been received by amban at Lhassa ; (2) that amban has been informed about rent of site by Wai-wu Pu. Instructions on this subject will shortly be sent to Mr. Ma ; (3) that amicable return of Dalai Lama is greatly desired by Chinese Government. Lama and his Ministers will not only not suffer, but will be rewarded, if this happens. After Dalai Lama had returned amicably to Lhassa, Emperor of China would receive favourably memorials for reinstatement. The above points, with the exception of the question of the site, are set down in writing in a despatch received from Lo to-day. I am sending a copy by mail. Return of Dalai Lama to Thibet is apparently Lo's object. He leaves Yatung on the 21st instant, and proceeds to Darjeeling on receipt of orders from China.'

"Trade agent, Gyantse, is being instructed by telegraph that if Lo's despatch is in English the text should be telegraphed ; if it is in Thibetan the original should be sent by post. It would appear that lama and his Ministers are willing to discuss matters with Lo, though they profess to be unable to place any more trust in promises of Chinese unless guaranteed by British Government."

[31875] No. 148.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 1st September, relative to Chinese troops in Thibet.

India Office, September 1, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 148.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 1, 1910.

THIBET (see my telegram dated the 18th ultimo).

There are at present, according to reports received from our officers, about 132 Chinese troops in the Chumbi Valley and about 60 at Gyantse.

[32136] No. 149.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 2nd September, 1910, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, September 3, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 149.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 2, 1910.

PLEASE refer to my telegram dated the 30th ultimo. The despatch from Lo is to the following effect:—

"The Chinese Government, I have the honour to inform you, is extremely delighted by reason of the appropriate and peaceable manner in which affairs have been administered by you since you took charge of the Gyantse office, and owing to the intimate friendship between China and Great Britain. As regards conditions prevailing recently, as your own eyes have witnessed everywhere, there is tranquillity throughout Thibet, trade becomes more prosperous, and crops are abundant. Treaty regulations between China and Britain have hitherto been carefully observed by his Excellency Lien Yuen, Chinese Resident at Lhassa, who never allows places in commercial marts to be exposed to danger and harm, and attaches great importance to their protection.

"Resident has deputed me to proceed to Gyantse to interview you personally, with a view to reassuring you by expressing to you all our [?] ideas, and in order also to ask you to inform your Government immediately by telegraph that there has recently been real tranquillity at commercial marts, as well as in the rest of Thibet, and that, despite Dalai Lama's flight, there has not been the least change in the administration of political matters. There would be mutual peace [?], without troubles of any kind, if Dalai Lama were to return to Thibet.

"It is my belief that the British Government will not listen to unfounded rumours from outside, but is glad to learn the real state of affairs in Thibet. As the benefit of two nations is concerned in this, I am communicating to you this despatch, and hope to receive a reply from you."

It will be observed, with reference to the second paragraph of the above, that the oral assurance made by Lo to trade agent, Gyantse, as to safety of Dalai Lama and Ministers in the event of their returning to Thibet, is not confirmed by Lo's despatch.

[32329] No. 150.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams to and from the Government of India, dated the 3rd September, 1910, relative to Thibet.

India Office, September 5, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 150.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September* 3, 1910.

THIBET.

I request that your telegram of the 2nd instant may be repeated to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

Enclosure 2 in No. 150.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 3, 1910.

THIBET.

With reference to your telegram dated the 1st instant, while troops will for the present still be under warning, orders have been issued for the discontinuance of military preparations.

[32515] No. 151.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, September 6, 1910.*

THIBET.

Government of India's telegrams to India Office of the 30th ultimo and the 2nd instant.

From an informal conversation at the Wai-wu Pu on the 2nd instant, I gathered that the Chinese Government were now considering the advisability of endeavouring to induce the Dalai Lama to come to Peking to take up his residence here, with spiritual powers and rank as Dalai Lama, and that they feel nervous as to the possible results of his return to Thibet. The Wai-wu Pu promised that I should be officially informed if they decided to adopt this course, as the assent of the Indian Government would have to be obtained to allow the Dalai Lama to travel through India. It appears to be doubtful whether it would be possible to induce the Dalai Lama to accept such a proposal, but as the subject may be mentioned to me again I should be glad to be informed how His Majesty's Government would view such a solution.

[31496] No. 152.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 6, 1910.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th July with reference to the expiry of the Anglo-Russian declaration of the 31st August, 1907, relating to the entry of scientific missions into Thibet.

I am to enclose the draft of a despatch dealing with the matter which, subject to Viscount Morley's concurrence, Sir E. Grey proposes to address to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[32760] No. 153.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 283.)
Sir, *Peking, August 19, 1910.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 141 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith the translation of the note from the Wai-wu Pu, dated the 11th August, in which, on the authority of the Chinese resident in Thibet, it is stated that peace prevails throughout that country and that full protection is being afforded to the trade marts at Gyangtse and Yatung. Further, the resident proposes to send Taotai Lo Ch'ang-ch'i to India to persuade the Dalai Lama to return to Thibet, and, in notifying this proposal to me, the Wai-wu Pu request that I will inform the Government of India with the view to facilities being granted to the taotai. They add that, on the receipt of my reply, instructions will be sent to the Resident Lien in order that the taotai may be able to start on his journey.

Yesterday Mr. Liu Yu-lin, junior councillor of the Wai-wu Pu, called at the legation and in my absence was received by the first secretary, Mr. Scott. Mr. Liu asked whether any news had been received about Thibet. The Chinese Government were anxious that the taotai should start on his journey to India without delay, and they were only withholding their instructions until they knew that the Government of India were prepared to give the requisite facilities. Mr. Liu was informed in reply that the proposal had been telegraphed to London and to Simla, and that as soon as an answer was received it would be communicated to the Wai-wu Pu.

Mr. Liu went on to talk about the condition of affairs on the southern frontier of Thibet. He mentioned the decision of the Indian Government to move reinforcements to protect the British escorts at the trade marts, and evinced a little alarm as to what their action might be. Mr. Scott thereupon repeated the assurances given in my note to Prince Ch'ing of the 22nd ultimo that the British force would not intervene between the Chinese and Thibetans and would only cross the frontier if British lives or property

were endangered. In reply to a further enquiry Mr. Liu was informed that it was presumed that the reinforcements would have arrived by now, and that, so far as His Majesty's Legation was aware, everything was quiet in the region in question.

Mr. Liu then said that the Chinese Government considered that, under the Trade Regulations, it was the right and the duty of China to protect British subjects and interests at the trade marts in Southern Thibet, and that they were prepared to utilise their troops for that purpose. He was, however, unable to say whether there were any Chinese troops in the neighbourhood or how long it would take to move them to the localities under discussion. In reply Mr. Scott said that he was not familiar with the Trade Regulations and would require to look them up, that so far as he knew matters were perfectly quiet and undisturbed on the southern borders of Thibet, and that he was under the impression that the Government of India regarded the reinforcements which they were sending as constituting ample protection for the British escorts. Moreover, the Wai-wu Pu had themselves deprecated the concentration of large numbers of troops of both countries near the frontier lest the population might become alarmed and trouble break out for which the Chinese Government could assume no responsibility. On the principle, therefore, of letting well alone, it was put to Mr. Liu whether it was necessary or desirable to move the Chinese troops as was proposed.

As reported in my telegram No. 146 of yesterday, the proposal was in the nature of an offer of assistance, but there can, I think, be little doubt that the desire to see our reinforcements withdrawn lay behind it. The withdrawal would seem to be a natural corollary of acceptance of the Chinese offer. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the local conditions to be able to judge of the effect which such a move on our part may have on our prestige, nor, in the absence of any information as to the present course of events in the localities in question, can I express an opinion on the expediency or desirability of leaving the escorts unsupported by British troops. It seems to me, however, clear that the Chinese Government wish to make their authority effective in that part, as they have already done in other parts of Thibet, and that if we acquiesce in their proposal they may, as suggested in Viscount Morley's telegram to the Government of India of the 10th June, eventually be in a position to claim that our escorts at Gyangtse and elsewhere should, under article 12 of the regulations, be completely withdrawn.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of His Majesty's chargé d'affaires),
E. SCOTT.

Enclosure in No. 153.

Piince Ch'ing to Mr. Max Müller.

Sir, *Peking, August* 11, 1910.

ON the 5th August I addressed a note to your Excellency stating that Thibet was quiet and that the security of the British escorts there could be guaranteed. I have now received a telegram from the resident in Thibet in which he states as follows :—

"There is peace in Thibet, both far and near, and at the two trade marts, Gyangtse and Yatung, full protection is being afforded. Trade with India is in full swing, and British officials and merchants come and go freely ; further, British lives and property have suffered no damage, and I beg that no apprehension should be felt on this score.

"As regards the fear of the British Government that the Dalai Lama's presence in India might cause trouble, I propose to send Taotai Lo Ch'ang-ch'i to India to persuade him to return to Thibet."

I have the honour to request that your Excellency will take note of the above and notify the Government of India by telegraph with a view to Taotai Lo being duly received and given all possible assistance on his arrival in India.

Upon receipt of your reply the Board will telegraph to his Excellency Lien to instruct the taotai to start on his journey.

I avail, &c.
PRINCE CH'ING.

[32761] No. 154.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 284.)

Sir, *Peking, August* 19, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the note I have received from the Chinese Government denying that supplies destined for the Dalai Lama at Darjeeling have ever been stopped by Chinese officials.

I telegraphed the substance of this note briefly to you yesterday.

I have, &c.

(In the absence of His Majesty's chargé d'affaires),

ERNEST SCOTT.

Enclosure in No. 154.

Memorandum communicated to Mr. Max Müller by Wai-wu Pu August 16, 1910.

WITH reference to the verbal statements made by Mr. Max Müller that supplies of treasure sent from Thibet to the deposed Dalai Lama, now resident in Darjeeling, had been invariably stopped by the Chinese officials, a telegram was at once sent by the Wai-wu Pu to the Chinese Resident in Thibet, and the following reply has now been received :—

"The Dalai Lama's supplies, clothing, &c., have invariably been released. As regards the detention of treasure, I am informed by the Commissioner of Customs at Yatung, in reply to my telegraphic enquiries, that there is no truth in the statement. From this fact it will be seen that the deposed Dalai Lama is circulating false rumours of the most serious description, and that no reliance can be placed on his statements."

The board has the honour to communicate the above reply.

[32784] No. 155.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 1st September, 1910, and of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 8th September, 1910, relative to the affairs of Thibet.

India Office, September 8, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 155.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 1, 1910.

THIBET. Please refer to your telegram of the 26th August.

The sole consideration is the safety of our agents. The opinion to which His Majesty's Government strongly adhere is that military preparations are not justified by the political conditions, and you are authorised to discontinue them, in view of your advice that, so far as the safety of the agents is in question, they may reasonably be discontinued. It is presumed that no necessity exists for any announcement to be made on the subject, and that if troops continue for the present to be under warning no inconvenience will result. The above should be repeated to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, together with your telegram of the 26th August.

On the 30th August a telegram was sent to the Minister in the following terms :—

"In communicating with the Chinese Government you should make full use of this unsolicited proof of good faith on the part of His Majesty's Government. You

should not, however, emphasise the responsibility which the Chinese have incurred for the safety of the agencies to such an extent as would be likely to lead to their concentrating Chinese troops in the Chumbi Valley in an inconvenient manner."

Enclosure 2 in No. 155.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 8, 1910.

THIBET. With reference to my telegram of the 1st September, 150 more Chinese troops from Lhassa have arrived at Gyantse.

2 515] No. 156.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 13, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking,* from which it appears that the latter has reason to suppose, from an informal conversation at the Wai-wu Pu, that the Chinese Government entertain misgivings as to the advisability of allowing the Dalai Lama to return to Thibet, and that they are contemplating an endeavour to induce his Holiness to take up his residence at or near Peking. Should he agree to this course, the Lama would proceed to China by the sea route, and the Chinese Government would request the assent of the Government of India to his passage across that country.

I am to enquire what attitude Viscount Morley would desire Mr. Max Müller to adopt, should the Wai-wu Pu renew these suggestions to him at some later date.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[33641] No. 157.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 16.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 15, 1910.

IN reply to your letter dated the 6th September, 1910, I am directed to say that the Secretary of State for India concurs in the terms of the draft despatch that Secretary Sir E. Grey proposes to address to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburgh regarding the expiry of the period for which the British and Russian Governments undertook to prevent the entry of scientific missions into Thibet.

I am, &c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

[33798] No. 158.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 16th September, relative to the Chinese and the Dalai Lama.

India Office, September 17, 1910.

* No. 151.

[32958]

No. 155*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd September, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, September 10, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 155*.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 3, 1910.

THIBET. With reference to your telegram dated the 1st instant.

While troops will for the present still be under warning, orders have been issued for the discontinuance of military preparations.

Enclosure in No. 158.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 16, 1910.

THIBET. According to a report received from the political officer, Sikkim, the Dalai Lama has received a letter from the Tashi Lama requesting his return to Thibet. The Tashi Lama, however, also sent an oral message advising him not to return to Thibet unless his safety were guaranteed by the British Government, and explaining that his letter had been written under pressure from the Chinese. No reply to the Tashi Lama's letter has yet been sent by the Dalai Lama.

[33641] No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 251.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 17, 1910.

YOU are aware that on the 31st August, 1907, by an exchange of notes between His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, a mutual declaration was made on behalf of the British and Russian Governments with reference to the desirability of each Government, so far as lay respectively in their power, preventing the entry into Thibet of any scientific mission whatever except by previous agreement with the other party to the declaration. This arrangement, which was concluded for a period of three years, expired on the 31st ultimo.

The question of the renewal of the declaration has been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, in consultation with the Government of India, but the conclusion reached is that, in all the circumstances, it is preferable that it should either lapse entirely or be replaced by another arrangement. The reason for this view is that the results which were anticipated have not been attained. In the first place, it was found that the Chinese Government were not disposed to make a formal declaration of a similar nature, nor were they able to define satisfactorily the limits of Thibet, and, in the second place, it has been possible, as in the case of Sven Hedin, for an expedition to penetrate into Thibet in the course of the last three years in spite of the existence of the declaration. The consequence is that, instead of closing Thibet to all scientific missions in accordance with the original intention, the declaration has merely had the result of placing British and Russian subjects, who might desire to engage in scientific exploration in Thibet, at a disadvantage as compared with persons of other nationality.

I request that you will lay these considerations before the Russian Government, and ascertain whether they hold the same views.

At the same time, you should inform them that His Majesty's Government have, at the present moment, no intention of promoting any scientific mission to Thibet, and that, in the event of private individuals applying for permission to cross the Indian frontier into that country, His Majesty's Government would, in any case, not fail, when the occasion arose, to acquaint the Russian Government with the attitude which they were adopting in the matter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[33958] No. 160.

Consul-General Wilkinson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)

Sir, *Chengtu, August* 15, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 12th instant, instructing me to report on a statement made by the Minister in attendance on the Dalai Lama to the effect that 7,000 troops from Szechuan are to leave for Lhassa on the 20th instant.

If "from Szechuan" meant "from the capital of Szechuan" it is clear that the Minister was mistaken, for there are at Chengtu and the cantonments near it little

more than one brigade (" hsieh ")—in other words, only between 4,000 and 4,500 men. The rest of the troops are scattered about the province, and although some 5,000 or 6,000 men are on duty in the marches to the west, or in the Thibetan province of Kham, still the campaign which the warden, Chao Erh-feng, is conducting against the tribesmen would hardly permit him to detach to Lhassa any large body.

There was, however, a rumour that three battalions (" ying ") were under orders to start this week towards the frontier, and a commandant (" t'ung-ling ") left, it is supposed in advance of them, for Yachow on the 6th instant.

I accordingly telegraphed to you early this morning that, although no official announcement has been made, it is believed that three battalions are to start shortly for the border, but that this may mean that they are merely to relieve other troops now on duty there.

Later in the day I called on the Governor-General, who, before I could broach the subject, told me that he had received a telegram from the Wai-wu Pu saying that they had been informed by His Majesty's chargé d'affaires of the dispatch of two companies of British soldiers from India to Yatung, in Thibet. The soldiers were needed there, it was affirmed, for the protection of British subjects, owing to some disturbance on the part of the Bhutanese. His Excellency asked me if I had any information about this movement.

I replied that all I had heard was a rumour that several thousand troops were about to leave Chengtu for Thibet.

Chao Chiht'ai said that he presumed that this was another canard started by Reuter's agency. It was altogether groundless: he had not more than a brigade in the whole place. Moreover, on the 6th instant some 2,000 Lolos had commenced raiding at Mapien (on the north-east of what is known to foreigners as Independent Lolodom). He protested against the entry of British troops in Thibet, for which, he said, he knew no reason. His last telegram from the Amban, Lien-yü, at Lhassa had stated that all was quiet. He suspected that either the cashiered Dalai Lama or perhaps some Russian was causing trouble. As for Bhutan, he added, somewhat inconsequently, it belonged to China.

I said that I had not yet been informed of what had taken place. I knew, of course, that the Dalai Lama was in India, and as the Bhutanese are Buddhists, it might be that he had been intriguing there. I felt sure that Russia had had nothing to do with the matter; she, like my own Government, had frankly recognised China's suzerainty over Thibet. With regard to the status of Bhutan, I merely remarked that weak countries have often paid tribute to one powerful neighbour while professing allegiance to another. In conclusion, I asked whether I might not repeat to my Government his Excellency's assurance that the rumour was baseless of the intended dispatch of several thousand men from Szechuan to Thibet.

The Governor-General replied that the rumour was obviously false, as I could see for myself that no men were being sent.

I have accordingly again telegraphed to you to say that the Governor-General at a personal interview emphatically denied the report. The Lolos raided in force last week, and the men at his disposal will hardly be sufficient for their suppression. I added that his Excellency deprecated the dispatch of British troops to Thibet, and claimed, incidentally, that Bhutan is a dependency of the Chinese Empire.

I cannot help thinking that there was some foundation for the report that reached the Dalai Lama, evidently from some agent of his in Chengtu. My German colleague, two of whose nationals are employed at the new arsenal, told me that the three battalions to which I have referred were to start for the west on the 16th of the moon, that is to say, on the 20th August, the exact date mentioned by the Dalai Lama's Minister. The projected dispatch of troops may, if it was a fact, have been motived only by the Lolo incursion, and be altogether unconnected with affairs in Thibet or Bhutan, but it has hitherto been the practice of the Szechuan Government to employ in their recurrent Lolo campaigns the " hsüng-fang tuï," or local garrisons, if only for the somewhat naïve reason that these last are not so well armed as the " lu chün," or modern army, so that in the event of defeat the weapons captured by the Lolos would be of less value. The general feeling among Chinese officials at Chengtu is that Lolo raids are merely a local nuisance, with which the neighbouring garrisons are quite competent to deal.

The position, however, of Governor-General Chao Erh-hsun would seem to be just now somewhat critical. He and his brother Chao Erh-feng, the Warden of the Marches, have been denounced to the Throne for malversation, nepotism, and

misgovernment, and the Governor of Shensi has been commanded to hold an enquiry. The governor has sent as his representative *ad hoc* a taotai to Chengtu, who is clothed with all the powers of a "ch'in-ch'ai," or Imperial commissioner. It is said that on the arrival of the latter Governor-General Chao called upon him, but was refused an interview pending the result of the enquiry. (It is also said that Chao chih-t'ai offered the commissioner a bribe of 100,000 taels, possibly as a trap, which was rejected.) In any case, his Excellency, who, though an able administrator, has certainly laid himself open to charges of nepotism and possibly of venality, has cause for caution, if not for anxiety. Failure at this juncture to suppress a Lolo rising might tell against him; hence it would be to his interest to see that whatever troops he has here at Chengtu are ready for a campaign.

As a matter of fact he and his executive council are proceeding to-morrow to inspect the cantonment at Feng-huang Shan, some 2 or 3 miles north of this city. Here are stationed the bulk of the Chengtu garrison, normally two regiments ("piao") of the "lu chün." The total number of effectives in the "modern army" of Szechuan cannot, I think, exceed 9,000; and of those in the "hsün fang," 10,000. (I exclude cooks, baggage coolies, and the like.) This force has to secure tranquillity for 50,000,000 people, over an area of 180,000 square miles, and yet from it have been detached the troops now pacifying the marches, operating in Kham, and garrisoning Lhassa.

The reports I have received from my correspondent at Batang, Mr. Muir (who recently journeyed to Chamdo, the then head-quarters of the Warden of the Marches), speak with wonder and respect of the success that Chao Erh-feng has achieved with what was apparently an altogether insufficient army; but I can hardly believe that even Chao Erh-feng, able and self-confident as he is, would imagine that it would be possible to bring force to bear on Bhutan or on Nepaul, should those States refuse the customary "tribute."

I have, &c.
W. H. WILKINSON.

[33922] No. 161.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 19.)

(No. 293.)

Sir, *Peking, August* 30, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the copy of a note which I addressed to the Chinese Government on the receipt of your telegram No. 118 of the 23rd instant, informing them that the necessary facilities would be given to Taotai Lo Chang-chi on his arrival in India for the purpose of persuading the Dalai Lama to return to Thibet.

In obedience to your instructions, I have made it clear in my note that His Majesty's Government regard the movements of the Dalai Lama with indifference.

I have, &c.
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure in No. 161.

Mr. Max Müller to Prince Ch'ing.

Your Highness, *Peking, August* 24, 1910.

IN the note which your Highness did me the honour to address me on the 11th instant you stated that the Chinese resident in Thibet proposed to send Taotai Lo Chang-chi to India to persuade the Dalai Lama to return to Thibet, and you requested me to notify this proposal to the Government of India in order that the taotai might be given all possible assistance on his arrival.

I duly communicated this proposal to His Majesty's Government, and I have the honour to inform your Highness that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stating that the necessary facilities will be given to the taotai.

With reference to the resident's allusion to the fear of His Majesty's Government that the presence of the Dalai Lama in India might cause trouble, I beg to state, in

order that there may be no misunderstanding in the matter, that His Majesty's Government regard the movements of the Dalai Lama with indifference.

I avail, &c.
(In the absence of Mr. Max Müller),
ERNEST SCOTT.

[34202] No. 162.

*Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.**

IN a memorandum communicated to the Russian Ambassador on the 3rd ultimo it was stated that the Government of India were taking steps to collect a force at Gnatong, close to the Indo-Thibetan frontier, in order to be able to protect the British trade agents and their escorts at Gyantse and Yatung in the event of danger to their lives arising out of the situation of unrest prevalent in Thibet.

The Government of India have now reported that an undoubted improvement has taken place in the condition of affairs in Thibet during the last few weeks, and have expressed the opinion that, in view of this circumstance and of the fact that the Chinese Government have acknowledged their responsibility for the protection of the trade agencies and are sending additional troops to Gyantse and the Chumbi Valley, the danger to the lives of the British officers in those places has diminished sufficiently to allow of a discontinuance of the military preparations in progress.

His Majesty's Government have accordingly authorised this step, which, in their opinion, has the additional advantage of clearly demonstrating to the Chinese Government that British policy as regards Thibet is actuated by no selfish political ambitions.

Foreign Office, September 21, 1910.

[34654] No. 163.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 305.)

Sir, *Peking, September* 8, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum forwarded to the Wai-wu Pu in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 277 of the 6th ultimo, in which I drew attention to the order issued by the ambans at Lhassa forbidding the Thibetan Government and all lamas of Tashi-lhunpo, from the Tashi Lama downwards, from holding any communication with foreigners, and I suggested that the avowed purposes of the Chinese Government would be better served by the appointment of an amban more sympathetic to the inhabitants of the country and more conciliatory to the Indian Government.

At an interview which I had with Mr. Hu Wei-te at the Wai-wu Pu on the 2nd instant I referred to this question, and recapitulated the arguments contained in my memorandum. I had not at that time received from the Indian Government the telegrams referred to in your telegram No. 120 of the 30th ultimo, but a Reuter telegram had prepared me for the information which they were subsequently found to contain. I was therefore able to dwell on the conciliatory attitude of His Majesty's Government throughout the recent events in Thibet and the good faith and friendliness which they had displayed towards the Chinese Government, and to point out that, though the Chinese Government had given repeated assurances as to their pacific and friendly intentions, the action of their official representatives in Lhassa, not only in the present instance but generally, went far towards nullifying those assurances. I said that I had been given to understand unofficially by a member of the Wai-wu Pu that the Grand Secretary Na T'ung was far from pleased with the present Amban Lien Yü, and had been in favour of replacing him. Mr. Hu, however, explained that it would be difficult to remove Mr. Lien from Lhassa at present, as he was the man chiefly responsible for the flight and degradation of the Dalai Lama, and his dismissal would be taken by the Dalai Lama as an admission that he (the amban) had been in the wrong, with the result that the Dalai Lama would become more difficult to deal with than ever. Mr. Hu, however, added that, in accordance with my request, orders

* Also to Mr. Yamaza, *mutatis mutandis*.

had been telegraphed to the amban to adopt a more conciliatory attitude in matters affecting the interests of His Majesty's Government and British subjects. I then enquired of his Excellency what action had been taken on my note of the 31st July respecting the difficulties that had arisen with regard to the leasing of land for the trade agency at Gyantse. Mr. Hu said that the necessary instructions had been sent, and this appears to be confirmed by the Government of India's telegram of the 30th August reporting the gist of a conversation between the British trade agent at Gyantse and Taotai Lo Chang Chi.

Mr. Hu then proceeded to discuss the question of the future of the Dalai Lama. He gave me to understand that the Chinese Government had come to the conclusion that the difficulties in the way of appointing a new Dalai Lama during the life of the present one were insuperable, and that they were now very nervous as to the possible results if he were allowed to return to Lhassa. They certainly have good grounds for not reposing faith in any promises the Dalai Lama might make, and, in whatever capacity he returned to Thibet, he would be in a position to intrigue and to stir up trouble which might lead to grave political complications. Mr. Hu considered that far the safest plan would be to induce the Dalai Lama to come to Peking and let him reside in full state as head of the Lamist Church in some temple in the neighbourhood, where he could continue to be an object of veneration for the faithful, but would not be in a position to cause political agitation.

I replied that it certainly seemed to be a good way out of the difficulty provided they could persuade the Dalai Lama to agree to such a course, but I reminded his Excellency that His Majesty's Government, though they regarded the present Dalai Lama with indifference, had the right to demand the maintenance of a Thibetan Government with whom they could deal.

Mr. Hu promised to inform me officially if it were decided to approach the Dalai Lama with a view to his return to Peking, as it would obviously be more prudent to convey him viâ India to Peking than viâ Thibet, and for that it would be necessary to obtain the consent of the Indian Government.

I do not propose to make any formal announcement to the Chinese Government of the withdrawal of our troops from Gnatong, but I shall, as you suggest, make full use of this unsolicited demonstration of good faith on the part of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure in No. 163.

Memorandum communicated to Wai-wu Pu.

THE Government of India have drawn attention to an order dated the 18th March last, issued by the ambans at Lhassa, which directs the cancellation of a grant of land to the late Shabdung Lama, a former Thibetan employee of the British trade agency at Gyantse, and forbids the Thibetan Government and all lamas of Tashi-lhunpo, from the Tashi Lama downwards, from holding any communication with foreigners, whether on state or private affairs.

Mr. Max Müller has been instructed to bring to the notice of the Chinese Government this action on the part of the resident at Lhassa, and to point out that the prohibition imposed on the Thibetan Government and the lamas of Tashi-lhunpo from holding intercourse with foreigners appears to be in violation of article 12 of the Trade Regulations of 1908. Further, that neither the Anglo-Thibetan Convention nor the Anglo-Chinese Convention provide for the interposition of the Chinese Government between His Majesty's Government and the Thibetan authorities upon any subject whatever.

His Majesty's Government have observed the strictest neutrality in regard to recent developments in Thibet, and they have certainly never given the Chinese Government reason to believe that they wished to be other than friendly neighbours. They have a right to expect that this friendly attitude should be reciprocated, but the present and other instances already brought to the notice of the Wai-wu Pu show that the representatives of the Chinese Government in Thibet are not animated with a similar spirit of conciliation. Since the avowed purpose of the Chinese Government's intervention in Thibet is the pacification of the country and the carrying out of its treaty obligations, Mr. Max Müller is instructed to represent that that purpose

might be better served by the appointment of a resident more sympathetic to the inhabitants and less unfriendly to the friends of his Government than the present Chinese commissioner at Lhassa. Failing this, stringent orders should be dispatched to Mr. Lien to adopt a more conciliatory attitude in matters affecting the interests of His Majesty's Government and British subjects.

The favour of an early reply is requested for the information of His Majesty's Government.

(In the absence of Mr. Max Müller),
ERNEST SCOTT.

Peking, August 27, 1910.

[33188] No. 164.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 28.)

Sir, *India Office, September* 28, 1910.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 13th September, 1910, enquiring what attitude the Secretary of State would desire His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking to adopt, if the Chinese Government were to request facilities for the passage of the Dalai Lama by the sea route to Peking.

In reply I am directed to enclose copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India on the subject. Viscount Morley is disposed to think, especially in view of what is said below, that there may be some ground for the apprehensions felt by the Government of India in this matter, and he would suggest that, if Secretary Sir E. Grey sees no objection, Mr. Max Müller should be instructed to reply to the Wai-wu Pu, if he is again approached by them, in the sense proposed by the Indian Government, viz., that, before giving an answer, His Majesty's Government would wish to know whether his Holiness desires to go to Peking, his last communication being that he does not wish to leave India.

It will, however, be seen from the further telegraphic correspondence, of which copy is enclosed, that his Excellency the Viceroy has received a letter from the Amban Len describing Lo Chang as a "special commissioner" sent to India to discuss certain matters with his Excellency. From Mr. Max Müller's telegram No. 141, dated the 12th August last, it was understood that the taotai, or, as he is described by the Viceroy, the expectant taotai, was to be merely an emissary to the Dalai Lama himself, and this has been the assumption throughout the correspondence. Lord Morley would suggest that, if Sir E. Grey sees no objection, Mr. Max Müller should be instructed to explain this to the Wai-wu Pu, as well as the action taken by the Viceroy, and to leave them to make what explanations they desire.

I am, &c.
COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 164.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September* 16, 1910.

THIBET.

Dalai Lama. Please refer to the last paragraph of Peking telegram to Foreign Office, No. 151, dated the 6th September. If again approached by the Wai-wu Pu, I consider that the chargé d'affaires should reply that His Majesty's Government will, if the Dalai Lama so desires, facilitate his Holiness's return to Peking by the sea route. Please communicate any observations you may have to make.

Enclosure 2 in No. 164.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 21, 1910.

THIBET.

According to a telegraphic report from the political officer, Sikkim, he received a visit on the 17th instant from Lo Chang Chi, who stated that it was the wish of his

Government that the Dalai Lama should return to Thibet, and requested that he (Mr. Bell) should endeavour to persuade him to do so. Mr. Bell replied that, under his instructions, he must remain neutral. Lo Chang stated that, in the event of the lama's return, his residence in the Potala would be sanctioned, and an annual allowance of 10,000 taels granted him; his life would be assured, but supreme spiritual or secular power could not be exercised by him. The Chinese Government would be memorialised for the improvement of his position, but what orders they would pass was not known.

A letter from Lien Yi, the Amban of Lhassa, has just reached me. He states that he had petitioned that his secretary, Lo Chang, should be appointed a special commissioner to India for the purpose of discussing with me certain matters on which an amicable settlement is desired; and that after addressing a communication on the subject to the British Minister at Peking the Board of Foreign Affairs had received an affirmative reply, in which His Majesty's Government had promised that the commissioner should be received. The rank of Lo Chang, who is described as an expectant taotai, does not entitle him to discuss matters with the Viceroy. I am informing him, through the political officer, Sikkim, that in the event of his coming to Simla a civil reception will be accorded him, and that anything he has to say will be heard by the Foreign Secretary, but that, as His Majesty's Government have not informed us that he has been accredited to the Government of India by the Chinese Government, and as communications are being exchanged in Peking, the interview must be an informal one. I am also informing him that he cannot be received by the Viceroy. He has commenced his journey to Simla, but he will rest at Calcutta.

Enclosure 3 in No. 164.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 21, 1910.

THIBET.

Please refer to your telegram of the 16th instant. To assist the Dalai Lama to depart from India and thereby facilitate the action of the Chinese, by whom no friendly disposition has at any stage been shown to us, would in no respect be to our advantage. It is not impossible that the answer we send may be misrepresented to him. A better course would appear to be to inform the Wai-wu Pu that, in view of the last communication we received from the Dalai Lama being to the effect that he does not wish to return, we should like to know his wishes before we give a reply. Independent action seems to be taking place on the part of the central and the local Governments.

Enclosure 4 in No. 164.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September* 23, 1910.

THIBET.

Your telegram of the 21st instant. I quite approve your refusal to receive Lo Chang, who, as secretary to the amban, is of low rank, and is not even a taotai. It is, in my opinion, uncertain whether he should be received by the Foreign Secretary. In any case there must be a distinct understanding that in no way is the Government of India to commit itself to the attempt to induce the Dalai Lama to go back to Thibet. The consequences of what may happen to the Dalai Lama, should he return to Lhassa, must on no account involve ourselves, whether directly or indirectly. Any single step in this direction should be avoided with your utmost pains.

Enclosure 5 in No. 164.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September* 23, 1910.

THIBET.

I request that my telegrams dated the 16th and 23rd September, and the two telegrams sent by you on the 21st September, may be repeated to Peking.

Enclosure 6 in No. 164.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 23, 1910.

THIBET.

With reference to my telegram of the 20th instant, it is anticipated that Lo Chang Chi will reach Simla about the 28th September. He informed the political officer, Sikkim, that he intended to apply by telegraph to the Peking Government for an interview to be arranged between himself and the Viceroy. The opinion I have expressed that his rank does not entitle him to discuss matters with me remains unchanged.

[35297] No. 165.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 309.)

Sir, *Peking, September* 10, 1910.

IN my despatch No. 263 of the 3rd ultimo I forwarded to you the copy of a note which I addressed to Prince Ch'ing requesting the assistance of the Chinese Government in reaching a settlement of the difficulty with regard to the leasing of land for the trade agency at Gyantse.

I have now received the enclosed reply, in which the Chinese Government communicate to me a telegram from the resident. It would seem from this message that a settlement satisfactory to all parties has been reached.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure in No. 165.

Prince Ch'ing to Mr. Max Müller.

Sir, *September* 8, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note with reference to the rent of a site by the British trade agent at Gyantse for the erection of the agency buildings.

I at once communicated by telegraph with our resident in Thibet, and am now in receipt of the following telegraphic reply :—

" The following report has been furnished me by the Taotai Lo :—

" ' A site, measuring 177 acres, was delimitated at Gyantse for a trading settlement where houses might be erected. Each acre was estimated at just over 6 Chinese *mou*. Out of this area the British trade agent, Mr. Weir, requested that a site, measuring 175 Chinese *mou*, might be rented to himself for the erection of the British trade agency, and a permit so to rent was accordingly given to him. Mr. Weir then verbally approached the landlords with regard to the amount of rent to be paid, and, on the ground that the majority of the land was rich, the Thibetan owners first demanded a rent of 160 rupees per Chinese *mou*. On the local officials strenuously insisting on a reduction by the owners of this figure, a rent of 50 rupees per Chinese *mou* was ultimately asked. There was no question of practical assistance having been refused or of bringing the case into court. The delay has been solely occasioned by the fact that the British trade agent refused to pay more than the rent which he was authorised to give as fair and reasonable, and stated that a settlement of the question must await the arrival of Mr. Pai-erh, the Commissioner at Lo P'ei-chê.

" ' Now, however, in conjunction with the Thibetan officials, I have used my utmost powers of persuasion with the Thibetan owners, and have arranged that the question shall be settled by the payment of a rent per *mou* by the British trade agent corresponding to the value of the beans or grain such land produced yearly. As

regards the cost of the permit to rent and the land tax payable, regulations have already been drawn up with which all parties are entirely satisfied, fixing the former at 6 mace and the latter at 1 t. 5 m. per *mou*.' "

I have the honour to forward the above report for your information and to request that you will issue instructions accordingly.

Prince CH'ING.

[35385] No. 166.

Extract from a Private Letter from Batang dated July 18, 1910.—(*Communicated by Mr. Max Müller and received at Foreign Office September* 30, 1910.)

(Private and Confidential.)

THE political conditions here are puzzling, and severely try the temper of patient Christians like myself. The country west of Tachienlu to Batang has been conquered, and some attempt is being made to govern it. The Thibetans are undoubtedly better off now than before, and Chinese education, civilisation, and moral ideas are improving the Thibetan outwardly; but it is impossible to understand what China intends to get out of the country. If his Excellency Chao was the head of a missionary board, and his officials and staff of Chinese poorly remunerated but self-denying missionaries, the efforts and results might become famous; but when one realises that the reforms which are influencing the moral, religious, mental, and physical life of the people are emanating from Peking—conservative, utilitarian, and unsympathetic—the puzzle becomes decidedly Chinese. The country is far too high to produce cereals, and the Chinaman has little use for beef, mutton, wool, hides, milk, butter, and cheese. In fact the country only produces what he values slightly. Again, even if it did produce cereals, no one would think of sending them to the coast, especially viâ Tachienlu, Chungking, and Shanghai. It seems to me that the day is coming when all the products of Eastern Thibet will go down by Talifu and out by Burmah. And so good-bye to Tachienlu and all theories which depend for success from that centre. The situation is something like this: his Excellency Chao says, "the region is eminently suitable for agriculture, therefore parcel out the waste uplands, between 13,000 and 16,000 feet, among good and industrious husbandmen." But two factors are at work interfering with this fundamentally important requirement: his Excellency can neither command nature nor induce good husbandmen to leave the fertile plains of Chengtu for the bleak uplands of Asia. Hence failures which would be amusing were they not so pathetic. So much for the country conquered.

His Excellency is busily engaged, after having pacified Derge in establishing the supremacy of China in the Chamdo region, as well as territory between that and Assam. So far the regions north and west of Batang are being quietly, but surely forced to tender in reality allegiance long tendered in theory. Just how it is being done is a mystery; but this conquest of Eastern Thibet is being accomplished with little or no bloodshed. The fighting force under the Warden is miserably inadequate, perhaps 4,000 men being a liberal estimate. There is no doubt before very long a great part of Thibet will be recognising the authority of China. But two questions arise: Can China do anything with the conquered country? and is the alleged subjugation a policy on the part of the Thibetans to avert the vengeance of the one invulnerable Chinaman? "Wait," they say, "Chao will go some day, and then our turn will come." And there is probably something in such rumours, for has not China's conquest and reconquest in this land been the wearying tale of the ages? Conquer a turbulent country at great expense, hold it at great inconvenience, and at the same time get nothing from it, and what happens? The fact, however, that Thibet is such a magnificent buffer may induce China to spend her money willingly.

Up to the present Chao has never returned to Batang. He is now at Draya, one of the turbulent centres between here and Chamdo. At the same time many of his officers are operating between here and Assam (Sadiya), the object being to introduce China's authority in the valley of the Bramaputra. Just lately Dr. Shelton went to Kiang Ka, some days beyond the true Batang frontier, and Muir pushed on to Chamdo, although overtaken by Chao's agents with orders to suggest his speedy return. The consequence is that now every town off the main road is forbidden to us; indeed we are practically confined to Litang, Batang, and Yenching. Short journeys of even 20 li are denied to us unless we give all kinds of absurd guarantees, and Thibetan

landlords were even commissioned to report on our actions. Needless to say I have not been doing anything to complicate the situation, but his Excellency Chao is in a towering rage. Of course if they do not arrange something better for us I must ask to be removed out to China again. It is simply sentimental insanity for nine adult foreigners to be confined to Batang, a village of about 1,000 people. It is interesting to note that the officials now deny that this is Szechuan. The Viceroy, in any case, never puts out proclamations beyond Tachienlu. So far, however, there is no reason to believe that the much-talked-of new province, Ch'uan Hsi, has received Imperial sanction, but I do know that the status of Tachienlu, Litang, Batang, Chamdo, and other places has not been changed, as suggested by the Warden. The same is true of the suggested new nomad sub-prefectures of Sanpa, Taopa, and other places. So it seems that his Excellency Chao is very much on the same footing as the Imperial commissioners in Lhassa, and indeed the status of the country west of Tachienlu differs little now from Thibet proper.

Nobody here pays any attention to the flight of the Dalai Lama. He seems to be no longer a *sine quâ non* of Thibetan politics.

[35188] No. 167.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 30, 1910.

YOUR telegram No. 151 of 6th September and Viceroy of India's telegrams of 21st September [Dalai Lama].

In accordance with the Viceroy's suggestion, you should inform Chinese Government, if you are approached again, that, before giving an answer, His Majesty's Government would wish to know whether Dalai Lama desires to go to Peking, his last communication being that he does not wish to leave India.

As regards letter of Amban Lien to Viceroy, you should point out to Chinese Government that His Majesty's Government understood that Lo Chang-chi was to be merely an emissary to the lama himself to persuade him to return to Thibet and explain the reasons for which he cannot be received by the Viceroy.

[35572] No. 168.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, October* 2, 1910.

I ENQUIRED yesterday of the Grand Councillor Na-t'ung if he had any information with regard to Lo Taotai's visit to Simla. His Excellency replied that he had none, and added that as Lo had no instructions from the Central Government to negotiate with the Government of India, his visit must be one of courtesy. I said that of course official negotiations between him and the Government of India were out of the question, and I intend to confirm this by a note in the sense of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 128 of the 30th ultimo.

With regard to the results of Lo's visit to the Dalai Lama, his Excellency said that his Government were without information, and he was therefore not in a position to say whether the Dalai Lama was willing to leave India either for Peking or Thibet. I stated once more that His Majesty's Government declined to accept any responsibility or to bring any influence to bear on the Dalai Lama one way or the other.

[36217] No. 169.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 319.)
Sir, *Peking, September* 16, 1910.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 305 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit the copy of a memorandum which I have received from the Wai-wu Pu in reply to my representations in regard to the unfriendly attitude of the Chinese Amban at Lhassa.

The Amban states that the land was leased to the Shabdung Lama, and on the

death of the lessee reverted to the possession of the Tashi Lama. Lien Yü also denies the report that an order has been issued forbidding communication between British subjects and Thibetan officials.

I have, &c.
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure in No. 169.

Memorandum communicated to Mr. Max Müller by Wai-wu Pu.

THE Wai-wu Pu have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Max Müller's memorandum stating that an order had been issued in March last by the Ambans at Lhassa directing the cancellation of a grant of land to the late Shabdung Lama, a former Thibetan employé of the British trade agency at Gyantse, and forbidding the Thibetan Government and all lamas of Tashi-Lhunpo, from the Tashi Lama downwards, to hold any communication with foreigners, whether on State or private affairs. Mr. Max Müller complained that this action on the part of the Ambans would seem to constitute a breach of treaty provisions.

The Board at once telegraphed to his Excellency Lien Yü making enquiries on these points, and are now in receipt of his reply.

He states that this Shabdung was a lama of the Sheng Chin monastery in further Thibet. He committed a crime, was imprisoned, and escaped to Darjeeling. In 1904 the Tashi Lama leased to him a piece of land and a small farm at Ch'ung Sheng. In March 1909 this Shabdung fell sick and died, and the Tashi Lama then resumed possession of the farm and land. He further denies that any order was issued forbidding British subjects to hold any communication with Thibetan officials, and states that all intercourse is now conducted in accordance with the provisions of the treaties.

The Wai-wu Pu have the honour to communicate his reply for your Excellency's information.

MINISTERS OF THE WAI-WU PU.

September 15, 1910.

[36765] No. 170.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 10.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 8, 1910.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram which has been received from the Government of India regarding a letter from the Chinese Amban at Lhassa to the Maharaja of Bhutan.

This letter is a direct defiance of the warning formally conveyed to the Wai-wu Pu in Mr. Max Müller's note of the 11th April last that "His Majesty's Government cannot allow any administrative changes in Thibet to affect or prejudice the integrity of Nepal or of the two smaller States of Bhutan and Sikkim, and that they are prepared, if necessary, to protect the interests and rights of these three States." Viscount Morley agrees generally with the views expressed by the Government of India. It may not, indeed, prove possible to insist effectively that there shall be no direct communications between the Amban and the Bhutan Government, and such communications on purely local questions will doubtless spring up in course of time. But it seems most desirable in the first instance, in order that the Chinese may clearly understand the position, that the procedure should be followed which served for many years in the case of Russia and Afghanistan. He would therefore suggest that, if Sir E. Grey sees no objection, His Majesty's chargé d'affaires should be instructed formally to communicate to the Chinese Government the treaty with Bhutan of the 8th January last, and to inform them that in future any communication that they may wish to make to the Government of Bhutan should be addressed to His Majesty's Government, who will be responsible for forwarding it and for seeing that it is duly answered. Mr. Max Müller should also (Lord Morley would suggest) remind the Wai-wu Pu of the warning conveyed to them in his note

of the 11th April last, and protest in the strongest terms against the Amban's letter, to which, of course, no answer will be returned.

Lord Morley is not aware what action Mr. Max Müller has taken on Sir E. Grey's despatch No. 277 of the 6th August last, in which the attitude of Amban Len was animadverted upon in another connection; but he would suggest that the Amban's letter might be quoted as a further illustration of his unsuitability for his present position, especially in view of his disposition to act independently of the central Government, revealed by Grand Councillor Na'tung's admission (in Mr. Max Müller's telegram of the 2nd instant) that the commissioner recently sent from Lhassa to the Government of India "had no instructions from the central Government" to negotiate with them.

The Government of India have been requested to repeat their telegram to Peking.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 170.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 4, 1910.

MY telegram of the 16th July: Bhutan.

The political officer, Sikkim, has received from the Maharaja of Bhutan a letter addressed to him by the Amban at Lhassa, under date the 8th August, amounting to a claim of the suzerainty if not the sovereignty of China. The title of Maharaja is ignored in the letter, which issues in the form of an order addressed by Amban Len here to the Deb Raja of Bhutan, the Paro and Tongsa Penlops, and other headmen and subjects. After announcing that Chinese troops have been posted for the country's defence at Lhoka and Kongbu, the letter proceeds: "You should not listen to bad instructions of other people and collect troops and make the country unsettled. If you stay peacefully as before, nothing harmful will happen to you. But if you unnecessarily act unlawfully, far from you being able to save your own lives, you will bring trouble to the country. As there must be some among you the headmen who know the customs, I, the great Minister, tell you these now [?] with good intent; therefore explain this to all and report to this Yamên. This is important and should not be disobeyed at all."

In the opinion of the political agent this letter is a deliberate *ballon d'essai*, and the Amban wrote it on the receipt of the news that we had assumed control of Bhutan's external relations. On the ground that the Amban's letter should be answered promptly, the Maharaja, writing on the 6th September, asks for an early reply. He has accepted in cordial terms the conditions of correspondence which you laid down in your telegram dated the 8th July last. It is observed by the political agent that it is admitted in Prince Ching's letter of the 18th April last, to His Majesty's Minister at Peking, that Bhutan is not under the suzerainty of China, while the terms of our treaty with Bhutan, which was published in March last, must be known to the Chinese. The political agent recommends that an intimation be sent to the Chinese Government that the letter from the Amban is not understood, and that the Government of India is the proper channel of any communication with the Bhutanese Government.

The instructions I propose to send to the political agent are that he should advise the Maharaja to send no reply to the letter addressed to him, the terms of which are not proper, and that he should state that His Majesty's Government will make representations at Peking, and that the irregular action of the Amban need cause the Maharaja no alarm. Rumours of our intention to collect troops if necessary may account for the Amban's action. But it is important that a protest against such a letter should at once be made, and in view of the tentative aggression habitual with the Chinese, it would seem best to press for instructions that in future the Amban should employ the Government of India as the medium of communication with the Bhutanese Government.

[36765] No. 171.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1910.

SEE Government of India's telegram of the 4th October, repeated to you: Bhutan.

The views of the Viceroy of India are generally agreed to by His Majesty's Government.

The warning that administrative changes in Thibet could not be permitted to have any effect upon the integrity of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal, which was conveyed to the Amban in your communication of the 11th April, would appear by his letter to have been completely disregarded.

It is most desirable that the Chinese Government should thoroughly appreciate the position, although an effective prohibition of direct communication upon purely local matters may prove to be impossible.

The treaty with Bhutan of the 8th January last should accordingly be formally communicated to them, and they should be informed that His Majesty's Government will, in future, be responsible for forwarding any communication which they may desire to make to the Government of Bhutan, and will see that it is answered in due course.

Their attention should also be called to your warning of the 11th April, and a strong protest should be made against the Amban's letter, which, of course, will receive no answer.

You might also adduce the Amban's letter as a further proof of his unsuitability for the position which he now holds, and remark upon his tendency to take action independently of his Government.

You should also express a hope that there is no foundation for the report from Lhassa, referred to in a telegram from India of the 8th October, and confirmed by the Nepolese representative at Lhassa, of the proposed dispatch of Chinese envoy to the Maharajah of Bhutan and the Prime Minister of Nepal, for the purpose of presenting each with a new title, and with a letter from the Emperor.

[37217] No. 172.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 13.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 13, 1910.

IN continuation of my letter of the 8th instant regarding Chinese relations with Bhutan, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India on the same subject, together with papers received by this mail.

As regards the proposed Chinese mission to Nepal, Viscount Morley is of opinion that it may be left to take its course. But he would propose to instruct the Government of India to advise the Prime Minister to consult His Majesty's Government before accepting the title or replying to the letter; and in the event of either the title or letter being found to imply Chinese suzerainty, he thinks that the Prime Minister should be advised to repudiate them.

As regards Bhutan, he would suggest that, if Sir E. Grey concurs in the proposals contained in my letter above quoted, Mr. Max Müller might be instructed, when communicating the recent treaty to the Wai-wu Pu, to mention the rumour, and to say that His Majesty's Government would expect the Chinese Government to consult them before conferring any title upon a ruler who is under their protection in respect of his relations with foreign Powers, and that in any case they would be unable to advise the Maharajah to accept it, nor could a Chinese envoy in any circumstances be permitted to enter Bhutan.

Lord Morley does not overlook the fact that from this differentiation between Nepal and Bhutan, the Chinese Government may possibly argue that their claim to suzerainty over Nepal is admitted by us. But apart from the fact that the differentiation is based upon an essential difference in the political status of the two countries *vis-à-vis* of His Majesty's Government, he thinks that it will be time enough to

challenge the Chinese claim in the case of the stronger State when some more definite attempt is made to assert it than the present may prove to be. Nevertheless it might be well that Mr. Max Müller should have general instructions—in case the Wai-wu Pu at any time use language suggestive of a claim to suzerainty—at once to enter a caveat.

The Government of India have been instructed to repeat their telegram to Peking.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 172.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 8, 1910.

BHUTAN: See my telegram of the 4th instant.

Bell was recently informed by the Dalai Lama that, according to a Lhassa report, Chinese envoys, giving a letter and new title from the Emperor will shortly be dispatched both to the Maharajah of Bhutan and the Prime Minister of Nepal. The Nepalese representative at Lhassa corroborates the report about Prime Minister.

[37777] No. 173.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 15th October, 1910, relative to Thibet and the Indian troops mobilised for service in case of need, for the protection of the trade agencies.

India Office, October 17, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 173.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 15, 1910.

THIBET. Please refer to my telegram dated the 3rd ultimo.

I propose to sanction demobilisation of troops still under warning, which is pressed for by military authorities.

[38206] No. 174.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 20.)

(No. 346.)

Sir, *Peking, October* 4, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram No. 128 of the 30th ultimo in regard to the future movements of the Dalai Lama.

As reported in my telegram No. 165 of the 2nd instant, I adverted to this subject in conversation with the Grand Secretary Na-t'ung on the previous day. I enquired whether his Excellency had received any report on Lo Ch'ang-ch'i's mission to the Dalai Lama, and whether he could give me any information with regard to his Holiness's intentions and wishes for the future. I explained that I only asked for this information for the convenience of the Government of India, and I repeated that His Majesty's Government would not influence the Dalai Lama, and that they could take no responsibility in whatever course he might decide upon.

The grand councillor could not tell me whether the Dalai Lama was in favour of leaving India for Thibet or Peking. He had received no report from Lo in regard to his mission. I then mentioned that the Viceroy of India had received a letter from the Amban Lien Yü saying that he had memorialised the Throne for the appointment of Lo Ch'ang-ch'i as special commissioner to discuss certain matters

with the Viceroy. I pointed out that facilities had been granted to Lo on the understanding that he was proceeding to Darjeeling to have a personal interview with the Dalai Lama, but that our information showed that his present intention was to continue his journey to Simla. I was not aware that he had received any instructions or authority from the central Government to negotiate with the Government of India, and that the latter obviously could not receive him in that capacity. Na-t'ung replied that the proposed visit must be one of courtesy, as Lo had no instructions from the Chinese Government to negotiate with the Government of India.

I have confirmed my observations and explained that the Viceroy is unable to receive Lo Ch'ang-ch'i in a note to Prince Ch'ing, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy.

I have, &c.
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure in No. 174.

Mr. Max Müller to Prince Ch'ing.

Your Highness, *Peking, October* 3, 1910.

WITH reference to my note of the 24th August, on the subject of Taotai Lo Ch'ang-ch'i's visit to Darjeeling, I have the honour to inform your Highness that I have received a telegram from the Viceroy of India respecting a letter written to him by his Excellency Lien Yü, the resident at Lhassa.

In this letter the resident stated that he had memorialised the Throne to appoint Taotai Lo as special commissioner to India to discuss certain matters with the Viceroy. His Excellency Lien Yü added that the Board of Foreign Affairs had communicated the matter to me, and that an affirmative reply had been received from the British Government promising to receive Taotai Lo.

I have the honour to point out to your Highness that His Majesty's Government understood from your Highness's note of the 11th August that Taotai Lo was being sent to Darjeeling merely as an emissary to the Dalai Lama himself to persuade him to return to Thibet. It is evident from the resident's letter to the Viceroy that Taotai Lo considers himself to be a special commissioner to negotiate with the Viceroy with reference to Thibetan affairs, and it would therefore be as well if the Chinese Government would inform his Excellency Lien Yü that the Viceroy is unable to receive him, and that the question of the appointment of a special commissioner, if it were necessary to appoint one, is a matter to be settled by our two Governments.

I had the honour to refer to this question at an interview with his Excellency the Grand Secretary Na T'ung on the 1st instant, and he assured me that Taotai Lo had not been authorised by the central Government to negotiate with the Viceroy, and I have the honour, therefore, to request that instructions to that effect should be telegraphed to his Excellency Lien Yü.

I avail, &c.
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

[38441] No. 175.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 22.)

(No. 172.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, October* 22, 1910.

THIBET.

In reply to your telegram No. 136 of the 21st instant, I beg to report that on the 14th instant I handed a note and made verbal representations to the Wai-wu Pu in the sense of your instructions. I have not yet received any reply, but will telegraph as soon as one reaches me.

[38764] No. 176.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd October, 1910, relative to the north-east frontier.

India Office, October 24, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 176.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 23, 1910.

REFERENCE is invited to letter, dated the 26th May, from Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, enclosed in letter of 14th July from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department. Anxiety is being caused locally in consequence of Chinese proceedings at Rima, and in vicinity of tribal tracts on north-east frontier by question of our future relations with those tribes. Military authorities are of opinion, with reference to Chinese advance, that position at present is unsound strategically, and they consider that the approximate extent of our influence should be as follows :—

Starting from the east of that portion of Thibetan territory of Tawang district, which runs down like a wedge to the frontier of British territory north of Odalguri, it should run north-east to longitude 94, latitude 29, and thence eastwards to longitude 96, along latitude 29. From longitude 96 it should run south-east to a point, as far east and as near Rima as possible, on the Zayul Chu, after which it should cross the valley of that river to the watershed between the Irrawaddy and Zayul, which it should follow until that watershed joins the divide between the Salween and Irrawaddy.

It is believed that the tribes in this area, some of whom are already under our influence, are for the most part independent.

The best policy to pursue would, we are inclined to think, be to extend the "outer line" as far as may be necessary, by arranging that there shall be no relations or intercourse between tribes within or beyond line with any foreign Power other than ourselves, by which means we should secure a buffer. But more complete information than is available is required on the following points :—

1. Nature and extent of each tribe's territory.
2. The extent, if any, to which China or Thibet recognises [?] the tribes.
3. Whether it is possible, and if so at what probable cost, to execute agreements on the lines indicated.

Information as to how far we can collect required data or get into relation with the tribes concerned is being awaited from Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam before we address you on the whole question.

In the meantime, on the authority of certain Mishmis who have come into Sadiya, Lieutenant-Governor has reported that all trade between Miju Mishmis and Thibet has been prohibited by the Chinese. It is essential, in his Honour's opinion, that we should be in a position to inform the tribe, who, he states, will probably come into British territory before the close of the present month, to what extent we are prepared to give them recognition. These Mishmis are accustomed to regard us as the dominant Power on that frontier, and the political officer, Sadiya, considers that tribe will be estranged, and that Chinese may succeed in imposing their authority upon them unless definite orders can be given to them. Hitherto the Mishmis have been under our influence, and a claim to be a British subject has been made by one of their chiefs.

General question of securing a buffer between Thibet and ourselves is still being considered by Lieutenant-Governor. But he holds that surrender to China of Mishmis, over whom our influence has been exercised, would in any case be unwise, and he

urges the advisability of not permitting a possibly hostile Power to thrust itself in upon us nearer than can be legitimately prevented, in view of our having the settled district of Lakhimpur to protect as well as the important station of Dibrugarh.

Views of local Government have our concurrence, and we solicit your authority, pending decision of general question of future policy, as to which we will submit as soon as possible our definite proposals, to inform the Mishmis that they are under our protection, and that in refusing to have any intercourse or relations with any other foreign Power than ourselves they will have our support.

Very early telegraphic orders are solicited.

[38441] No. 177.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 24, 1910.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant respecting the report that Chinese envoys will shortly be dispatched to the Prime Minister of Nepal, and the Maharaja of Bhutan, to give them each a letter and a new title from the Emperor of China.

I am to state that, with regard to Nepal, Sir E. Grey concurs in the action proposed by Viscount Morley in paragraph 2 of your letter under reply, viz., that the Chinese mission to that country should be left to take its course, but that the Government of India should advise the Prime Minister of Nepal to consult His Majesty's Government before accepting the title or replying to the letter, and that if either the title or letter is found to imply Chinese suzerainty he should be advised to repudiate them.

With regard to Bhutan, as you are aware, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Mr. Max Müller on the 11th instant instructions to express the hope to the Chinese Government that the report both as to Nepal and Bhutan was without foundation. A copy of this telegram was forwarded to the India Office on the 13th instant, and therefore crossed your letter under reply.

The accompanying telegram has just been received from Mr. Max Müller,* reporting that he made representations on the 14th instant, both verbal and written, in the sense desired, and Sir E. Grey would suggest that, before sending any further instructions to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires in the sense indicated in the third and fourth paragraphs of your letter, His Majesty's Government should wait to see whether the action taken is productive of any satisfactory result.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[38851] No. 178.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 20th October, relative to the demobilisation of the force for Thibet.

India Office, October 24, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 178.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October* 20, 1911.

THIBET. See your telegram dated the 15th October.

You may demobilise troops.

* No. 175.

[39227] No. 179.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 25th October, relative to Bhutan.

India Office, October 27, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 179.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October* 25, 1910.

BHUTAN. See your telegram dated the 4th October.

You have received repetitions of telegrams to and from Mr. Max Müller. Chinese Government and His Majesty's Government are the proper channels of communication, but in case of communications of a trivial or unobjectionable character the procedure approved in my telegram dated the 8th July should be tolerated.

With reference to your telegram dated the 8th October, we may allow Chinese Mission to proceed to Nepal. But advice should be tendered to the Prime Minister that, before replying to letter or accepting title, he should consult His Majesty's Government, and he should be advised to repudiate letter and title if suzerainty of China is implied in either. In no circumstances can entry of Chinese envoy into Bhutan be permitted.

[39442] No. 180.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 178.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Peking, October* 29, 1910.

MY telegram No. 172 of 22nd October.

Note received from Chinese Government in reply to my note of 14th October states that Bhutan is a vassal State of China, and from time of Yunigcheng (1723–36) has paid tribute and frequently received sealed orders from late Emperors. Moreover, in seventeenth year of Kuang Hsü (1891) letters patent under Imperial seal were bestowed on her. Hitherto Amban in Thibet, in addressing communications to Bhutanese Government, has always employed form of manifesto, while latter have replied in form of petition; these styles of correspondence have been in use for years past, and are not a modern innovation.

In present instance Amban, in addressing his communication, has acted in accordance with established precedent, and has not unduly interfered. As for treaty concluded between Great Britain and Bhutan, Board of Foreign Affairs has received no information of it, nor is it possible on account of this treaty to make alterations in Chinese long-established treatment of Bhutan.

Note continues that my note under reply states that no prejudice to integrity either of Nepal or of Bhutan and Sikkim can be allowed. Chinese Government observe that Nepal has forwarded tribute to Peking for years past, and from long ago submitted to vassalage of China. Bhutan likewise is a vassal State of China, and cannot be regarded on the same footing as Sikkim, which in accordance with treaty is under protection of Great Britain.

China, in regard to Bhutan affairs, will continue to act in accordance with established precedent, and will not make any alteration in respect of status of that country.

Note which I have telegraphed *in extenso* concludes by saying that this specific and clear statement is for communication to His Majesty's Government.

Copy of my note of 14th October in which I enclose text of Bhutan treaty was sent to you viâ Siberia on 19th October.

(Sent to India.)

[39819] No. 181.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 31st October, 1910, relative to the demobilisation of troops for Thibet.

India Office, November 1, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 181.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 31, 1910.

WE have demobilised the troops under warning for Thibet. See your telegram dated the 20th October.

[40046] No. 182.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 3.)

(No. 366.)

Sir, *Peking, October* 14, 1910.

IN obedience to the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 132 of the 11th instant, I have addressed the note, of which I have the honour to enclose copy, to Prince Ch'ing, protesting in strong terms against the letter sent by the Amban Lien Yü to the Maharajah of Bhutan on the 8th August. I have also expressed the hope that there is no truth in the report that Chinese envoys are shortly to be dispatched to the Prime Minister of Nepal and the Maharajah of Bhutan to present them with letters and new titles from the Emperor of China.

In handing this note to his Excellency Hu Wei-te at the Wai-wu Pu to-day, I said I could hardly believe that this deliberate attempt to interfere with the State of Bhutan in the face of the warning which I had been instructed to convey to the Chinese Government last April had been authorised by the Central Government in Peking. I preferred to think that it was another instance of unauthorised and independent action on the part of the Amban Lien, whose continued presence at Lhassa was, in my opinion, a perpetual cause of friction, and whose removal I had already recommended on a previous occasion.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure in No. 182.

Mr. Max Müller to Prince Ch'ing.

Your Highness, *Peking, October* 14, 1910.

I HAVE several times recently, both in writing and at interviews with your Highness's Board, had occasion to complain of the unfriendly attitude of the Amban Lien Yü at Lhassa as regards his relations with the Indian Government as being so much at variance with the friendly and pacific assurances of the Chinese Government. I have now received telegraphic information from India respecting his Excellency Lien Yü's attempted interference with the State of Bhutan, the facts of which I am instructed by my Government to bring to your Highness's notice.

It appears that the Maharajah of Bhutan has received from the Amban at Lhassa a letter, dated the 8th August, in which a claim is made practically to Chinese suzerainty, if not sovereignty, over Bhutan. The letter ignores the Maharajah's title, and is in the form of an order addressed to the Deb Rajah of Bhutan, the Paro and Tongsa Penlops, and other headmen and subjects by Lien Amban. It announces that Chinese troops have been posted at Lhoka and Kongku for the defence of the country, and enjoins

upon the Bhutanese not to listen to the bad advice of other people and collect troops. The Amban also threatens that if they act unlawfully, so far from being able to save their own lives they will bring trouble to the country. It terminates with an injunction to obey and report to the Amban's Yamen.

The Indian Government having communicated the above to the home Government, I have the honour to inform your Highness that I have been instructed by the latter to communicate formally to the Chinese Government a copy of the British treaty with Bhutan, signed the 8th January, 1910, the conditions of which are doubtless already known to your Highness. At the same time, I am instructed to protest in the strongest terms against the writing of this letter by the Amban, and to state that of course no answer will be sent to it. His Majesty's Government further desire to point out that any communication that the Chinese Government may in future wish to make to the Government of Bhutan should be addressed to His Majesty's Government, who will be responsible for forwarding it and for seeing that it is duly answered. I am also to remind your Highness of the warning conveyed in my note of the 11th April, namely, that His Majesty's Government cannot allow any administrative changes in Thibet to affect or prejudice the integrity either of Nepal or of the two smaller States of Bhutan and Sikkim, and that they are prepared, if necessary, to protect the interests and rights of those three States.

His Majesty's Government are of opinion that an additional illustration has now been afforded of the unsuitability of the Amban Lien Yü for his present post. He is evidently a man who is disposed to act independently of his Government, as has already been seen in the matter of the mission of Taotai Lo to India, and his continued retention at Lhassa cannot but have a prejudicial effect on the friendly relations between our two countries.

A report from Lhassa has reached His Majesty's Government to the effect that it is intended shortly to dispatch Chinese envoys to the Prime Minister of Nepal and the Maharajah of Bhutan, to present to each of them a letter and a new title from the Emperor of China. Moreover, the Nepalese representative at Lhassa has corroborated the report as regards the Prime Minister of Nepal.

Under these circumstances, I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to express the hope that there is no foundation for this report.

Awaiting the favour of an early reply, I avail, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

[39973] No. 183.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 2nd November, relative to the relations between China and Bhutan.

India Office, November 2, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 183.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November 2, 1910.*

CLAIMS of China in regard to Bhutan and Nepal.

Reference is invited to telegram of the 29th ultimo from Mr. Max Müller to Sir E. Grey. As much will depend on the attitude of the Prime Minister of Nepal, it would be desirable, in my opinion, that his views should be obtained at this stage. Please say whether this has your concurrence.

[40668] No. 184.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 25th October, relative to affairs on the north-east frontier.

India Office, November 7, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 184.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October 25, 1910.*

NORTH-EASTERN frontier. Please see your telegram dated the 23rd October. Large questions of policy, which ultimately it must fall to your successor to examine for the information of His Majesty's Government, are involved by your proposals. As regards question of Mishmis, I should prefer that that also should stand over for the consideration of Lord Hardinge, and I request that a temporising answer be given if they come in the meantime. As regards the two pieces of information which it is proposed in the last sentence of your telegram to give to the Mishmis, I am at this stage wholly unable to concur.

[40986] No. 185.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 9th November, 1910, relative to the Dalai Lama.

India Office, November 10, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 185.

Government of India to the Earl of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November 9, 1910.*

TRADE agent, Yatung, telegraphed on the 7th instant as follows :—

(1.)

"I was called on by Mongolian Hututu Lama, with button of the first rank, and the Mongol Talama Lopsang Darjetha, with second rank, from Peking. A few Mongolian monks from Lhassa accompanied them. I was informed by them that the Mongolian people of eighteen provinces in Mongolia have commissioned them to endeavour to induce the Dalai Lama to go back to Thibet. A Mongolian letter, sent by a Mongolian called Padwang, was shown to me, in which the Dalai Lama was urged to go back at once to Thibet, and was informed that, if he returned to Thibet and acted according to their advice, the people of Mongolia would guarantee his safety and would arbitrate between the Thibetans and Chinese. I was also shown a closed cover addressed by the Lhassa Amban to the Dalai Lama, asking the latter to return at once to Thibet."

(2.)

"Five thousand Chinese troops are stated by the Mongol delegates to be in Thibet at present time. Report of deportation to Chengtu of Thibetan Minister Lieushar is also confirmed by the delegates."

[41197] No. 186.

India Office to Foreign Office—(*Received November* 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th November, relative to Nepal.

India Office, November 11, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 186.

The Earl of Crewe to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, November* 7, 1910.

I APPROVE your proposals regarding Nepal. See your telegram dated the 2nd November.

[41920] No. 187.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 17.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 16th November, relative to Nepal.

India Office, November 17, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 187.

Government of India to the Earl of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 16, 1910.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 25th October.

Prime Minister of Nepal on being informed by resident of news that despatch of a Chinese Mission to Nepal was impending, and on being asked if any information had reached him, replied that report must, he thought, contain some truth; he added that acceptance of any obligation from China would be against his wishes, and asked to be advised in the matter.

Views and advice of His Majesty's Government, as indicated in your telegram cited above, were then explained to His Highness by the resident.

Entire concurrence was expressed by Prime Minister, who stated that it was his intention that Nepalese representative at Lhassa should be directed at once to advert to the subject of the rumours in a communication to the amban, and to make it evident to him that the idea of sending the mission might be dropped, as a fresh title of honour would not be appreciated. Prime Minister is quite satisfied, resident states, that continuance of past policy of Nepal of playing off Chinese and British suzerainty against one another no longer offers any advantage, and His Highness will readily follow any advice that may be given by us so far as may be consistent with the prestige of his own Government.

We should be obliged if you could ascertain from Peking whether the title of "Wang," by which rulers of Nepal are addressed by Chinese, or the title of Thong Lin Pin Mako Kang Wang Sian bestowed on Prime Minister, contains anything implying that suzerainty is accepted by Nepal. Question was raised by the Prime Minister.

[42038] No. 188.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 17th November, regarding Lo Chang Chi's mission to the Dalai Lama.

India Office, November 18, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 188.

Government of India to the Earl of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 17, 1910.

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 23rd September, 1910.

On the 15th instant Lo Chang Chi left Darjiling for Thibet without visiting Simla. His mission was unsuccessful.

[41742] No. 189.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Max Müller.

(No. 405.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 19, 1910.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 366 of the 14th ultimo, respecting Chinese interference in Nepaul and Bhutan, and I approve the terms of the note which you addressed to the Chinese Government protesting against their action in this connection.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42783] No. 190.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 24.)

(No. 399.)

Sir, *Peking, November* 3, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the note which I have received from the Wai-wu Pu in reply to my note of the 14th October regarding the alleged acts of Chinese interference in the internal affairs of Bhutan and Nepaul.

I telegraphed this note to you practically *in extenso* in my telegram No. 178 of the 29th ultimo.

It will be seen that this note goes far further than Prince Ch'ing's note of the 18th April, and directly claims both Bhutan and Nepaul as vassal States of China. It asserts that the Wai-wu Pu had no information as to the treaty concluded between Great Britain and the former State, and implies that in any case such a treaty could not affect China's long-established position in Bhutan. The note contains no reply to my enquiry as to the rumoured intention to dispatch Chinese envoys to the Prime Minister of Nepaul and the Maharajah of Bhutan, and is altogether couched in so unconciliatory and aggressive a tone that I have thought it better to confine myself to merely forwarding to you and the Government of India this "specific and clear statement" and waiting for your further instructions, which I shall doubtless receive in due time, in regard to the reply to be returned to this defiant communication.

I have, &c.
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

Enclosure in No. 190.

Wai-wu Pu to Mr. Max Müller.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Peking, October* 28, 1910.

WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note (of the 14th October, quoted in précis—Action of Amban Lien Yü).

We have the honour to observe that Bhutan is a vassal State of China, and from the time of Yung Cheng (A.D. 1723–1736) has paid tribute and frequently received sealed orders from late Emperors. Moreover, in the 17th year of Kuang Hsü (1891) letters patent under the Imperial Seal were bestowed on her.

Hitherto the Amban in Thibet, in addressing communications to the heads of the Bhutanese Government, has always employed the form of a manifesto, while the latter have replied in the form of a petition; these styles of correspondence have been in use for years past, and are not a modern innovation.

In the present instance the Amban Lien, in addressing his communication, has acted in accordance with established precedent, and has not unduly interfered.

As for the treaty concluded between Great Britain and Bhutan, the Board of Foreign Affairs has received no information of it, nor is it possible on accouut of this treaty to make alterations in China's long-established treatment of Bhutan.

Your note under reply states that no prejudice to the integrity either of Nepaul or of Bhutan and Sikkim can be allowed.

We have the honour to observe that Nepaul has forwarded tribute to Peking for years past, and has long submitted to vassalage to China. Bhutan likewise is a vassal State of China, and cannot be regarded as on the same footing with Sikkim, which, in accordance with treaty, is under the protection of Great Britain.

China, in regard to Bhutan affairs, will continue to act in accordance with established precedent, and will not make any alterations in respect of the status of that country. This specific and clear statement we have the honour to address in reply to you for your information and for communication to the British Government.

We avail, &c.

[42803] No. 191.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 189.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, November* 24, 1910.

CHINA and Nepaul.

Your telegram No. 152 of the 21st November.

According to the "record of wars" the Emperor of China conferred the title of "Kuo Wang" on the ruler of Nepaul after the war over a hundred years ago.

Wang is the title used for a Chinese prince, but it may also apply to the prince of an independent State. In the case of Nepaul it probably denotes a feudatory prince. I am told the Chinese would regard the acceptance of a letter marked "Kuo Wang" as a recognition of suzerainty in the same way as they regard the tribute missions sent periodically from Nepaul to Peking.

I cannot identify the title bestowed on the Prime Minister. Could the full titles given by China to him and to the Maharajah be sent to me in Chinese characters?

[44559] No. 192.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 6th December, relative to the Dalai Lama.

India Office, December 8, 1910.

Enclosure in No. 192.

Government of India to the Earl of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 6, 1910.

INTENTION to visit me shortly in Calcutta, and then proceed to England to lay his petition before His Majesty, was recently announced by the Dalai Lama to Mr. Bell. Instructions have been given to the latter to inform the Lama that I could not conveniently receive him this cold weather in Calcutta, and that it was necessary to warn him that, while it was not desired that his freedom of movement should be restricted in any way, his proceeding to England for the purpose indicated would serve no useful purpose, and that no assistance in this respect could be afforded him.

[45229] No. 193.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 14.)

Sir, *India Office, December* 14, 1910.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd instant, forwarding copy of a despatch from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Peking on the subject of Chinese claims to suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram upon the same subject.

2. Although too much importance need not be attached to the Chinese claims so long as no attempt is made to enforce them, the terms of the Wai-wu Pu's note are such as to call, in the Earl of Crewe's opinion, for an equally "specific and clear statement" in reply.

As regards Nepal, it will be seen that the Prime Minister and Durbar vehemently repudiate the claim now advanced, and the history of Chinese relations with Nepal, which has recently been examined in this office with some care, shows that it possesses no better foundation than similar claims to suzerainty over other neighbouring States which have been advanced by the Chinese but have succumbed to the logic of facts and the lapse of time. Copy of a note on this subject is enclosed for convenience of reference.

3. The Government of India's telegram appears to furnish sufficient material for dealing with the case of Bhutan, and, as they pertinently observe, Prince Ch'ing himself, in his note of the 18th April, put Nepal in one category as "properly (or originally) feudatory" to China, and Bhutan and Sikkim in another as "states in friendly relations with China."

Lord Crewe would therefore suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that Mr. Max Müller should be instructed to inform the Wai-wu Pu that His Majesty's Government have no desire to interrupt the present friendly and complimentary relations existing between Nepal and China, but that they must themselves act and advise the Nepalese Government to act upon the assumption that Nepal is not a vassal, but wholly independent of China and in intimate relations with the British Government, in accordance with the treaties and the mutual understanding agreed upon between them.

4. With regard to Bhutan, Mr. Max Müller might say that His Majesty's Government must insist on the observance of the procedure laid down by them, and that communications addressed otherwise than through them will not be acknowledged. The treaty recently concluded by Bhutan of her own free-will has now been communicated to the Chinese Government, who have therefore no excuse for ignoring the relations formally established between that country and His Majesty's Government. That treaty puts Bhutan, as far as the conduct of its foreign relations are concerned, on the same footing with Sikkim, whose status is now recognised by the Wai-wu Pu.

Mr. Max Müller might add that these views of His Majesty's Government are not new, and do not portend any change in our attitude either to the States concerned or to China. But the assertion of them in unmistakable terms has been rendered necessary by the recent development of Chinese policy in Thibet, involving the temporary overturn of stable government in that country, and the dispatch of Chinese troops in the direction of the frontiers of India and her allies. His Majesty's Government have recognised China's interests in Thibet, and have been unwilling to

embarrass her in her action there so long as she adheres to her own pledges and does not prevent the Thibetan Government from fulfilling its treaty obligations. But no attempt of the Chinese Government to exercise influence over States so remote from the sphere of direct Chinese interests and in such close relations with the Government of India as Nepal and Bhutan can possibly be tolerated.

5. The Government of India have been instructed to repeat their telegram to Peking.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 193.

Government of India to the Earl of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 6, 1910.

STATUS of Bhutan and Nepal. Please refer to your telegrams of the 1st and 7th ultimo.

Resident in Nepal has received letter to following effect from Prime Minister, whom he consulted :—

"I hasten to contradict statement of Wai-wu Pu in regard to relations between Nepal and China, which I have received with grave astonishment and concern, and I repudiate with all the stress and emphasis at my command the Chinese claim of suzerainty. The claim is a damaging reflection on our national honour and independence, besides being an unwarranted fiction. We have always regarded the nature of our relations with China, although of long standing, as innocent, simple, and friendly. Chinese Government have always borne the whole expenses of the missions that proceed to China from Nepal, which are of the nature of embassies from one court to another, and have invariably been treated with honours and consideration due to foreign guests. These missions are merely the channel by which our friendly connection with distant China is kept up, by means of which our high regard and respect for the Emperor are expressed, and the good-will of the Chinese Government, especially on account of our heavy stake in Thibet, is cultivated. The missions bring return presents from the Chinese court, and the presents which they carry for the Emperor can never be regarded as tributes. I consulted the Durbar as the matter is of the gravest importance. They were startled to hear of this surprise which has been sprung upon Nepal so unexpectedly, and agreed with me that a claim so derogatory to their status as a free people must be promptly disavowed."

Question of change in attitude of Government of India towards Nepal in recent years, in regard to her prestige and status as an independent State, has also been raised by Prime Minister in his letter. As regards this point, we propose to address you later after the subject has been carefully considered. Copy of papers forwarded by last mail.

We trust that claims of China will be firmly resisted; as stated in our despatch of 11th June, 1903, we do not regard her claims as having any validity. As regards the statement in the despatch quoted above that in the treaty of 1856 allegiance to China was acknowledged by Nepal (as to which reference is invited to letter from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary, Political Department, India Office), the correctness of the passage in the treaty which refers to allegiance has been questioned by the Prime Minister.

2. With regard to Chinese assertion as to Bhutan, Mr. Bell writes to the following effect, after consulting the Bhutan agent :—

"No tribute is paid to Thibet or China by Bhutan. Small presents are given to the Dalai Lama, as being head of their religion, by the commercial missions which visit Thibet from Bhutan. Assertion that letters patent or sealed orders are received by them is also denied by Bhutan. A seal and hat with false coral button, neither of which has ever been used, were received by former Deb Raja about 1891. With regard to the statement that, in addressing Bhutan, the manifesto style has been employed by the Amban, while the form of a petition has been used by Bhutan in reply, it is denied by Bhutan agent that, except possibly in recent years, this has ever been done. In 1909, when Ma Chi-fu was sent by the Amban to Bhutan, a letter was written in the manifesto style by the Amban, and Ma Chi-fu was not permitted to interview the Maharaja, and was only allowed to come a few miles into the country.

To address a high official like the Amban as if a superior is required by politeness according to Bhutanese custom. Chinese seal is not used by Bhutan, and claim to suzerainty on the part of Thibet or China is definitely rejected by her."

A specific instance is also quoted by Mr. Bell, in which the claim has in the past been rejected by Bhutan. We forwarded by last mail a copy of Mr. Bell's letter.

Government of India, in their dealings with Bhutan, have never recognised suzerainty of China (see our letter dated the 1st October, 1908) from the time that British intercourse with Bhutan began in 1773. (See Aitchison, vol. ii, p. 286.) It may also be pointed out that, in his note dated the 18th April, 1910, Prince Ch'ing put Bhutan on the same footing as Sikkim, which is admitted to be under protection of Great Britain, by stating that both these States were in friendly relations with China.

Enclosure 2 in No. 193.

Historical Note on Relations between Nepal and China.

(Confidential.)

IT is perhaps unnecessary to trace back the history of Nepalese foreign relations to a prehistoric period. It is sufficient to say that early in the sixth century Nepal became a feudatory of Thibet—which was then a powerful and independent kingdom (Lévi, "Le Népal," ii, 52)—and so continued until the ninth century, when, with the collapse of Thibet, it drifted gradually into the Indian sphere of influence. The Chinese do not appear on the scene until the end of the fourteenth century. In 1381 the King of Nepal received a seal from the Emperor, and from that year to 1427 presents were regularly interchanged between Nepal and Peking (*id. ib.* i, 67, ii, 228). In the latter year the Emperor Huien-ti's mission to Nepal met with no response, and relations seem to have been interrupted until the beginning of the eighteenth century. In the meantime Nepal had divided into three kingdoms, of which China, by its conquest of Thibet in the reign of the Emperor Kang-hsi (1662–1722), became the powerful neighbour (*id.* i, 71). The three Nepalese kings thought it prudent in 1731 to send to the Emperor Yong Tcheng a gold-leaf petition and "tribute" consisting of local products. It does not appear whether this tribute was rendered a second time.

In 1742, Prithi Narayan succeeded to the throne of Gurkha, and by 1769 the Gurkhas had conquered and consolidated their control over the whole of Nepal. In 1788 they invaded Thibet, and the Thibetan and Chinese troops being unable to resist them, a secret arrangement was concluded with the approval of the Chinese general. The Gurkhas were to withdraw and the Thibetans to pay an annual tribute. "The Chinese general then reported to the Emperor of China that the Gurkha chief only wished to send a tribute mission to China, and that he had settled the little frontier incident without the loss of a single soldier or the spending of a single tael. The Gurkha mission was thereupon allowed to proceed to Peking, and the Emperor, in blissful ignorance of the attack on the Thibetan frontier, sent the Gurkha Raja, on dismissing it, a patent of King." (Rockhill, "Dalai Lamas," p. 51, from Chinese records). This characteristic piece of make-believe was, however, spoiled by the refusal of the Lhassa Government to pay the tribute; whereupon in 1791 the Gurkhas again invaded Thibet. Both sides then appear to have turned to the East India Company for help, and in 1792 Lord Cornwallis received a memorial from the Gurkha Government and a letter from the Dalai Lama (translations printed in Kirkpatrick's "Embassy to Nepal," pp. 345–349). He replied to both that the company wished "to maintain the most cordial and friendly terms with all the powers in India," and could not interfere in a hostile manner; but he proposed after the rains to send a gentleman who was in his confidence to mediate. To the Raja of Nepal he explained that while the policy of non-interference was in general the policy of the English Government, "the connection that has been formed with the Emperor of China renders a due observance of it still more necessary. The English company have for many years carried on extensive commercial concerns with the subjects of the Emperor of China by sea, and have actually a factory established in his dominions. To assist Nepal with a military force against the Raja of Lhassa, who is dependent on the Emperor of China, would be inconsistent with the connection that has so long prevailed between the company and the Emperor." (Lord Cornwallis to Raja of Nepal, the 15th September, 1792, Kirkpatrick, p. 349). The comment of the Chinese general on this incident is very instructive. Having first represented Lord Cornwallis as saying

to the Nepalese envoy :—"Hereafter you must be diligent in discharging your duties to the Throne [*i.e.*, of China], frequently sending tribute" (of which there is not one word in the letter), he proceeds : "when last year I summoned all the chiefs of the tribes to send troops to stop the trouble, I had only in view the desirability of diminishing the strength of the Gurkhas, without counting particularly on the aid of the foreign barbarian soldiers. Here we have this headman of the Peling [*i.e.*, Lord Cornwallis] receiving the summons from your Majesty's Minister with every sign of the profoundest respect This tribe [*i.e.*, the British], which trades at Canton, and always experienced the gracious kindness of the Imperial Court, spontaneously tell the Gurkhas that Thibet has been for ages a dependency of China, and that they must not seek a quarrel with it. How profoundly just and right are these words!" (Quoted by Rockhill, *op. cit.* p. 62).

In accordance with his promise, Lord Cornwallis sent Captain Kirkpatrick in February 1793. But in the meantime the Chinese troops had defeated the Gurkhas within a march of Katmandu, and the latter had been fain to make peace in September 1792. The exact terms of the treaty are not forthcoming. Markham ("Narratives," p. 77), says :—"The Gurkhas agreed to restore all their plunder; to pay an annual tribute to the Emperor of China; and to send an embassy to Peking once in every five years." Rockhill (*op. cit.* p. 52), drawing from Chinese sources, does not mention the annual tribute. Kirkpatrick (p. 275), speaks of the Nepal Raja as "having relinquished all his conquests in that quarter, and formally recognised the paramount authority of the Emperor of China over the Nepal dominions." The contemporary Chinese history of the campaign, "Cheng vou tsi" (translated by Imbault-Huart, "Journal asiatique," vol. xii, 1878, p. 348), says that the Nepalese prayed "qu'il leur fût permis de vivre éternellement sous les lois de la Chine."

Parker ("Nepaul and China," in "Asiatic Quarterly," 1899, vol. vii, p. 72), quotes a "synopsis of a decree by the Emperor," issued in 1792, after the war, in which the following passage occurs :—"On the whole [the Gurkhas'] submission is more humble than that of the usurping King of Annam, and perhaps, hearing of his recent visit to Peking, they may be induced also to come later on. Under these circumstances I will pardon them and withdraw As matters stand, the success is not such that I can celebrate a formal triumph in the temple. If, therefore, the plunder taken at Tashilhumpo is returned, with Shamarpi's corpse and retainers, you may accept their offers. They can send tribute on the same footing as Annam, Siam, Burma, and Korea." Some further light is thrown on the point by a memorial addressed in 1842 by the Gurkha King to the Emperor, in very submissive terms (translated by Imbault-Huart and quoted by Lévi, *op. cit.* i, 188), in which is quoted an Imperial decree addressed to the Gurkha King in 1793, as follows: "Vous êtes souverain d'un petit État; vous viendrez à la cour une fois tous les cinq ans. S'il y a des gens du dehors qui vous troublent ou envahissent votre territoire, vous pourrez rédiger un placet pour porter ces faits à ma connaissance; j'y enverrai alors des hommes et des chevaux ou je vous ferai don d'une certaine somme d'argent pour vous venir en aide. Respectez ceci."

In the same year a Gurkha mission took the tribute to Peking. In 1799 the Gurkha King, Ran Bahadur, asked for and received Royal rank for his son and eventual successor. But the general policy of China seems to have been one of indifference; and, perhaps in consequence of the injunction given by the Emperor Kien-lung to his successor in 1796—not to intervene in the affairs of Nepal without absolute necessity (Lévi, i, 181)—they rejected appeals for help on various occasions. In 1815, according to Parker (*l.c.*, p. 78), who unfortunately does not state his authority, "When the Nepalese tried to force China's hand by saying that the English would probably disapprove of tribute being sent to China, the Emperor said [*i.e.*, to the Amban at Lhassa]: 'Tell them you dare not report this language to me. As a matter of fact they can join the Feringhi rule if they like, so long as they send us tribute, and so long as the Feringhi do not cross the Tangut frontier.'" Tribute was sent in 1813, 1818, 1822, 1837 (when it was sent in the name of the Rani, and refused as coming from a woman). In 1842 the Nepalese King, in the memorial referred to above, sought to hold China to the promises of help given in 1793, but the Emperor extricated himself from all of them (text quoted in Lévi, p. 191). In 1856, after a series of aggressions on Thibet, Nepal concluded a treaty with that country, in the preamble of which, as it appears in Aitchison, ii, 97, the words occur: "We further agree that the Emperor of China is to be obeyed by both States as before." The Prime Minister of Nepal having recently challenged the accuracy of this translation, a revised translation has been prepared by Major O'Connor, in which

the passage appears: "Both parties, paying respect as always before to the Chinese Emperor," &c. In 1858 the Prime Minister received a mandarin's button and the title "General in Chief of the Army, truly brave Prince and Prime Minister." (Lévi, i, 185, who says that it was also borne by his successor, Bir Shamsher Jung. Wright, "History of Nepal," p. 66, gives the date as 1873.)

Reference has been made above to the story derived from Chinese records of a Nepalese mission to China at the close of the earlier and successful war of 1788. This story (which also appears in "Cheng vou tsi," *l.c.*, p. 361) is confirmed by the Nepalese memorial already referred to, which was sent to Lord Cornwallis in 1792. The memorial does not of course mention the Chinese general's "explanation," nor does it explain why a mission was sent. It merely says that, after the evacuation of Thibet by the Gurkhas, "the Gurkha sent a deputation, consisting of Hurry and Bhulbudder Khuwâs and five-and-twenty others, with presents and an 'arzee' [memorial] to the Emperor of China." The deputation remained forty-five days at Peking and was received fifteen times. Finally, "they were all honourably dismissed with suitable presents, and charged with a firman to the Gurkha conveying to him a title and dignity, together with a splendid dress and honourable presents." (Kirkpatrick, p. 343.)

It appears, therefore, on the evidence of both parties, that the first mission to Peking was the result of a victorious and not of a disastrous campaign, and this is worth bearing in mind. Whether or not the nature of the mission was misrepresented to the Emperor by the Chinese general, the fact remains that it was first sent by the Gurkhas in the hour of victory; and from the mere fact that such a mission was sent, bearing presents and bringing back presents and a title, no admission of dependence can necessarily be inferred.

But whatever the origin of the custom, there is no doubt that it is firmly established. More than once, however, it has been pretermitted. Thus it is said that, owing to the unfavourable reception which it received at Peking in 1852, relations between Nepal and China were interrupted, and no mission was sent until 1866, when, however, owing to the disturbed state of the intervening country, it did not succeed in reaching Peking (Elles, "Report on Nepal," p. 38). Again, in 1900, owing to famine in Shansi and Shensi, the Chinese were not prepared to find the necessary transport, and requested the Nepalese Government not to send the mission. In 1895 the wording of the Nepalese letter presented by the mission was brought to the notice of Her Majesty's Government by the British Minister at Peking (Sir N. O'Conor). He pointed out that the ruler of Nepal "is therein represented as the devoted and submissive vassal of the Emperor of China," and added:—

"The uncertainty at present attaching to the political condition of China appears to me to render it of importance that the relations between Nepal and China should be clearly defined, and that a shadowy claim of suzerainty should not be interpreted as constituting a real state of vassalage." (No. 164 of the 30th April, 1895.)

Lord Salisbury shared this view, and after it had been ascertained from the Government of India (Lord G. Hamilton's Secret despatch of the 12th July, 1895; Government of India's Secret letter of the 10th September, 1895) that the language used was traditional, and was believed to date from the end of the eighteenth century, Her Majesty's Minister at Peking was instructed to speak to the Chinese Government. He accordingly visited the Tsung-li Yamên on the 20th December, 1895, "and took an opportunity of informing Prince Cheng and the other Ministers present that the submissive expressions in the letters from Nepal are not regarded by Her Majesty's Government as an acknowledgment of vassalage, or, indeed, as anything more than a purely formal and complimentary style of address. Weng Ta-jen observed to his colleagues that Nepal had for many years past been a tributary to China, and the Ministers exchanged some remarks upon the subject amongst themselves"; but Mr. Beauclerk "considered it advisable to allow the subject to drop without further discussion." (Mr. Beauclerk's despatch No. 508 of the 22nd December, 1895.)

As already mentioned, no mission was sent in 1900; but in 1905, when it was reported that the Amban at Lhassa had memorialised the Throne for permission to send the mission forward, the resident in Nepal asked the Maharajah what were the facts. The Maharajah replied in writing that the "high-flown language" of the Amban's memorial (in which Nepal was spoken of as "a dependency beyond the borders of China," whose "tribes have always displayed a loyal devotion to the Throne") "does not correctly represent the actual, but rather undefined, relations"

existing between Nepal and China. He explained that "the practice of sending a mission was inaugurated soon after the war between this country and China in 1792 A.D., and this practice has since been kept up more for its commercial advantages than for anything else. The few presents which the mission carries to Peking, are not of much value, and certainly not in the nature of tribute. The customary letter which is sent on the occasion is written in the truly oriental style of exuberant but meaningless politeness and follows a stereotyped rule. They are merely a means for the party to gain access into the country under very advantageous circumstances, and to dispose of, with very great profit, the large quantity of goods which they take with them. It may be known to you that all goods belonging to the party are carried free from our frontier to Peking and back by the transport provided by the Chinese Government, which also provides our men, free, with all necessaries on the road. It has very little political significance, and I wonder therefore, to find in the said enclosure, the presents described as a tribute from Nepal. In the letter to the Emperor it is distinctly written, the word 'saugat,' which means 'present.' Moreover our relations with, and the trade and other facilities which we enjoy in, Thibet make it encumbent upon us to keep this harmless and friendly practice, as this country has a very considerable interest as well as various rights and privileges in the said country, commercial and otherwise." (Prime Minister of Nepal to Major Manners Smith, 19th April, 1906.)

The mission on this occasion seems to have been treated *en route* with scant courtesy by the Chinese provincial authorities, and the Nepalese envoy told Sir J. Jordan that "the question of continuing these missions appeared to him to be of doubtful utility, and he was reporting on the subject. Former missions had been largely in the nature of commercial speculations, and had proved very successful in this respect. Little profit was now to be made. On the whole he was now inclined to think that the mission was a relic of the past which might be discontinued, although the process should be a gradual one." (Sir J. Jordan's despatch No. 260, of 5th June, 1908. Before leaving Peking, however, he was "less disposed than on a previous occasion to advocate the discontinuance of these missions. He spoke of them as a 'harmless and friendly practice,' and considered them of some use in promoting friendly relations between Nepal and China in Thibet." (Sir J. Jordan's despatch No. 308, of 7th July, 1908. It should be noted that when the mission was received by the Emperor and Empress Dowager "the Ceremony of Kotow was not performed, nor does it seem to have ever been the custom as far as these missions are concerned." (Mr. Grant Jones's Memorandum of 5th July, 1908, enclosed in above.)

How little real significance attaches to such missions, and yet how jealously the Chinese cling to them, is illustrated by the history of the Burmah Mission. As soon as it was known that Her Majesty's Government intended to send an expedition to Burmah in 1885, the Chinese Government represented that Burmah was tributory to China, and in the negotiations that followed they were prepared to go to any lengths in recognising the annexation provided that their face was saved by the continuance of the decennial present-bearing mission which the Kings of Ava had sent to the Chinese Emperor. At first they accepted a proposal that the Emperor should nominate a Buddhist hierarch who should send the mission. This proved impracticable. It was then proposed that the Queen and the Emperor should exchange presents, but the Chinese rejected this, because "the Empress of India being the equal of the Emperor of China could not send tribute." As a compromise they suggested that the mission should be sent by the Local Government of Burmah. Her Majesty's Government accepted this, but when it came to drafting the convention, further difficulties arose. The draft put before the Chinese ran:—"England agrees that the highest authority shall continue to send the customary ten-yearly missions *sent from Burmah* to China"; but the Chinese insisted on substituting "sent with offerings" for the words in italics, and would not accept "presents" instead of "offerings." Her Majesty's Government then proposed "ten-yearly missions sent from Burmah to China in the customary manner," and the Chinese counter-proposed "In conformity with the old Burmese custom of sending offerings to China, England agrees that the highest authority in Burmah shall send a ten-yearly mission *with* articles of local produce," and it was explained that in the Chinese text the word "with" meant "to present." The formula finally adopted was "Inasmuch as it has been the practice of Burmah to send ten-yearly missions with articles of local produce, England agrees that the highest authority in Burmah shall send the customary ten-yearly missions." No mission was, in fact, ever sent, for, in consequence of the misbehaviour of the Chinese Government in other matters, it was decided to inform them in 1896 that owing to

altered circumstances the mission was abandoned. But the point is that Her Majesty's Government did not consider the payment by the Chief Commissioner of Burmah of what the Chinese doubtless still regarded as tribute to be inconsistent with the *status* of Burmah as a province of British India.

During the negotiations of 1886 the idea of tribute as understood by the Chinese was examined. Sir Robert Hart (who served as a private channel of communication between the Chinese and Her Majesty's Government) stated that the term was employed in Peking in three senses :—

1. Tribute proper, from fief to liege, with investiture, *e.g.*, Corea.
2. Limited tribute, periodically sent, but without investiture, *e.g.*, Burmah.
3. Any present from a foreign Government to the Chinese Emperor, *e.g.*, from England.

"First is dependent, and must be protected; second is independent, and can claim assistance; third will always have sympathy. (Mr. Neel's Memorandum, Chap. i, p. 9). Nepal would presumably be claimed as belonging to the second category. Colonel Yule gave the following list of States sending tribute to Peking (from the collection of administrative statutes of the reigning dynasty called Tchou-khe thsing-li ssê) :—

1. Corea.
2. Loochoo.
3. Tonking.
4. Cochin-China.
5. Siam.
6. The Philippine Islands.
7. Holland (*i.e.*, perhaps Batavia).
8. Ava.
9. The Kingdom of Europe (*sic*).

And, he added, "this list in itself seems a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Chinese claims." (*Ib.*, Appendix (C), p. 5.) The list, it will be seen, with all its absurdity, does not include Nepal. On the other hand, in the Imperial decree quoted above (p. 2) Nepal is put, as regards tribute, on the same footing as Annam, Siam, Burmah, and Corea.

Colonel Yule also quoted a remark of Professor Douglas's which is probably applicable to the Nepalese tribute also :—

"I suspect that both the Chinese and Burmese courts are deceived as to the political relations implied by the presents interchanged; the Chinese believing that the presents they receive from Burmah are tribute, and that those which they send are given as a token of patronage, and the Burmese believing that the exchange is such as should pass between equals." (*Ib.*, Appendix (E), p. 12.)

F. A. H.

November 4, 1910.

ADDENDUM.

With reference to the remark of the Chinese Emperor in 1815, quoted on p. 4, Professor E. H. Parker writes to me (6th November, 1910) :—

"The passage occurs in the 1st moon of 1816, on the 'jên-yin' day of the 60-day cycle—probably about the end of February. The Emperor Kia-k'ing upbraids (in a homily addressed to his courtiers) the stupidity of the residents (Kia-ming and another) in making the answer they did to the Gurkhas' plea that 'if we surrender to the "Pi-leng," they will not allow us to send tribute to the Celestial Dynasty.' The Emperor says: 'What they ought to say (or have said) is,' and he proceeds to draft an imaginary reply."

Here follows Chinese text and word-for-word translation, which Professor Parker renders freely :—

"(The resident is directed to say, or told he should have said): 'If you really end by giving in your submission to the "Pi-leng," the Imperial Dynasty will anyhow

ignore the matter; but the great thing is that, whenever the periodical tribute date arrives, you must send in your tribute in accordance with law-precedent.'

"This is taken from the 'Tung-hwa-luh,' a book which gives the Emperor's own words for everything, even if other people's words are quoted by him. No doubt the India Office has an officer at its disposal, and, if so, that officer will find a complete history of British-Nepal affairs in the 'Tung-hwa-luh.'

"P.S.—Mr. Rockhill has a theory that 'Pi-leng' does not mean 'Feringhi'; but as, anyway, he makes it mean 'foreigners,' the etymological point does not in the least affect the point that here it means the British [rule in India]."

Professor Parker in another letter (dated the 9th November) explains that the decree of 1792, quoted on p. 4, also comes from the "Tung-hwa-luh," and that it is certainly genuine. The "Tung-hwa-luh" (= "Eastern Flowery Transcript" or "Manchurian Dynasty Record") contains 250 years of Chinese history day by day down to 1874; it was written more or less contemporaneously, and the last instalment, 1874–1908, is expected shortly. The quotation from Rockhill on p. 1 about the agreement of 1788 also comes from it.

Professor Parker also sends an extract from the official Peking Court Circular of the 19th October, 1910, which he translates as follows:—

"The Thibet resident memoralises: The Gurkha King having respectfully received the command-letter sends in and submits his thank-expressions-document." Imperial rescript "All right."

This doubtless refers to the Maharajah's letter on the return of the mission from Peking, and it would seem that the variation from the traditional forms of expression had not attracted the Amban's attention at all events.

[45229] No. 194.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.

(No. 441.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1910.

THE Secretary of State for India has had under his consideration the note from the Wai-wu Pu, enclosed in Mr. Max Müller's despatch No. 399 of the 3rd ultimo, in which the Chinese Government put forward a definite claim that both Nepal and Bhutan should properly be regarded as vassal States of China.

The Earl of Crewe is of opinion that the terms of this note are such as to call for an "equally specific and clear statement in reply," and I have accordingly to request that you will inform the Wai-wu Pu that, while His Majesty's Government have no desire to interrupt the present friendly and complimentary relations existing between Nepal and China, they must themselves act and advise the Nepalese Government to act upon the assumption that Nepal is not a vassal, but wholly independent of China, and in intimate relations with the British Government in accordance with the treaties and the mutual understanding agreed upon between them.

With regard to Bhutan, you should say that His Majesty's Government must insist on the observance of the procedure laid down by them, and that communications addressed otherwise than through them will not be acknowledged. The treaty recently concluded by Bhutan of her own free will has now been communicated to the Chinese Government, who have therefore no excuse for ignoring the relations formally established between that country and His Majesty's Government. That treaty puts Bhutan, as far as the conduct of its foreign relations is concerned, on the same footing with Sikkim, whose status is recognised by the Wai-wu Pu.

You may add that these views of His Majesty's Government are not new, and do not portend any change in our attitude either to the States concerned or to China. But the assertion of them in unmistakable terms has been rendered necessary by the recent development of Chinese policy in Thibet, involving the temporary overturn of stable Government in that country, and the dispatch of Chinese troops in the direction of the frontiers of India and her allies. His Majesty's Government have recognised China's interests in Thibet, and have been unwilling to embarrass her in any action there so long as she adheres to her own pledges and does not prevent the Thibetan Government from fulfilling its treaty obligations. But no attempt of the Chinese Government to exercise influence over States so remote from the sphere of direct

Chinese interests and in such close relations with the Government of India as Nepal and Bhutan can possibly be tolerated.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46899] No. 195.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Earl of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 8th December, 1910, relative to the situation in Thibet.

India Office, December 28, 1910.

Enclosure 1 in No. 195.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *November* 24, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to state that recent paragraphs in the press indicate that Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.I.E., has advocated publicly on two or three occasions the posting of both British and Russian agents at Lhassa, and will probably advocate it also in his forthcoming book regarding Thibet. I write, therefore, merely to express a hope that, should the question of such posting ever be considered by the Government of India, I may be given an opportunity of expressing my views, before it is decided. Such arguments as I have seen adduced in favour of the proposal appear to be based on a misreading of the present political situation, and the proposal itself to be contrary to our interests.

2. The Dalai Lama has seen references to it in the newspapers, and is hopeful, therefore, of bringing it about. It would, of course, be in the interests of Thibet, as it is always in the interest of such States to foment disputes between their powerful neighbours.

Enclosure 2 in No. 195.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Darjeeling, November* 25, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with the telegram dated the 7th November, 1910, from the British trade agent, Yatung, to my address, and repeated to you regarding the mission of certain Mongolians to the Dalai Lama to invite the latter to return to Thibet.

2. It appears that these Mongolians can show no authorisation from the Mongolian people, and that the Lama has no intention of returning to Thibet on their invitation. The Thibetan Ministers believe that their mission has been arranged by the amban at Lhassa.

Enclosure 3 in No. 195.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Darjeeling, November* 25, 1910.

IN continuation of the correspondence resting with my letter dated the 15th November, 1910, I have the honour to state that Mr. Lo Changchi called on the Dalai Lama on the 11th November, and informed the latter that, under orders of the Wai-wu Pu, he was going back to Thibet, as he was not authorised to discuss all the matters mentioned in the Dalai Lama's letter of the 20th October, 1910. The Lama asked Mr. Lo to give him a letter stating all the facts mentioned above, and in consequence Mr. Lo gave a letter to the Dalai Lama. A translation of the letter in question is submitted herewith.

Enclosure 4 in No. 195.

Respectfully submitted to His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

From Lo-Tao-tai, bearing the official title of a Tsan-nung, officer in Thibet, on the recommendation of the Chun-jetru and favoured with nomination to be appointed Chünjé-tru afterwards.

(In detail.)

BEGGING to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from your Holiness, the Dalai Lama of Thibet, dated the 28th day of the 9th month of the 2nd year of Shöntong's reign (30th October, 1910), the contents of which need not be reiterated here. In this your Holiness has said that although I have, during my interviews with your Holiness's self, and the Ministers each in turn, given many promises with a view to obtain an amicable settlement, yet it was quite clear that it would be hopeless to expect that the main question of the independence and integrity of Thibet would remain as in the past. Your Holiness therefore asked me for a speedy answer as to whether I am authorised to discuss this point, and if not, to forward your Holiness's letter in original to the Emperor of China, if I thought it necessary to do so, with my own report thereon. I, the Tao-tai, have after careful perusal of the same telegraphed the important points of your Holiness's letter to the Wai-wu Pu, and the Wai-wu Pu on the 7th day of the 10th month (9th November, 1910) has, by telegraph, ordered me to inform your Holiness that I am ordered to return to Lhassa. This I have done during my interview with your Holiness on the day before yesterday. I again entreat your Holiness the Dalai Lama to fulfil my earnest hope by returning to Thibet soon.

I entreat your Holiness to bear this at heart. Submitted respectfully on this the 12th day of the 10th month of the 2nd year of Shöntong's reign (14th November, 1910).

(Seal of Lo-Tao-tai.)

Enclosure 5 in No. 195.

Mr. Bell to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Darjeeling, November* 26, 1910.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with my letter dated the 15th instant, regarding the proposed visit of the Dalai Lama to England.

2. At recent interviews with the Lama and his Ministers they informed me that the party is likely to number twenty to thirty. I do not know the attitude of the Government of India towards the visit, but I thought it right to remind the Lama and the Ministers that the reply of our Government on their case was perfectly clear, and that His Holiness would have to undergo some discomforts on board ship, &c., and that the journey and stay in England might entail conditions which devout Thibetans would regard as derogatory to the dignity of His Holiness. It appears that the Ministers had also told the Lama that in their opinion the journey was arduous and not without danger and had urged that some of them should go and leave the Lama in Darjeeling. The latter, however, has evidently made up his mind to go himself. His idea is that, as he has come to Darjeeling to represent the case of the Thibetans, so it is his business to push the case to the end, and that his personal representations will have more weight than those of his Ministers. No considerations of discomfort, danger, or loss of dignity appear to influence him, and once he has made his mind up he seldom changes it.

3. The party think also that the Chinese Government, knowing they have gone to England and fearing possible complications, may instruct the Chinese Minister in London to promise them some improvement in the present political position. As regards their representation to His Majesty's Government, they appear to think that the latter is continually misled by false representations about their case from the Chinese Government, and that, if they can get into direct touch with His Majesty's Government, they will be better able to combat these false representations.

4. They expect to start in about a month's time, but cannot do so until they can

get the necessary silver, &c., to defray the expenses of the journey and of the stay in England. They hope to have to remain there only one or two months, but are prepared to remain longer, if they can thereby achieve anything. The silver, &c., they say, is being brought from Thibet secretly by different persons, who are taking devious ways, so as to escape the Chinese soldiers posted on the roads. They put no faith in the amban's promise that he will not stop their supplies.

5. The Dalai Lama and his Ministers are evidently very anxious that I should accompany them on the ground that I speak Thibetan, know them personally, and understand the history of their case and the general political position of Thibet.

6. I would enquire what attitude I should adopt towards the proposed visit. The Dalai Lama has asked me when the reply of the Government of India to their proposal will be received. I do not see that we can prevent them going, but it is clearly desirable that we should keep a close watch on them to prevent intrigues with foreign Powers as far as possible. I shall be very glad to accompany them, if the Government of India think this desirable.

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Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Tibet Part XIII 1910. Apr. 1912. TS Political and Secret Department Records: Series 20: Political and Secret Department Library (1757-1952): Foreign Office Prints (1843-1937) IOR/L/PS/20/FO87/2. British Library. China and the Modern World, link.gale.com/apps/doc/YWUSXC745117564/CFER?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-CFER&xid=77d9c90d&pg=1. Accessed 21 Apr. 2022.